RUSSIA SUPPORTS DRPK UNSCR TEXT, SEEKS CLARITY ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001508

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2019
TAGS: PREL UNSC PGOV NK RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA SUPPORTS DRPK UNSCR TEXT, SEEKS CLARITY ON
ENFORCEMENT ROE'S

REF: STATE 59864

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle; reasons 1.4(b/d).


1. (C) Russian DFM Aleksandr Borodavkin called in Ambassador
Beyrle late June 8 (Moscow time) to discuss the current draft
UNSCR under consideration in New York condemning North Korea
for its recent nuclear tests and missile launches.
Borodavkin opened by noting that, in principle, Russia is
ready to support a strong resolution. Indeed, he voiced
support for the current draft text, while noting that China
continues to express some concerns with certain language.


2. (C) However, Borodavkin continued, the possibility that
force might be used (in particular, U.S. naval force) to
interdict ships suspected of transporting materiel prohibited
under terms of the resolution has given Moscow pause. Before
Russia agrees join consensus on the present text, or one
similar to it, the GOR wanted to be certain that all UNSC
members, especially the P-5, understand the potential
consequences of that action. Furthermore, the GOR would
appreciate clarification from the U.S. on the "rules of
engagement" it would apply to enforce the resolution. For
example, if ships steaming for North Korea refuse to heed the
call of U.S. naval vessels to divert to ports other than in
North Korea for inspection, under what conditions would force
would be employed? What sort of consultation with higher
authorities would take place? Borodavkin explained that the
GOR felt compelled to ask these questions in light of the
DPRK's unpredictable behavior, threats to use force itself
and references to its mutual military assistance agreements
with the PRC.


3. (C) Borodavkin emphasized repeatedly that the Chinese,
"better than the rest of us," understand the North Koreans.
He noted that Russia wanted to be completely certain that the
Chinese were being consulted not just on the text, but on the
consequences of the resolution, especially if it should
result in the use of force. He understood this to be an
"abstract discussion and an abstract request," that some
might think to be of a technical nature, but for Moscow it
represents real concern over how the situation might evolve.
Beyrle assured Borodavkin that we are consulting with the
Chinese intensively, but urged him to engage with us based on
Russia's view of its own interests, not possible Chinese
objections. Borodavkin emphasized that Russia shares the
objective of a North Korea without nuclear weapons. That
said, North Korea has already twice reneged on its
commitments. Ambassador Beyrle agreed, and noted that, at
this point, it would be extremely difficult to rebuild trust,
and thus a suggestion in the resolution that foresaw DPRK's
return to the NPT was a non-starter.


4. (C) Finally, Borodavkin wanted to make clear that the
language in the draft resolution, its possible adoption and
implementation cannot serve - and will not be acknowledged by
Russia - as a precedent for Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) discussions or action. The circumstances the
international community now faces with regard to North Korea
are unique and of a special nature that a strong response is
appropriate. Borodavkin handed over a non-paper (in Russian)
concerning the resolution and Russia's request for certain
assurances concerning possible use of force. We have faxed
that to EUR/RUS.


5. (C) Comment: Borodavkin emphasized the desire of Moscow to
cooperate to convey a strong message to North Korea
concerning its recent nuclear and missile tests. Concerns
that North Korea may escalate tensions, or perhaps even
employ force itself, seem to be motivating Russian caution,
not confrontation, on adopting the draft resolution.
Borodavkin called Ambassador Beyrle mid-morning June 9 to
reinforce Moscow's strong interest in receiving, ASAP, more
detail on ROE's governing high-seas interdiction by U.S.
vessels. Additional clarity from us on this question will
likely move Russia closer to accepting the language in the
existing draft SCR. End Comment.
BEYRLE