Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW1873
2009-07-22 09:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

U/S BURNS JULY 7 MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN:

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR KG GG AZ AR RS 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4313
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001873 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KG GG AZ AR RS
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS JULY 7 MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN:
NAGORNO-KARABAKH, CENTRAL ASIA, GEORGIA, UKRAINE

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001873

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KG GG AZ AR RS
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS JULY 7 MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN:
NAGORNO-KARABAKH, CENTRAL ASIA, GEORGIA, UKRAINE

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. In a meeting with U/S Burns July 7, on the
margins of the President's visit to Moscow, Deputy Foreign
Minister Grigoriy Karasin said he was optimistic about the
chances of a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. He
urged the U.S. and Russia to be transparent on dealings in
Central Asia, and stressed that Moscow "hoped" that the new
U.S. deal on Manas would be for temporary transit purposes
for Afghanistan and not a permanent military establishment.
The latter would be seen as almost as provocative to Moscow
as NATO enlargement. He acknowledged that Deputy PM Sechin
and Defense Minister Serdyukov were in Bishkek, without
specifying the nature of their trip. Karasin said Russia
supported continuation of the Geneva process for Georgia, but
reiterated arguments that Tbilisi was playing a political
game rather than seeking to stabilize the situation. U/S
Burns countered Karasin's claim that Russia was seeing U.S.
military support for Georgia, stressing that U.S. efforts
were currently focused on training. Karasin expressed
concern at growing nationalism in Ukraine and perceived
efforts by Kyiv to politicize differences with Russia over
the Black Sea Fleet. He urged A/S Gordon and A/S Blake to
visit Moscow for bilateral meetings soon. End summary.

Nagorno-Karabakh
--------------


2. (C) Karasin told U/S Burns he was "unusually optimistic"
about the chances for resolving the conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh. He said he thought there was a good
possibility the two Presidents would reach an agreement on
the issues of refugees and the Lachin corridor. He liked the
idea of a U.S.-Russia-France statement at the G8, and thought
that if the Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents could reach
agreement on the principles at their meeting in Moscow on
July 17, it would be a very important achievement.


3. (C) Karasin commented that the Turkey-Armenia new "love
affair" had Baku nervous, but said it was good and we should

welcome it. He praised the work of the Minsk Group and said
he would be interested in any new ideas the U.S. could
suggest on how to proceed.

Central Asia
--------------


4. (C) U/S Burns told DFM Karasin that he would be traveling
to Central Asia following the G8 Summit in Italy. Karasin
said the recent events in Urumqi showed how fragile the
stability in that part of the world was. China was even more
stable than the Central Asian countries, and Urumqi was
dangerous because of the possible domino effect in other
regions. He said the U.S. and Russia should assess together
the challenges in Central Asia and consider each other's
priorities in the region.


5. (C) Karasin noted that Russia wanted to play its own role
with the Central Asian countries, but they also had their own
interests with Russia. Russia had many more contacts with
Central Asia than before; President Medvedev and PM Putin
were actively engaged, and had visited the region several
times. The leaders of the countries would likely be in
Moscow for the Presidents' Cup horse races July 17-18, and it
was possible that Medvedev would visit the region, including
perhaps Tajikistan, at the end of July. Russia was
politically involved, but was trying to develop more economic
and trade ties, and believed that more business and projects
should follow.


6. (C) Karasin wryly commented that the Central Asian
countries often tried to play the U.S. off against Russia and
vice-versa. The U.S. and Russia should be transparent, blunt
and understand each other's "maneuvers" regarding the region.
"Competition should be fair and contribute to stability in
the region." He also commented that Russia had been
suspicious of U.S. efforts to put Central Asian countries
with Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and other countries in the
region. Russia did not agree that they had similar problems
and issues, but was concerned that the problems in
Afghanistan and Pakistan - Islamic fundamentalism, narcotics
trafficking, extremism, and instability - would eventually
migrate to Central Asia. He asked whether the U.S. really
thought Central Asian nations could do more to solve the
problems in Afghanistan. U/S Burns said there were obvious

MOSCOW 00001873 002 OF 003


differences between the Central Asian states and those of
South Asia, but emphasized the practical value of cooperation
on issues like electricity and trade, and the importance of
overflight and transit arrangements in Central Asia for our
common stake in stability in Afghanistan.

