Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW2579
2009-10-14 15:36:00
SECRET
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):

Tags:  JCIC KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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DE RUEHMO #2579/01 2871536
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 141536Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5076
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0307
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0354
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5390
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 6832
S E C R E T MOSCOW 002579 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD (P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO--N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2034
TAGS: JCIC KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):
(U) PLENARY MEETING, OCTOBER 12, 2009

Classified By: Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T MOSCOW 002579

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD (P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO--N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2034
TAGS: JCIC KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):
(U) PLENARY MEETING, OCTOBER 12, 2009

Classified By: Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-MOS-001.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 12, 2009
Time: 10:05 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.
Place: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The first meeting of the two delegations to the START
Follow-on (SFO) Treaty negotiations during the latest round
in Moscow was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
October 12, 2009. A/S Gottemoeller and AMB Antonov discussed
the importance of the upcoming negotiating session in Geneva
and agreed on the need to intensify work in order to resolve
outstanding issues. Antonov confirmed his government's
support for work already done by the delegations, noting in
particular President Medvedev's approval of these efforts.
Gottemoeller noted high level U.S. Government interest and
involvement in this work, and stressed the tasking she had
received from senior U.S. leaders to finish all work on the
treaty before the START expires on December 5.


4. (S) Gottemoeller asked Antonov to explain, with regard
to both philosophical and substantive grounds, the omission
of a number of START provisions from the Russian-proposed SFO
Treaty text. Antonov requested a list of those provisions to
facilitate a Russian response. Antonov admitted that Russia
may have misread the current U.S. Administration's position
on disarmament and thus may have to revise the degree to
which the Russian-proposed text has simplified START
provisions, although this would be only after discussion
among the experts. On telemetry, Antonov continued to make

the argument that the U.S. proposal on telemetry could be
used to the detriment of the Russian Federation and that the
U.S. had not yet explained the need for access to the other
side's telemetry. He also complained about the U.S.
excessive constraints on mobile ICBMs, which he claimed was
not based on reciprocity. Finally, the agenda for the
remaining two days of meetings was discussed and agreed. End
Summary.

-------------- -
STOCKTAKING OF INTERSESSIONAL WORK IN CAPITALS
-------------- -


5. (S) AMB Antonov welcomed A/S Gottemoeller and the U.S.
delegation to the MFA and offered his congratulations to
President Obama for his selection as recipient of the Nobel
Peace Prize. Widely smiling, he added that this award would
likely make things more difficult for the U.S. delegation
during the START Follow-on Treaty negotiations. He indicated
that the next two weeks of negotiations in Geneva will
determine whether it would be possible to conclude a new
treaty before START expires, and noted that the results of
the previous session had been reported to President Medvedev,
who had expressed his support for the results already
achieved. Antonov confirmed that the Russian delegation was
prepared to intensify its work, commenting that it was very
important that approaches that are based on matters of
principle be addressed as rapidly as possible.


6. (S) Antonov said that Gottemoeller's ten key SFO Treaty
issues (provided earlier) had been carefully examined by the
Russian side and expressed his hope that the U.S. side had
worked as hard to address Russian concerns, adding that

without real movement on key points it would be very
difficult in Geneva. In order to begin this process, it was
necessary to know what was the goal of the U.S. approach. He
noted that there were still some "debts" owed by the U.S.
side: a draft text on notifications; a U.S. response to the
Russian proposed Joint Statement on Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Ukraine; and a U.S. response on the proposed JCIC agreement
concerning Votkinsk, commenting that, in connection with this
third item, Taylor and Koshelev should be instructed to
finish work on this agreement very quickly.


7. (S) Antonov then turned to "homework" done by the
Russian side since the last Geneva round, mentioning that his
military experts would be making a presentation later in the
week and remarking that he hoped that the U.S. side would be
able to make a presentation on the U.S. approach to counting
as well. In particular, Antonov remarked that it would be
useful to know how the U.S. had evaluated the results of the
recent session and what decisions had been made.


