MOSCOW ON ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER LIEBERMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001139

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL OFDP IS RS
SUBJECT: MOSCOW ON ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER LIEBERMAN

REF: A. MOSCOW 896

B. 08 MOSCOW 1991

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: MFA officials look forward to working with
Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman, who they believe may be
more pragmatic on the peace process than his typically harsh
rhetoric suggests. They remain unsure, however, just how
large a role he will have in formulating key policy decisions
regarding Israeli security. MFA officials feel comfortable
dealing with the Russian-speaking Lieberman, who is
considered by some to act more Russian than Israeli.
Observers point out, however, that Lieberman left the Soviet
Union in 1978 (from Moldova, where he grew up),and his
actual ties to Russia are limited. They do not believe he is
well connected to Moscow's ruling elite, nor to Russia's
Jewish community. If Lieberman follows through on his
statement to elevate already strong Russia-Israel ties, this
would prove a success for the GOR goal of benefiting
politically from the Russian-speaking diaspora. Observers
contend that the GOR had hoped to have real influence within
this large and diverse community, but, in the case of Israel,
has settled on enjoying the soft power it has given Russia
through close cultural ties. End summary.

Lieberman Will Be Pragmatic
--------------


2. (C) MFA officials have assessed Lieberman as more
pragmatic than his often harsh rhetoric regarding the
Palestinians and neighboring Arab states suggests. DFM
Saltanov told Ambassador Beyrle that Lieberman had given
contradictory signals, stating that he would dismantle his
house in the West Bank for the sake of peace while issuing
harsh comments about Israeli Arabs. In Saltanov's
assessment, however, National Security Advisor Uzi Arad was
likely to play a more decisive role in Israeli MEPP policy
formulation than Lieberman (ref A). Counselor in the MFA
peace process office Timur Zabirov offered a similar
assessment, in which Lieberman would not play a significant
part in key security issues. He thought Lieberman's business
and organizational skills more suited to a different
government ministry, but understood that the Yisrael Beiteinu
(YB) party leader was given the Foreign Ministry because he
wanted to sit on Netanyahu's security council. Middle East
and North Africa Department Director Sergey Vershinin
commented that while Arad and other advisors to Netanyahu
were expected to play a significant role formulating foreign
policy, it was important to remember that they were not
politicians like Lieberman who reflected the will of a
significant part of the Israeli electorate. He thought
Lieberman would be more pragmatic than his comments
suggested, particularly after the rigors of governing
tempered some of the FM's more extreme inclinations.

He Acts Like a Russian
--------------


3. (C) MFA officials have commented that Lieberman acts more
Russian than Israeli, providing a high level of comfort for
working with him. Not only did Lieberman recently conduct an
entire meeting with Saltanov in Russian, but, Saltanov joked
to EU special representative for the Middle East Lotte, he
was even allowed to smoke while visiting the Israeli Foreign
Ministry. Israeli Ambassador Azeri told the Ambassador that
the Russians consider Lieberman "their guy." They feel they
know him; they like and understand his "aggressive" way of
presenting his case. Middle East Studies Institute President
Yevgeniy Satanovskiy warned not to get too carried away by
Lieberman's Russianness, reminding us that the FM was from
Moldova, not Russia, and left the Soviet Union in 1978 when
he was only 20.

Not Plugged in to Moscow
--------------


4. (C) Satanovskiy, who, as a founder and former President of
the Russian-Jewish Congress is intimate with the Moscow-Tel
Aviv nexus, told us that he was acquainted with Lieberman but
did not believe that the Israeli FM had strong affiliations
with Moscow's ruling elite. He was unaware of any formal
links between Russia and Lieberman's YB party. Satanovskiy
did not consider Lieberman particularly well plugged in to
Moscow's Jewish community. Rather, he saw Lieberman as part
of a large "circle" of Russian-speaking Jews who traveled
easily between Russia, Israel, the U.S., UK, and Germany for
personal and business reasons. Contacts were facilitated by
organizations such as the Moscow-based Russian Jewish
Congress and less formal associations between people in the
Russian-speaking communities in each country.


MOSCOW 00001139 002 OF 002



5. (C) Satanovskiy said that despite the attention given in
the Russian press to Lieberman's comments that he wanted to
raise Russia-Israel ties to that of a strategic partnership,
he did not believe the Israeli FM was pursuing a special
Russian agenda. Furthermore, Lieberman's YB party should not
be considered a "Russian party," as the FM's political
success demonstrated an ability to integrate into Israel's
Hebrew-speaking establishment.

The Russian-Speaking Jewish Diaspora
--------------


6. (C) Leonard Terlitskiy, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society's
representative in the CIS, agreed with Satanovskiy's
assessment of Lieberman's limited ties to Moscow, as well as
his description of the Russian-speaking Jewish diaspora.
Terlitskiy said that if Lieberman succeeded in elevating the
already strong relations Russia enjoyed with Israel, it would
accomplish the GOR goal of benefiting politically from the
Russian "compatriots abroad." This did not mean that
Lieberman was Moscow's man in Israel, nor that the GOR had a
fifth column among Russian-speaking Jews. Terlitskiy
explained that the GOR had attempted to exert some influence
on this population in Israel, and the Kremlin played a role
in the formation of the Federation of Russian Jews, a rival
organization to the Russian-Jewish Congress. He believed,
however, that the GOR had not seen the success it had hoped
for in influencing the Russian-speaking Jewish diaspora, and
was content to allow it to serve as an element of Russia's
soft power. In the case of Israel, this has paid off in the
form of cultural bonds that have translated into growing
political and economic ties (ref B).
BEYRLE