Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW1995
2009-08-04 12:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

TENSIONS WITH GEORGIA: NATO ALLIES PONDER

Tags:  PREL PGOV RS GG GM UK FR SW OSCE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHMO #1995/01 2161239
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4432
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001995 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG GM UK FR SW OSCE
SUBJECT: TENSIONS WITH GEORGIA: NATO ALLIES PONDER
DEMARCHE, MFA DOWNPLAYS PROBLEMS

REF: A. 08/04/09 RUBIN-RUSSELL EMAIL

B. 08/02/09 STATE-MOSCOW AND TBILISI EMAIL AND
PREVIOUS

C. TBILISI 1427

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Eric S. Rubin for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001995

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG GM UK FR SW OSCE
SUBJECT: TENSIONS WITH GEORGIA: NATO ALLIES PONDER
DEMARCHE, MFA DOWNPLAYS PROBLEMS

REF: A. 08/04/09 RUBIN-RUSSELL EMAIL

B. 08/02/09 STATE-MOSCOW AND TBILISI EMAIL AND
PREVIOUS

C. TBILISI 1427

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Eric S. Rubin for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary. On August 4, NATO Quad Allies proposed a
joint demarche to the GOR regarding the rising tensions with
Georgia, accompanied by a similar approach to the GOG. On
August 2 and 3, the MFA told us it had no information why
Russian forces did not respond to Georgian attempts to
contact them via the hotline August 1, or why Russia failed
to attend the July 31 Incident Prevention and Response
Mechanism (IPRM) meeting. The MFA urged that we stop pushing
for access to South Ossetia by international observers, and
said South Ossetia, followed by Russia, would boycott the
IPRM if the OSCE did not "correct" its plan to open an office
in Tbilisi. Russia urged Georgia to accept South Ossetia's
proposal for border delimitation talks to avoid recent border
disputes. In a non-sequitur, Rossiskaya Gazeta published an
interview with DFM Karasin that possibly predated the rise in
tensions, as Karasin did not address them in remarks that
added nothing new. End Summary

--------------
Quad deliberations
--------------


2. (C) On August 4, NATO Quad Allies in Moscow proposed a
joint Quad demarche to Acting FM Karasin or MFA IVth CIS
Department Director Andrey Kelin this week to underscore the
GOR's responsibility for actions, or lack thereof, of its
military in Georgia, as well as for South Ossetian actions,
and voice concern over the rising tensions in advance of the
anniversary of the August 2008 war. The Allies suggested
making a similar approach to the GOG, and informing the GOR
of that step. Any approach, they counseled, should be made
after obtaining their capitals' concurrence, and after the
Swedish EU presidency delivers its August 3 statement
regarding the tensions along the South Ossetian
administrative boundary line (planned for August 4). See ref

A (NOTAL) for more details.

--------------
DFM Neverov
--------------


3. (C) On August 2, 2009, Charge called Acting DFM Igor
Neverov to express U.S. concerns with Russia's absence from
the July 31 Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM)
meeting, as well as Russia's failure to answer GOG attempts
to contact Russian forces August 1 via the hotline (ref B) to
discuss the alleged shelling of Tskhinvali from the Nikozi
area in Georgia proper. Charge stressed the importance of
non-escalation in words and rhetoric, as negatively
exemplified by the Russian MOD's August 1 statement, in which
the MOD compared the current events to the run-up to the
August 2008 war and threatened to "use all means and
resources available to protect the citizens of the republic
of South Ossetia and the Russian servicemen." Neverov
responded that he understood Under Secretary Burns had raised
the same points with Karasin on August 2, who had agreed to
stay in close contact on the issue.

--------------
IVth CIS Deputy Director Dvinyanin
--------------

Russian non-engagement
--------------


4. (C) On August 3, MFA IVth CIS Deputy Director Alexei
Dvinyanin told us he did not know why Russian forces did not
respond to Georgian attempts at contacting them via the
hotline. He implied that the call did not go through, as
opposed to Russia deliberately ignoring the call. Dvinyanin
said that Russia's non-participation in the July 31 IPRM
meeting was not a sign of political unwillingness. Instead,
the Russian side had not been reached in advance of the
meeting. He underscored that Russia supported the IPRM.

EUMM
--------------


MOSCOW 00001995 002 OF 002



5. (C) Dvinyanin said it would be necessary to redefine the
EUMM's mandate if the West wanted it to access South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, given that the September 8 Sarkozy-Medvedev
agreement had spoken of the "deployment of additional
observers in the zones adjoining South Ossetia and Abkhazia,"
which excluded the breakaway regions from the mission's
mandate.


6. (C) Dvinyanin went on to say that the West should abandon
its goal of inserting international monitors into South
Ossetia under current circumstances. He said the West's and
Russia's positions were clear, and that reiterating them
would not change anything.

OSCE office in Tbilisi
--------------


7. (C) Dvinyanin said that the Greek OSCE
Chairmanship-in-Office's plans to open an office in Tbilisi
threatened the IPRM, as South Ossetia had stated it would
boycott the IPRM if the Greeks were to go forward with their
initiative. In that case, Russia would also boycott the
IPRM, as there was agreement that the meetings could only
take place if all members participated. Russia would make
this point to OSCE special representative Ambassador
Charalambos Christopoulos when he visited Moscow August 5.
Dvinyanin charged that the Greek proposal was meant to
circumvent the need for OSCE Permanent Council agreement.


8. (C) Dvinyanin maintained that, according to the Greek
initiative, the Tbilisi office was not simply to render
logistical support to the OSCE IPRM representative, which was
acceptable, but to provide "political functions," including
establishing a permanent base for the OSCE representative and
following any humanitarian projects agreed upon in the second
Working Group of the Geneva talks. Dvinyanin said that South
Ossetia would only agree to such an office if an equal and
independent one were opened in Tskhinvali, which would
similarly participate in the IPRM talks.


9. (C) Dvinyanin stated that Russia was "prepared to take
any position that helps." When urged to persuade South
Ossetia to soften its stance, he responded that Greece, not
South Ossetia, needed to "correct" its position, by either
having the OSCE office in Tbilisi only provide only
logistical support to the OSCE IPRM representative, or by
establishing an equal and parallel office in Tskhinvali.

Military action
--------------


10. (C) Finally, Dvinyanin said that the USG should direct
its concerns to the MOD regarding its August 1 statement, not
the MFA. He doubted Russian forces were moving
administrative border posts near Kveshi (ref C),but said
that such problems could easily be remedied if Georgia were
to accept South Ossetia's proposal to start border limitation
talks. We responded that that would hardly be possible.

--------------
Karasin interview
--------------


11. (SBU) In the meantime, Rossiskaya Gazeta on August 4
published the transcript of an interview with DFM Karasin,
likely conducted prior to the recent events. While
containing the usual tough tonality and language, Karasin did
not address any of the recent events. Instead, he noted
Medvedev's January decree on sanctions for supplying arms to
Georgia and criticized recent military maneuvers in the
region. He touted the Big Treaties with Abkhazia and South
Ossetia and other Russian efforts to rebuild the regions, as
well as the April 30 border guard agreements. While
professing Russian willingness to engage with the EUMM and
support for the IPRMs, he repeated the usual accusations
against the West regarding the failure to renew the UN and
OSCE mission mandates.
RUBIN