8. (S) Gottemoeller stated that she generally had the same
view as that expressed by Antonov concerning the fundamental
importance of their work. She mentioned that, during the
past week in Washington, she had found a very significant and
high level of interest, including by President Obama, noting
that both Secretary Clinton and U/S Tauscher were highly
involved and interested in the SFO Treaty effort. She said
that she and Antonov should talk about how to prepare for the
Clinton-Lavrov and Tauscher-Ryabkov meetings over the next
two days, in order to have a coordinated approach. She
thanked Antonov for his words of congratulations on President
Obama's selection as a Nobel laureate, adding that Antonov
had been very timely on Friday morning in making this same
comment during their telephone conversation. She recalled
that President Obama had made the comment that this award was
about the future, which meant that the successful results of
these negotiations need to be an important part of that
future. Gottemoeller noted that the future has an elastic
quality to it: it could be the near, medium, or far distant
future, and the quality of that elasticity depends upon the
pace of work of their two delegations.


9. (S) Gottemoeller remarked that the U.S. delegation had
received the same sort of very serious tasking from
Washington, which was to complete all of its work on the
treaty by December 5. She stressed that the next few weeks
of work will be decisive, not only that done in capitals but
also during the next round in Geneva. She recounted that the
U.S. delegation had made very careful preparation in
Washington, and she was glad to hear that the same had
occurred in Moscow. She said that the two sides were in
agreement as to what should be done during the meetings in
Moscow: she intended to talk about the Joint Statement on
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as well as about Votkinsk,
and that, with respect to Votkinsk, she had already talked
with Taylor and Brown about final conforming of the
respective texts on that matter. Concerning the
notifications text, she reported that she had heard from
(U.S. delegation member and Notification WG chairman) Siemon
that it will still take some input from the U.S. members of
the Inspection Protocol and the Elimination Protocol working
groups before that text could be finalized.

--------------
U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR THE MOSCOW MEETINGS
--------------


10. (S) Concerning additional objectives for the Moscow
meetings, Gottemoeller said that she wanted to go through the
treaty text and raise some questions, adding that the Russian

side might have some questions as well to pose to the U.S.
side. As to the work of the military experts on both sides,
she noted that Dr. Warner would be ready to make a
presentation regarding counting rules issues, and it would be
good if the military experts could meet separately to do some
work on these matters, either on Tuesday morning or in the
afternoon during the plenary session, after the meeting
between the foreign ministers was over.


11. (S) Antonov responded that for twenty years he had been
chastised for not having any young diplomats working in the
arms control field and joked that he had now brought them in
to show them how not to work. He then went through a
proposed agenda for the three days in Moscow: a meeting on
October 12 from 1000 to 1200; a meeting on October 13 from
1600 to 1800; and a meeting on October 14 from 1000 to 1300,
followed by a buffet lunch for the two delegations and for
U.S. Embassy officials, until 1430. Returning to
Gottemoeller's suggestion about having the military experts
meet separately, Antonov acknowledged that, of course, the
experts could speak without the participation of the heads of
delegation, but he noted that there was a great interest in
his delegation to take part in the discussion of counting
rules, so he proposed that it be done during the October 13
plenary meeting, although it would probably be in his
absence. At the October 14 meeting, his intent was to speak
about the results achieved in the course of the two days and
to discuss how to structure their joint work for the next
round in Geneva.


