Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW2619
2009-10-21 11:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

POPULAR PUTIN CAN'T HELP GOVERNOR AND UNITED

Tags:  PREL PGOV PMAR PHUM PINR ECON EFIN RS 
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DE RUEHMO #2619/01 2941128
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 211128Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5163
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002619 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PMAR PHUM PINR ECON EFIN RS
SUBJECT: POPULAR PUTIN CAN'T HELP GOVERNOR AND UNITED
RUSSIA IN SARATOV

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan M. Elliott; reasons 1
.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002619

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PMAR PHUM PINR ECON EFIN RS
SUBJECT: POPULAR PUTIN CAN'T HELP GOVERNOR AND UNITED
RUSSIA IN SARATOV

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan M. Elliott; reasons 1
.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: A two-day visit to the upper Volga city of
Saratov gave us the opportunity to hear about the "power
vertical," by which federal government and United Russia
political party authorities exercise control over
oblast-level activities. The very top-down approach to
decision-making has created immense frustration among city
officials, party and NGO leaders with regional officials.
They universally denounced the haughty manner in which
regional officials ignore opposition voices. City of Saratov
authorities have managed to build broad networks of
consultation with opposition parties and NGO's, earning them
respect from those groups. Even United Russia leaders
acknowledged that the malfeasance of the current governor has
been so damaging that only his replacement (expected in
March, 2010) could possibly change public perceptions. The
change in leadership should allow city and oblast leaders to
benefit from the overwhelming regional popularity of PM Putin
(and to a lesser extent, President Medvedev). End Summary.

Moscow's Influence Strongly Felt
--------------


2. (C) Meetings with government, opposition and NGO leaders
during a September 30-October 1 visit to the upper Volga
River region city of Saratov revealed little concern for the
economic crisis. They painted a picture of frustration with
the control national government and political authorities
from Moscow exercise over regional decision making. The
legacy of Saratov's past status as a closed Soviet city with
a concentration of defense industries whose interactions with
other Soviet regions was minimized means that, even 18 years
after the USSR ceased to exist, the city has few business
connections with other Russian cities, and has been passed
over for investment by a number of foreign firms.


3. (C) Saratov resident contacts we met bemoaned the
inability of regional authorities to take decisions that

would enhance the oblast's prospects. "Week in Saratov"
deputy editor Olga Kopsheva told us that no entrepreneurs,
least of all from Saratov itself, were interested in
investment while the current, corrupt leadership remained in
power, and while it was clear that a political transition was
starting. Saratov Governor Pavel Ipatev, appointed by Putin
in 2005, has been incapable of placing the oblast's interests
ahead of his own financial ones. The icing on the cake came
when the city's sewer and water delivery systems imploded
during the summer, leaving residents without safe drinking
water or waste disposal options for weeks. Public anger
boiled over at Ipatev, whose administration had received
substantial federal funding for such infrastructure
improvement projects. Citizens demanded accountability for
money spend on clearly shoddy work. Even for United Russia,
this was the last straw after years of mismanagement,
signaling the opening of local, intra-party competition to
replace Ipatev.


4. (C) Moscow's influence is keenly felt in Saratov. United
Russia National Presidium Secretary Vyacheslav Volodin hails
from Saratov and remains involved in oblast-level personnel
decisions. With Governor Ipatev focused on his financial
interests in Russia and abroad, including in Abkhazia,
Volodin's influence is at times considered positive, but is
generally resented. A few local newspapers, including "Week
in Saratov," write extensively on the governor and regional
corruption. They have not encountered difficulties from
security forces for doing so, also indicating intra-party
disapproval with the governor. Local government and
political party officials argued that Volodin has been upset
by the fact that high approval ratings in the oblast for
Putin and Medvedev have not helped United Russia, whose
popular support hovers at 40 percent. He has therefore taken
to intervening from Moscow to try to keep the local party
organization from splintering.

