RUSSIAN MFA ON GAZA, LEBANON AND IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000113

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR LE IQ IR IS RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON GAZA, LEBANON AND IRAQ

REF: A. STATE 4387

B. 08 BEIRUT 1780

C. 08 TEL AVIV 2900

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) Summary: In a January 16 meeting, MFA Middle East and
North Africa Director Sergey Vershinin welcomed the
U.S.-Israeli Anti-Smuggling MOU, which he thought would help
produce the Egyptian brokered cease-fire, and urged early
consultations by the Obama Administration on next steps.
Vershinin characterized the GOR response to the Gaza crisis
as balanced, but stressed concern over the civilian death
toll. He was concerned that Israeli actions had strengthened
Hamas, weakened Abbas, and increased divisions among Arab
states over the peace process. Vershinin stressed that the
GOR was committed to the roadmap and a two-state solution,
and suggested March might be a good time to hold a Moscow
Middle East conference to move the Israeli-Palestinian track
forward. He noted that many in the region, including the
Iranians, were waiting to see what direction the Obama
Administration would take, but feared that expectations for
change in U.S. policy were "too high." Vershinin defended
the MIG-29 donation to Lebanon as useful in bolstering the
Soliman government, noting that the package of military
assistance had been the product of negotiations. Previewing
the January 16 MFA statement, Vershinin urged renewed U.S.
investigation of the accident involving a Russian diplomatic
vehicle in Baghdad. End summary.

Russia Welcomes Anti-Smuggling MOU
--------------


2. (C) On January 16, we delivered ref A points on the
anti-smuggling MOU signed by the U.S. and Israel to MFA
Middle East and North Africa Director Vershinin, who welcomed
the U.S. initiative. Vershinin argued the MOU would make Tel
Aviv more likely to accept the Egyptian cease-fire proposal
under negotiation. Noting that FM Livni chose to travel to
Washington to sign the MOU while fighting in Gaza continued,
Vershinin concluded that Israel took seriously the
opportunity the agreement presented to halt weapons
smuggling, which would play positively in Israeli domestic
political terms. Vershinin quizzed us on the particulars of
the MOU, such as if it focused exclusively on weapons and
whether it would be binding upon the U.S. and Israel.


3. (C) Vershinin underscored Russian concern over the
increasing civilian death toll and worsening humanitarian
crisis in Gaza, which necessitated an immediate halt to
fighting. He noted that the GOR's response to the crisis had
been "balanced," with calls upon both Israel and Hamas to
avoid civilian deaths and take the necessary steps to reach a
cease-fire.

Hamas is Strengthened, Abbas Weakened
--------------


4. (C) Vershinin said that despite Israel's intention to
damage Hamas through its military incursion into Gaza, it was
Palestinian Authority President Abbas who would suffer
politically. The PA had no role in efforts to end the
crisis, while the Hamas leadership was in Cairo hammering out
a cease-fire agreement. Commenting that "aggression builds
solidarity," Vershinin thought that the crisis had
strengthened Hamas and unified its leadership, which would
complicate attempts to reach Palestinian reconciliation. He
quipped that the "two state solution" might best refer to
separate Palestinian entities in Gaza and the West Bank.
Vershinin sidestepped our question about the impact of the
crisis upon Iranian influence in Gaza, arguing generally that
Iran was being less provocative as it waited for new policy
initiatives from the Obama Administration.

Arab League Emergency Meeting
--------------


5. (C) Vershinin took note of the January 16 Arab League
emergency meeting in Doha, telling us that it was not a good
sign when the Egyptians and Saudis were sidelined in peace
process politics. He pointed out, however, that the summit
was not simply a meeting of radicals, with the Emir of Qatar,
Algeria's Bouteflika, and Lebanon's Soliman in attendance.
Ahmadenijad was there as well, indicating that although the
Arab states are concerned about Iranian influence, they still
see the need to engage with Tehran. Vershinin commented that
whereas the Arabs were once unified on the Palestinian issue,
it had become a serious source of division between moderates
and radicals, which was not in Russian or U.S. interests.
Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia also faced increasingly
difficult situations internally, as their populations were

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radicalized by televised images of Palestinian suffering
aired around the clock by Al-Jazeera.

The Roadmap is the Way Forward
--------------


6. (C) Vershinin stressed that Russia remained committed to
the roadmap, which was "not dead" despite the latest
complications in the region. The Quartet was an "excellent
process" through which to move forward and strengthen the
roadmap. Vershinin downplayed revisionist suggestions in the
region that the time to reach a two state solution had
passed, telling us that other solutions "would not work."
The GOR felt strongly that holding a Moscow Middle East
conference would provide an opportunity for the serious
discussion necessary to move the Israeli-Palestinian track
forward. Vershinin suggested March as a possible timeframe,
after upcoming elections in Israel and Palestine had
concluded, and following consultations on the Middle East by
the new U.S. Administration. He urged early U.S.-Russian
consultations on the peace process. Vershinin bemoaned the
fact that the expectations placed upon the Obama
Administration to radically change U.S. policies toward the
region were "too high."

MIGs to Lebanon
--------------


7. (C) Vershinin defended the decision to donate 10 MIG-29s
to Lebanon as "necessary" to strengthen President Soliman and
the Lebanese military against Hizbollah forces, which was in
both Russian and U.S. interests. Such an "investment" in
Lebanon would help enhance the country's internal stability,
which would, in turn, help the region. According to
Vershinin, the MIG-29s were included on the list DefMin Murr
presented to the GOR during his December visit, and were the
subject of negotiations. (Note: Vershinin probably was not
present during the meeting at the Russian MOD when the
subject was raised (ref B). End note.) He underscored the
positive Lebanese reaction to the Russian offer to donate the
aircraft, as well as tanks and other material. Vershinin
dismissed concerns over the regional military balance,
suitability of the aircraft for Lebanon's needs, and the
specter of a Hizbollah-dominated government with advanced
military hardware, arguing that supporters of Soliman had to
help him demonstrate the benefits of the Doha agreement.

Russia-Israel
--------------


8. (C) Vershinin specifically denied that Israel reacted
negatively to the Russian offer of MIGs to Lebanon. In any
event, he asked, what could 10 planes do against Israel?
Vershinin confirmed that the agenda of Israeli MOD Pol-Mil
Director Gilad's December visit to Moscow was topped by the
Iranian nuclear program and possible Russian S-300 sales. He
assured us that the GOR fully understood Israeli concerns on
both issues. Both Vershinin and, in a separate meeting, an
Israeli Emboff, described for us a less acrimonious visit by
Gilad than previously reported (ref C).

Russia Dissatisfied with U.S. Response on Iraq Accident
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Vershinin previewed for us the MFA statement, released
later on January 16, citing what the GOR called the "lack of
progress in the investigation of the American role" in the
November 19, 2008, accident involving a Russian diplomatic
vehicle in Baghdad. The statement complained that despite
Russia providing the U.S. with information on the incident,
the U.S.'s failure to determine who were the perpetrators
demonstrated a "reluctance to assume responsibility" for the
accident. We reiterated to Vershinin that the U.S. had acted
upon all the information provided to date by the GOR and had
found no information indicating U.S. involvement in the
incident. Vershinin joked that the GOR understood the U.S.
to be the highest authority in Iraq, and found it difficult
to believe that we could not ascertain responsibility. He
asked that U.S. efforts to gather information on the issue
continue.
RUBIN