12. (S) Antonov asked whether it was possible to have
Taylor and Brown address the Votkinsk issue at this point;
Gottemoeller demurred, saying that it could be done on the
following day. Antonov then agreed to start with a review of
the treaty text, to allow the U.S. side to raise questions,
or to start with the Joint Statement, leaving the choice to
Gottemoeller,

--------------
DISCUSSION OF RUSSIAN "OMISSIONS"
--------------


13. (S) Gottemoeller chose the option of going through the
SFO Treaty text, emphasizing that she would be interested in
any questions the Russian side might have as well. She
explained that there were two types of questions that she
would raise: the first were more or less of a general,
philosophical nature, while the second involved very specific
comments, particularly about Article V. Beginning with
Article II, Gottemoeller raised the issue of the Russian
approach to counting the various items to be limited under
the treaty. She noted that the two presidents had agreed to
two aggregate limits: a limit on deployed nuclear warheads
and a limit on deployed strategic delivery vehicles. The
Russians had recently introduced a third limit, on ICBM and
SLBM launchers, both deployed and non-deployed. She said that
she wanted to understand the rationale for this, and why the
Russian side went beyond what the presidents had agreed to in
the Joint Understanding issued at the July Summit in Moscow,
when there did not appear to be a need to do so.


14. (S) Antonov responded that this question dealt with the
"homework" that had been undertaken by the Russian side, and
that a presentation will be made on this subject later in the
week: the U.S. side had asked that the Russian military
experts make a presentation, and the experts were prepared to
do so on October 13. Turning to the point about
"philosophical" questions, he confirmed that what the
presidents had decided had to be implemented by the
delegations and that those decisions cannot be adjusted in

any way. He observed, however, that this question could also
be approached in a different way, which would be to say that
the delegations may develop those decisions in a creative
manner. He asserted that this was what the U.S. side had
done with respect to some of the Russian ideas. If the
presidents had said something in very concrete language, then
that has to be reflected specifically in the text, but that
does not mean that the two delegations have to be limited by
just what has been said by the presidents. If something that
was important for effective implementation is found, then it
should be proposed to the leaders.


15. (S) Antonov asserted that this principle was the basis
of the elaboration of the July 6 Joint Understanding: if
something was not included in that document, it did not mean
that it cannot be added later. He noted that the principal
difference between the two sides prior to agreement on the
Joint Understanding concerned counting rules, and that
difference still remained. He claimed that the Russian side
had taken a step towards the U.S. position in this regard by
focusing on deployed warheads rather than attribution of
warhead loadings, acknowledging that there were, in fact,
different schools of thought within the Russian delegation as
to whether this had been the right step to take, but it had
been taken, and it would not be walked back. Antonov
stressed that the Russian side would continue to move forward
and wanted to develop that idea and go further than START:
this was the reason for the additional limit on ICBM and SLBM
launchers. He acknowledged that there were, of course, other
reasons why this limit had been proposed and affirmed that
the October 13 presentation would be more specific. But the
objective had been to deal with this matter in order to be
able to move forward more quickly.


16. (S) Gottemoeller confirmed that the U.S. delegation was
looking forward to the Russian presentation on Tuesday and to
having the chance to elaborate U.S. views. She noted that
she had two sub questions that could help steer that
discussion:

- Could the Russian side clarify the relationship between the
launcher limit in Article II and the provisions in paragraph
3 of Article III: the idea that launchers can move easily
between being "deployed" and being "non-deployed." Would it
not be easier to use the U.S.-proposed concept of "ICBMs and
SLBMs with their associated launchers," commenting that the
U.S. side foresaw the complicated situation of the
requirement to notify changes between "deployed" and
"non-deployed": it would be more complicated than it needed
to be. She proposed that the Russian side consider using the
START concept of a launcher being "considered to contain" a
missile when that missile was temporarily removed, even when
that system is in effect not operational for a short period.

- The second sub question was a bit more straightforward: in
the Russian concept, is the relationship between the number
of delivery vehicles and the number of launchers constant?
In the current Russian proposal, the limit of delivery
vehicles is 500, while the number of launchers is 600. Will
the limit of ICBM and SLBM launchers always be 100 more than
the limit on strategic delivery vehicles?


17. (S) Antonov responded that he understood Gottemoeller's
question, remarking that she was talking about the limit of
500 on deployed delivery vehicles and on the limit of 600 for
both deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers.
Turning to Orlov, he stated that this issue will be
addressed, and expressed his thanks to Gottemoeller for
raising this specific question, commenting that this would
permit the MOD to prepare its answer for the coming meeting.