United Russia: Taking No Chances
--------------


5. (C) United Russia official Artur Zabbarov told us that
tensions are palpable between regional and city, and regional
and national, party officials, which he ascribed to
shortcomings of the governor's leadership and to resentment
over Volodin's long-distance involvement in local matters.
The oblast, he said, was now quietly preparing for the

MOSCOW 00002619 002 OF 003


post-Ipatev period. When the governor goes, the new team
will be assembled by Volodin, he claimed. Local United
Russia officials resent that their influence
locally/regionally is limited by Volodin's involvement, he
confided. He also noted that Volodin has lent his private
support to increasing the stature and resources available to
"Molodaya Gvardia" in the oblast to the detriment of "Nashi"
there. Molodaya is playing a key role in putting forth a
public image of United Russia as committed to modern
development of Russian interests and to helping citizens in
need.


6. (C) The local party has devoted itself to preparing for
regional-level inter-party debates that they expect to be
started after the United Russia party congress in November.
Confirming what we've heard from national leaders in Moscow,
Zabbarov told us that the debates were necessary to infuse at
least some competition into an otherwise stagnant political
environment, but that they carried a risk for United Russia.
Speaking frankly, he said that no one in United Russia's
Saratov branch is able to present a coherent argument or to
address the kind of criticism or attacks that are to be
expected in a constructive debate. A major effort has been
launched at coaching senior officials, including the Speaker
of the Oblast Duma, who he contended was the favorite to
replace Ipatev.

Opposition: Going Nowhere Fast
--------------


7. (C) In spite of the limited opportunities to engage with
the oblast administration, opposition parties work closely at
the city level with United Russia officials and civil
servants, and have their respect. Pravoe Delo leader Igor
Tanatin is a case in point. He has a long track record of
working in the liberal opposition, and currently serves as an
aide to one of the last Union of Right Forces (SPS) deputies
in the regional Duma. He was praised for his
constructiveness by United Russia and other local and
regional government leaders. But he told us that the
disarray within Pravoe Delo (successor to SPS) at the
national level had hurt his chances of any local electoral
success. He also bemoaned a growing apathy on the part of
citizens who were more focused on personal lives than on
public service or on organizing to try to translate their
dissatisfaction into political representation and policy
change.


8. (C) Yabloko in Saratov is saddled with the legacy of the
1990's. It no longer has any elected representatives in the
oblast or city legislatures. Rather, Saratov regional party
Chief of Staff Mariya Sazonova has focused on bringing
together a range of special interests, ranging from
environmental to human rights (including every member of the
local branch of Soldiers' Mothers group). Solidarity local
organizer Aleksey Bityutskiy told us that he and other
activists are working at the grass roots to help citizens
challenge government or business decisions that adversely
affect housing, environmental or educational conditions.
They have engaged lawyers to offer free legal services to low
income citizens. He described any direct political
confrontation with regional authorities as futile in the
short term, hoping that over time citizens would turn against
United Russia.

Local Authorities Focus on Results
--------------


9. (C) Saratov City officials painted a positive picture of
the town's prospects. Head of the Department of NGO,
Political Party, and Religious Organization Cooperation Pavel
Grishchenko, who has visited the U.S. three times in the last
5 years (Dallas, Texas is Saratov's sister city),spoke of
the importance of working with any group ready to contribute
to improving life in Saratov. His views were echoed by
Public Chamber Chairman Mikhail Shmyrev and several of his
Chamber members, who told us that they worked hard to build
networks among different kinds of organizations. Their work
in the city of Saratov was praised by activists, including
those from Solidarity. And their comments outlining an
inclusive approach to problem solving confirmed comments from
NGO and party officials, including United Russia, contrasting
local and regional administrations. Contacts told us that
city-level bureaucrats seem to be selected more on the basis
of their qualifications, while oblast-level bureaucrats get
their jobs on the basis of connections or recommendations.

MOSCOW 00002619 003 OF 003


That difference further influences public perceptions of
effective government (at the city level) versus incompetent
government at the oblast level, which citizen's link back to
corrupt Governor Ipatev.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Saratov is in a holding pattern until March of 2010,
uncertain who will lead it after that point, and uncertain
whether, and to what extent, United Russia's Volodin will
continue to be involved with local and regional matters from
Moscow. United Russia expects their approval ratings to jump
once Ipatev is replaced and they are preparing to take on the
opposition in public debates, hoping that Putin's (and
Medvedev's) popularity will help them.
Beyrle