CFE: A WAY FORWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001184

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2019
TAGS: PREL KCFE PGOV MARR RS
SUBJECT: CFE: A WAY FORWARD

REF: A. USOSCE 98

B. RUSSIAN NON-PAPER ON EST ARMS CONTROL FAXED TO
EUR/RUS

C. 07 MOSCOW 5749

Classified By: CDA Eric Rubin, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Although Russian Foreign Ministry officials
would like to overcome the impasse over the Conventional
Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE),other Russian interagency
voices argue for its annulment. As noted in the non-paper
provided to A/S Gottemoeller April 24, the MFA is prepared to
continue working on the basis of the Parallel Actions
Package, but it is clear that Russia's actions in Georgia
have seriously complicated the likelihood of reaching a
satisfactory agreement on fulfillment of the Istanbul
Commitments. In keeping with the analysis from USOSCE (ref
A),we believe that modifying the Parallel Actions Package to
adjust it to current realities (without conceding Russian
positions on Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the Gudauta base),
and delinking the explicit preconditionality regarding
Russian forces in the separatist regions from submission of
the Adapted CFE Treaty for ratification, may provide the
needed impetus to elicit necessary compromises on Russia's
part.


2. (C) At the same time, we would urge U.S. development of
alternate formulas or transparency/confidence-building
proposals as a replacement to the A/CFE flank regime that
would be attractive to the U.S. and the Allies. Indeed, this
was suggested by Antonov in his April 24 aide memoire, and
could provide a means to resolve the other major outstanding
issue at a critical point of U.S. choosing. We could also
explore Russia's suggestion to look at CFE as a useful tool
to help support the arms control elements within Medvedev's
European Security Treaty (EST) proposal (ref B). Russia has
suggested the U.S. and Russia meet before the June 10
security conference in Berlin to discuss CFE. While this
timeline probably is not realistic given Washington
imperatives, an informal bilateral on the margins in Berlin
may give us the opportunity to explore the way forward. End
summary.

Russian Interagency Divided on CFE
--------------


3. (C) Since December, MFA officials have asked several times
when the U.S. intends to resume negotiations on CFE, each
time noting divisions within the Russian interagency over how
to proceed. While MFA European Directorate Vladimir Voronkov
stressed the Ministry's willingness to work off the basis of
the Parallel Actions Package, he conceded that some in the
Russian Government were opposed to resuming participation in
CFE and to seeing the Adapted treaty enter into force. (Note:
The MOD has never liked CFE since it is seen as limiting the
freedom with which Moscow can deploy its military forces and
equipment.) Voronkov commented that it was still possible to
reach an agreement, but "it would not be a tragedy if it
died." Still, most experts argue that Russia does not want
to be seen as the one to kill the treaty, and would be more
likely to continue its "suspension," than to withdraw from
the agreement.


4. (C) The MFA considers the CFE Treaty a "relic" of the Cold
War, and believes the Adapted Treaty was concluded when
Moscow was still in a position of weakness at the end of the
1990's. Even though the power derived from its oil and gas
wealth has been shaken by the financial crisis, the GOR does
not consider it is operating from a position of weakness
vis--vis the West at it did in 1999. In the past two years
since Russia threatened to and then did suspend its
participation in CFE, Moscow has taken our offers at
compromise and pocketed them with no or little change in
their demands. While there has been little movement on
Russia's key demands for lifting its suspension of CFE (per
the MFA, elimination of the flank limits as to Russia,
collective ceilings or some accounting of NATO members'
holdings, "guarantees" of ratification coupled with some kind
of "provisional implementation" of the Adapted CFE Treaty,
Baltic accession, and a definition of "substantial combat
forces"),recent discussions with MFA officials indicate that
Moscow may nonetheless be more open to compromise.

Istanbul Commitments and Flank Regime
--------------

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5. (C) As USOSCE elaborated (ref A),Moscow's frustration
that NATO allies were holding up their ratification of the
A/CFE until Moscow "fulfilled" its Istanbul commitments
regarding Georgia and Moldova was a factor contributing to
its suspension of the CFE in December 2007 and its demands
that the A/CFE be changed to address Russia's concerns. As
seen from Moscow, the two most difficult issues to resolve
have been over Russia's fulfillment of the Istanbul
Commitments, and Moscow's insistence that the flank regime be
eliminated as to Russia (or entirely).


6. (C) Moscow considers its agreement to work off of the
Parallel Actions Package a major concession, since Russia
continues to dispute Allied contentions that it has not
fulfilled its Istanbul Commitments, and still maintains that
the Istanbul Commitments were not linked directly to
ratification of the Adapted Treaty, i.e., that the Allies
have moved the goal posts on Russia. Russia argues that
"troops" and "peacekeepers" are different entities and that
the Istanbul Commitments allowed it to keep its peacekeepers
in Georgia and Moldova, pursuant to
internationally-recognized mandates. Moscow acknowledges
that the conflict in Georgia has made the issue much more
complicated, given "the new realities on the ground." Still,
MFA DVBR Counselor for CFE Sergey Federyakov indicated that
Moscow was willing to consider transparency measures for both
Gudauta and Moldova, and on the latter, to explore
discussions within the OSCE process of the possible
modalities for a future monitoring mission. As USOSCE has
proposed, if we were willing to delink the submission of
A/CFE for ratification procedures from the explicit
preconditionality regarding Russian forces in the separatist
regions that has characterized the U.S. position, it may give
us a way forward on both CFE and Russia's presence in
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Moldova.