Orlov nodded in agreement.


18. (S) Gottemoeller then turned to Article IV, noting that
this article dealt mostly with issues related to non-deployed
mobile ICBMs, and acknowledging that the differences between
the two sides were well understood. She added that the
previous round in Geneva had been very useful for allowing
the U.S. side to understand the Russian position, and stated
that the U.S. side was now studying that issue to be able to
address it in Geneva. She noted, however, that Article IV
had some additional provisions, such as those limiting the
number of test heavy bombers and non-deployed ICBMs and
SLBMs, and asked for the Russian rationale in omitting them.
Orlov expressed some puzzlement as to the question, but
Antonov interjected that Gottemoeller's questions were sound
and required serious analysis, remarking that it would be
best if all of these questions could be provided in writing,
and adding that these questions were too serious to be
responded to immediately. Antonov promised that answers to
these questions would be worked on by the Russian side and
that a response would be provided, perhaps at the next
meeting. He commented in that connection that several
members of the Russian delegation were not present at this
meeting because they were still working on these issues for
the subsequent meeting. He mentioned that some of
Gottemoeller's questions would be answered by the Russian
presentation and that others could be discussed during the
next round in Geneva.


19. (S) Gottemoeller explained that the U.S. side had made a
very careful review of U.S.-proposed texts noting provisions
that had been omitted in the Russian text, remarking that it
might be good to look at the main differences in order to
understand the rationales for their omission. She stated
that this was the idea behind the U.S. list, and said that
she would pass over this list, in unofficial Russian, on the
following day.


20. (S) Antonov responded that he agreed completely with
Gottemoeller's approach, observing that it would help the
Russian side understand where the U.S side had problems with
the Russian approach. He acknowledged that his delegation had
been unable to conduct a similar analysis over the past week,
and he expressed his view that once he received this list, it
should be possible to make progress quickly in removing
differences between the two sides. As an aside, he
acknowledged that the most productive times are when the
delegations meet outside of capitals, when the experts can
work most creatively and can focus on their work. He stated
that this type of work will be done, but that it is best done
in Geneva. At this point, he turned to his own delegation
and announced that they will have the second half of the
upcoming Sunday (October 18),to do precisely this in
preparation for the upcoming Geneva round. Gottemoeller
responded that she was sympathetic, having just had a very
busy week in Washington, where there were many issues to deal
with, not all of which were related to these negotiations.
She noted that the list she would be providing to Antonov had
been developed by some of her delegation who had remained in
Geneva to do just this sort of detailed work.


21. (S) Continuing with the "philosophical" questions,
Gottemoeller mentioned that the U.S. draft of Article V
contained many prohibitions taken from START, including the
ban on rapid reload systems, on production, testing and
deployment of ballistic missiles over 600 km range and their
launchers on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, and
on emplacement of missiles and their launchers on the ocean
floor, seabed, or beds of internal waters. She noted that
the U.S. had detailed points on why these provisions should

be retained, and, commenting that she could begin that
discussion later during this meeting, she stressed that she
wanted to raise the larger philosophical question that she
had also made during the previous round in Geneva. She
remarked that several of these prohibitions were first agreed
upon in the SALT II Treaty and were part of the two
countries' mutual legacy of arms control, and explained that
the omission of such provisions could raise questions in the
public and among arms control experts as to whether this new
treaty regime was, in fact, effective. She acknowledged that
there might be some alternative ways of referring to such
obligations within the text of the new treaty, but that in
any event, neither side wanted to be seen as sliding
backwards. Gottemoeller stated that this was the reason she
had raised this general question and why she had wanted to
hear the Russian views, reiterating that she was prepared to
work with the Russian side to simplify this article. Antonov
asked whether she could present the U.S. vision of this
article, in order to help in its simplification.
Gottemoeller noted that the U.S. side had found that the
prohibitions contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12
of Article V in the U.S. text had been omitted in the Russian
text, and the U.S. side was prepared to discuss this in more
detail, with specific points. Gottemoeller stated that she
intended to conclude her "philosophical" points first and
then return to specifics at a later time.

