Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW2983
2009-12-10 12:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

DUMA FOREIGN AFFAIRS CHAIRMAN WARNS START

Tags:  PREL PARM PGOV RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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O 101231Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5626
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002983 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM PGOV RS
SUBJECT: DUMA FOREIGN AFFAIRS CHAIRMAN WARNS START
RATIFICATION NOT AUTOMATIC

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002983

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM PGOV RS
SUBJECT: DUMA FOREIGN AFFAIRS CHAIRMAN WARNS START
RATIFICATION NOT AUTOMATIC

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) In a December 7 meeting with Ambassador Beyrle,
Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachev
claimed that an "unequal" START follow-on treaty would
expose President Medvedev to criticism from deputies from
the Communist Party (KPRF),many of whom have direct
expertise in arms control issues given their military
backgrounds or as "red directors" in the defense sector.
As an example, he cited Communist deputy Yuli Kvitskinskiy,
a renowned Soviet arms negotiator from the 1980s. Such
deputies, Kosachev said, do not trust America and will be
very tough on the treaty.


2. (C) The Duma, Kosachev continued, can in many cases be
considered to be "in the pocket" of the Medvedev-Putin
leadership, given the strength in parliament of the United
Russia party. But on this issue, he said, "it's not like
that. If the text is not equal, then it will be easy to
whip up opposition." For this reason, he said, Medvedev
and the Russian negotiating team need to be hard-nosed in
the discussions on remaining issues such as telemetry and
verification. The Ambassador reaffirmed that the U.S.
wants this treaty to serve as a stepping stone to
additional arms control agreements on fissile material and
testing and that we are interested in serious cooperation
on developing missile defense. At the same time, the U.S.
side is also facing congressional pressure and therefore is
insistent on maintaining the successful transparency and
verification mechanisms of the earlier treaty.


3. (C) Asked about Putin's role in the negotiations,
Kosachev said he is informed about the developments and he
offers his observations, but the final decisions rest with
Medvedev. In addition to making the decisions, he added,
Medvedev takes final responsibility.


4. (C) On the ratification timetable, Kosachev said the
Duma would like to synchronize its action as much as
possible with the U.S. Senate and he intends to remain in
close contact with the Senate and with his counterparts on
HFAC as the treaty is being considered in both capitals.
He also noted that, before introduction in the Duma,
treaties must undergo a time-consuming legal review by the
Justice Ministry, a process that takes a minimum of three
months, even with the Russian president expediting the
work. He welcomed the offer by A/S Gottemoeller to visit
Moscow in the coming months to answer deputies' questions
about the treaty.

COMMENT
--------------


5. (C) Kosachev is an experienced operator who recently
met with the negotiating teams in Geneva; he understands
the Washington legislative process well and recognizes the
scrutiny any treaty will be subject to in the Senate. His
comments about difficulties in the Duma, therefore, were
probably mainly intended to create a perception of
meaningful legislative pressure in order to justify tough
Russian negotiating positions. The GOR, in fact,
establishes its positions without reference to views in the
Duma because, despite what Kosachev may claim, ratification
is not in doubt. KPRF opposition is certainly a
possibility, but its virulence will be determined more by
internal politics than by the content of the treaty.
Beyrle