7. (C) Equally problematic is the question of elimination of
the flank regime. As USOSCE notes, this is at the heart of
A/CFE and the principal element in President Clinton's
explicitly stated readiness to submit the A/CFE for
ratification. However, as experts here have told us, the
fact that Moscow is the only country facing restrictions on
deployment of its forces and equipment on its own territory
"really irritates Putin" (ref C),and there has been no
flexibility on this issue since the suspension. But
Federyakov told us that while Moscow still insisted on
elimination of the flank limits, it might be possible to
develop transparency measures, such as notification of force
levels and equipment in the flank zones, that would be a
partial substitute for the flank regime.


8. (C) Progress on these two issues may in turn open up
resolution of other questions. A proposal by Allies to
delink the Istanbul Commitments and submit the A/CFE for
ratification within a specified timeline, possibly coupled
with a willingness to "provisionally" abide by the terms of
the Treaty (e.g., after/after Senate ratification) would
likely enable us to fruitfully press Moscow for resolution of
other remaining issues, such as over collective ceilings, a
definition of "substantial combat forces," and Baltic
accession.

CFE and EST
--------------


9. (C) Although some defense experts here maintain that CFE
"is dead," because it is seen in Moscow as a vestige of the
Cold War and not in keeping with a revitalized Russia, they
acknowledge that Russia wants arms control in Europe and
the predictability and transparency that a treaty like CFE
provides. When asked about the link between CFE and
Medvedev's EST proposal, Federyakov rejected any direct
connection, insisting that the EST was simply a statement
of principles and rules of behavior whereas CFE laid out
specific obligations: exact mechanisms, parameters,
limits, etc. He said Moscow was not looking to replace CFE
with a new European arms control arrangement or to
negotiate A/CFE within the framework of the EST, but believed
it would be beneficial to have both EST and A/CFE.
(Federyakov gave us a non-paper which he said had been
previously delivered to the U.S., laying out the objectives,
principles and criteria for arms control within the context
of the EST - paper faxed to EUR/RUS).


MOSCOW 00001184 003 OF 003


The Way Ahead
--------------


10. (C) In our view, it is unrealistic to expect that the low
level of Russian interest in preserving the CFE can be
leveraged into Moscow renouncing its strategic calculus in
the frozen conflicts. The reality is that Russian heavy
military equipment will remain in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
for many years, with Moscow's near-term commitment to its
satellite statelets hardening, not weakening. Regardless of
the U.S. going-in position on the Parallel Actions Package,
we must come to grips with the fact that in whatever deal we
try to make, Russia will not withdraw its TLE from Georgia's
breakaway regions for many years and certainly won't do it
for CFE.


11. (C) Moscow will be looking to the June 10 conference in
Berlin to hear the Allies' views of the way ahead on CFE,
and Federyakov told us the MFA hopes the discussion will be
informal and more of a "brainstorming" session than set
remarks by each country repeating already-known positions.
German Embassy officials told us there would be four
elements to the conference: a stocktaking; the way forward; a
regional approach within CFE regime; and the impact of new
technical developments (e.g. drones) on CFE regime. While
Russia will be looking for cracks in Allied unity and to
widen any it finds, it will also be looking for new ideas
Allies may have to suggest. Meeting bilaterally with Moscow
on the margins of the conference could enable us to explore
more thoroughly Russia's willingness to engage creatively.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) The two areas we have outlined - delinking
ratification of A/CFE from the Istanbul Commitments and
replacing the flank regime restrictions with transparency and
CSBMs - would require a major revision of the Parallel
Actions Package, as well as major changes to the nature of
the A/CFE, including potentially to what would be submitted
to the U.S. Senate for consideration. Maintaining the
policies of the past years will lead to no progress on
Istanbul Commitments and the effective if not actual death of
CFE, with the concomitant negative effect on U.S.-Russian
ties and cooperation in other areas.


13. (C) We recognize that Allies have faithfully supported
our efforts to resolve the impasse over CFE with Russia and
many will be reluctant to change positions. That said, the
change in the U.S.-Russia relationship gives us the
opportunity to explore a different approach, one we should
develop through extensive consultations with Allies. MFA
Director Voronkov is among the GOR officials who has linked
progress on the A/CFE to improvements in the U.S.-Russian
relationship. We can build on A/S Gottemoeller's
consultations, FM Lavrov's May 7 meeting with the Secretary
and bilateral consultations at the June 10 experts meeting in
Berlin to gauge Russian flexibility in finding a way forward.

RUBIN