--------------
Articles IX - XII
--------------


22. (S) Gottemoeller turned to Articles IX through XII,
noting Russian omissions in Article IX (ban on concealment
measures),X (provisions of telemetry),XI (continuous
monitoring and elimination inspections),and XII (cooperative
measures with regard to mobile launchers and heavy bombers).
She said that the Russian positions on telemetry and on
continuous monitoring were clear, and that, in some cases,
the Russian text had moved some provisions from one part of
the treaty to another, as was the case for elimination
inspections. In some cases, however, the provision had been
omitted entirely, and this was the case, in particular, for
the ban on telemetry encryption, which had been included
since the SALT II Treaty, where it was included in the
context of non-interference with NTM. She noted that this
was another area where the two sides could be viewed as
backsliding. On Article XII, the Russian position with
respect to cooperative measures for mobile launchers was
predictable, but what was not clear was the omission of
cooperative measures for heavy bombers. Further, it was not
clear why the prohibition on concealment measures during
testing, which was contained in U.S.-proposed Article IX,
paragraph 3, was omitted, since this also seemed to be
beneficial to the Russian side. Gottemoeller stated that
this was an example of effective reciprocity: the obligations
were reciprocal and benefited the U.S. and Russia alike, just
as restrictions would constrain both sides in the same way.
With these comments, Gottemoeller concluded her
"philosophical" discussion.


23. (S) Antonov responded that, of course, the Russian side
would study her comments carefully, and he admitted that such
comments do lead one to closely examine the differences in
their respective approaches. He explained that, in the
development of the Russian approach, the attempt had been
made to create a vision that responded to Russian national
interests. He remarked that once he had the opportunity to
fully explain the Russian approach to her, including the
assumption that the text should be drastically simplified, he
was convinced that the U.S. side would support such a

simplification in terms of its impact on verification. The
Russian side was also convinced that the U.S. supported a
simplification of the financial aspects of verification. Now
it appeared that this assumption represented an incorrect
assessment of the current U.S. Administration's position on
disarmament. Antonov admitted that, for him, it had been
unexpected that the current U.S. Administration wanted to
retain much of the language and concepts found in START, even
under conditions in which both countries had stated that
their relationship had dramatically improved. Thus, the
Russian side was now very seriously reviewing the U.S.
position and revising its views on the U.S. position, while
looking to see where U.S. concerns could be met.


24. (S) Continuing, Antonov said that it was possible - it
was a possibility that he could not discount - that the
Russian attempt to simplify the SFO Treaty was perhaps
excessive, and that perhaps the Russian proposal should be
seen as just an initial vision of the treaty text. He did
not exclude the possibility that, in the course of
negotiations, some provisions might be re-introduced, but
that decision would be made only after detailed and careful
discussion by experts.


25. (S) Finally, on the issue of telemetry, he noted that
while he was working in his office on Sunday he had read the
U.S. proposal and had also read the views of the Russian MOD
military experts. It turned out that the two sides were
talking as though coming from two completely different
dimensions. He noted that Russian had been frank about how
telemetry could be used to the detriment of the Russian
Federation, and still the Russian side had not received U.S.
argumentation in support of maintaining telemetry provisions,
only that the U.S. was in favor of telemetry - no responses
to the Russian concerns that had been raised in the previous
round had yet been received. Antonov stated that oftentimes
he hears the comment that the U.S. side has directly
responded to Russian concerns, and maybe that was the U.S.
psychology, likening it to a situation in which one side
asks, "Why are tulips so beautiful," and the other side
responds, "Because it's lonely and difficult to live in the
woods."