Manas
--------------


7. (C) Karasin stressed that Russia hoped the new U.S.
agreement with Bishkek was for "transit" and not for a
"permanent military establishment." The latter would "touch
Russia's strategic interests," and would be seen as a "second
variant" to NATO enlargement - not as serious as NATO but
similar in its impact on Russian security. He said the deal
we reached seemed to be about 90 percent the same as the
previous arrangement. U/S Burns said that the transit
arrangements were similar, but the security and financial
aspects were different. He emphasized that we have no
interest in permanent military bases in the region. Karasin
acknowledged that Deputy PM Sechin and Defense Minister
Serdyukov were in Bishkek, but merely said he hoped they
would "bring some concrete results back" without specifying
the nature of their trip.

Georgia
--------------


8. (C) Karasin said that Tbilisi needed to "change its
political philosophy." Georgia wanted to be an enemy to all
its neighbors, and could act with impunity because it felt
that it was supported by the major powers. This was a
dangerous attitude, Karasin warned. Tbilisi should realize
that it would be better to search for "friendly language"
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and even with Russia.


9. (C) Moscow had "honestly" supported efforts - and spent
long, sleepless nights - to find solutions on the OSCE and UN
monitors, Karasin said, but it was "clear that Georgia had
been given the choice in Vienna, New York, and Geneva between
stability and playing a political game, and had chosen the
latter."


10. (C) U/S Burns countered Karasin's claim that Russia was
seeing U.S. military support for Georgia, stressing that U.S.
efforts were currently focused on training. Karasin said
Russia now had border guards in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
and knew there "wouldn't be an avalanche of recognitions,"
but there needed to be some new ideas. Moscow would continue
to support Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's economic and social
development, but needed "normal behavior" from Tbilisi.


11. (C) Karasin emphasized that at the OSCE, Russia had not
pressed for two completely separate missions, but for two
missions reporting to the same chief in Vienna. The same was
true at the UN, but Tbilisi "preferred instability," he
claimed.


12. (C) Russia believed the Geneva process should continue,
Karasin said, because it gave an opportunity for the Abkhaz
and South Ossetians to face the Georgians, and it was in all
our interests to promote such continued communication.

Ukraine
--------------


13. (C) Karasin said he generally shared the view that the
political and economic situation in Ukraine was a mess, and
that the leadership needed to stop squabbling among
themselves and focus on efforts to overcome the problems.
U/S Burns stressed that our main interest in Ukraine right
now was stability.


14. (C) Karasin said that initially, Moscow had been
concerned about the scheduling of the elections for January
17, since it was likely all the candidates would use
end-of-year gas issues with Russia in their campaigns.
Moscow was increasingly concerned about two issues:
perceived growing "nationalism" in Ukraine, as evidenced by
events at the 300th anniversary of the battle of Poltava; and
second, efforts to politicize differences over Sevastopol and
the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) and to link them to the U.S. and
NATO. The practical difficulties over the BSF could easily
be resolved, Karasin argued, but Kyiv kept trying to
politicize the issue. Still, Karasin said, the relationship

MOSCOW 00001873 003 OF 003


was "normal," with a lot of contacts, and Russia still
considered Ukraine as "close and friendly." Karasin
contended that "if we could sweep away the artificial flavor
of Ukrainian bad nationalism, it would be better for
everyone."


15. (C) On gas issues, Karasin said the signing of the accord
between the EU and Ukraine, with no Russian input two days
before the Brussels conference, had been "peculiar." It was
clear the EU, Ukraine and Russia had to get together and
settle the gas transit problems; it could not be done without
Moscow. (He added with a twinkle that corruption in the
energy sector was much worse in Ukraine than in Russia). If
both sides were serious, they needed to be transparent.
Russian officials, particularly Putin, were very clear
(though he noted that Gazprom chief Alexey Miller was less
so),but Ukraine had no logic; it wanted the supply but did
not want to pay.

A/S Gordon
--------------


16. (SBU) Several times, Karasin said Moscow would very much
welcome visits by A/S Gordon and A/S Blake to Moscow and
looked forward to meeting with them soon.
BEYRLE