26. (S) Concerning the question of reciprocity, Antonov
noted that he had read some papers concerning mobile
launchers of ICBMs that dealt with the data base, and he
admitted that he had been prepared to accept their inclusion,
but when he looked at verification provisions, he asked
himself, how can the U.S. side suggest that this is
reciprocal, when only one side has such systems? He noted
that this was a philosophical approach as well: there should
be the same rights and obligations for both sides. Thus, in
reading the papers on mobiles, he now understood why the U.S.
was opposed to the principle of "equal security," because, in
the U.S. view, there would not be equal security. Stopping
himself, and saying that this was just philosophical, and
perhaps he was wrong, he stressed that the sides needed to
find a way to solve their differences. He proposed that he
and Gottemoeller needed to meet one-on-one, at the beginning
of the upcoming round, to agree on what they wanted to
accomplish. And perhaps they should be pragmatic and even a
little bit cynical, because both needed to understand what
each wanted to get from the other on concrete issues. He
stressed that the work on these issues would be done in the
working groups and that the Russian side was prepared to do
this work once it received these U.S. documents, in any
format, in the plenary or otherwise.


27. (S) Gottemoeller responded that she would not sign on
to cynicism, and noted, referring to Antonov's allusion to

"the difficulty of living in the woods," that it is hard to
find mobile launchers in the forest, and that the U.S.
concern about mobiles had to do with a covert deployment of
such missiles as a form of breakout potential - it was the
larger question of strategic stability. She acknowledged
that she understood the Russian position and that this issue
was being worked in Washington. She said that she was looking
forward to presenting the results of this work during the
following week, in Geneva, noting that just as the Russian
Federation takes into account its national interests, of
course the U.S. would take into account its own interests.
Antonov joked that this sounded like "equal security."


28. (S) Gottemoeller noted that it was true that the
previous U.S. administration had taken a simplified approach
to the negotiation of the Moscow Treaty, but that treaty
benefited from the fact that START was still in force.
However, with the impending expiration of START, there was
the question of what verification aspects of START should be
retained. Thus, the two sides were in complete agreement on
the need to simplify, to streamline, and to make the
verification measures more effective, just as the presidents
agreed in July, but a balance had to be struck between
oversimplification and too much reliance on START-like
provisions. Therefore, there was still much work yet to do
for the two delegations.


29. (S) Gottemoeller extended congratulations to the work
done by the working groups and noted that the success of
completing the treaty by December 5 depended to a great
extent on them. However, the two heads of delegation needed
to "drive the train." Antonov responded that the two sides
had different ways of thinking, even when talking about the
Moscow Treaty and START. He agreed that START provisions were
available for the Moscow Treaty, but that what had been
forgotten was that the ABM Treaty was in force at that time.
Thus, the situation was completely different now in terms of
strategic stability. If, on the other hand, there were to be
a combination of the Moscow Treaty, the ABM Treaty, and
START, that would be best. Concluding his thought, Antonov
said that the two sides will try to find mutually acceptable
solutions, even though one element that previously
contributed to strategic stability, the ABM Treaty, had been
rejected by the U.S. side.


30. (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov concluded by discussing
plans to hold a one-on-one meeting about the reports to the
foreign ministers and deputy foreign ministers, the agenda
for the Tuesday and Wednesday meetings, and the
Taylor-Koshelev meeting on JCIC documents relating to the
completion of continuous monitoring activities at the
monitored facility at Votkinsk.



31. (U) Documents exchanged: None.


32. (U) Participants

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller
AMB Ries
Mr. Brown
Mr. Elliott
Ms. Friedt
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Mr. Katsakis

Mr. Sobchenko(Int)
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Koshelev
Ms. Furzhenkova
Mr. Ivanov
Ms. Ivanova
Col Izrazov
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Kuznetsov
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Col Novikov
Gen Orlov
Mr. Pishchulov
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Streltsov
Mr. Trifonov
Mr. Venevtsev
Mr. Vorontsov
Mr. Yermakov
Ms. Zharkikh

Ms. Komshilova (Int)


33. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
Beyrle