Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW1110
2009-04-29 13:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

MFA ON OSCE AND UNOMIG MISSIONS, INCIDENT

Tags:  PREL PGOV RS GG AZ 
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P 291341Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3089
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001110 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG AZ
SUBJECT: MFA ON OSCE AND UNOMIG MISSIONS, INCIDENT
PREVENTION MECHANISM, GENEVA PROCESS, NAGORNO-KARABAKH

REF: A. TBILISI 808

B. MOSCOW 1053

Classified By: Pol M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001110

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG AZ
SUBJECT: MFA ON OSCE AND UNOMIG MISSIONS, INCIDENT
PREVENTION MECHANISM, GENEVA PROCESS, NAGORNO-KARABAKH

REF: A. TBILISI 808

B. MOSCOW 1053

Classified By: Pol M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In an April 28 meeting, MFA Fourth CIS
Director Kelin showed no signs of flexibility on the OSCE
mandate renewal. He downplayed prospects that a UN mandate
for Abkhazia could be extended to South Ossetia, but
predicted Russia's proposal for the UN mandate would
"surprise" the West by the scope of its transparency. A
UNOMIG redline will be Russia's insistence on its border
guards securing the administrative boundary line, as per a
GOR-Abkhazia security treaty. Kelin praised the results of
the first Incident Prevention Mechanism meeting, and said DFM
Karasin and EU Morel had subsequently reached agreement to
co-chair the meetings, with Ergneti remaining the venue, and
English and Russian the agreed languages. While Russia now
fully supports the Geneva Process, Kelin downplayed
humanitarian aid discussions, as South Ossetia already
received all the aid it needed from Russia and the Red Cross.
Kelin had low expectations for progress on Nagorno-Karabakh,
but told us that that Medvedev's talk of "new approaches"
that could "inject new notes" in resolution talks alluded to
the offer that the Minsk Group co-chair countries guarantee
peace in the Lachin corridor, obviating the need for an
international peacekeeping mission. End Summary.

--------------
OSCE: "We're the most important"
--------------


2. (C) In an April 28 meeting, MFA Fourth CIS Director
Andrei Kelin showed no signs of flexibility on the OSCE
mandate renewal, despite reiterating Russian support for an
OSCE presence in South Ossetia. Asserting that the Greek
proposal for one joint mission was unacceptable to South
Ossetia, Kelin instead called for flexibility from the West.
Acknowledging Russia was isolated in its opposition to the
Greek compromise, Kelin stressed "I realize it's consensus
minus one, but we're the most important." Maintaining that
Russia could not force South Ossetia to accept OSCE monitors
or status-neutral formulations in a mandate renewal decision,
Kelin said the OSCE observers' record before the August 2008

conflict had rendered the South Ossetians stubborn and
ideological, reducing Russia's influence. Dismissing as
"technical" the issue of permitting monitors to cross the
administrative boundary line (ABL) between South Ossetia and
Georgia proper, Kelin said the substantive issue at hand was
the combination of the three elements -- an OSCE mission in
Tbilisi, observers in Georgia, and observers in South Ossetia
-- in a manner acceptable to South Ossetia.


3. (C) Kelin was skeptical about German and other proposals
that a UN mandate expand to cover South Ossetia, should the
OSCE presence end. Geographic dissimilarities alone, he
said, made it impossible apply a demilitarized and restricted
weapons zone to South Ossetia. Tskhinvali was only 12 km
from the ABL and could not be left vulnerable to a Georgian
attack as was the case in August 2008. The irregular course
of the ABL in South Ossetia also necessitated staffing a
large number of border guard posts to control the many entry
points.


4. (C) During our extended exchange on the virtues of
Greece's creative ambiguity in circumventing status questions
in its proposals and the importance of the OSCE mission on
both sides of the ABL to provide transparency and increase
confidence, Kelin only reiterated South Ossetia's
"ideological" opposition to a mission that did not explicitly
reference South Ossetia in its title, and warned that too
much Russian pressure only entrenched South Ossetian
resistance.

--------------
UNOMIG: "Our proposal will surprise you"
--------------


5. (C) Kelin said Russia was looking for a constructive
approach in the UNOMIG mandate negotiations, and noted
Abkhazia's desire to retain UNOMIG -- even if only to benefit
from the jobs the UN's presence would create. Kelin repeated
Lavrov's positive assessment of elements on the UNSYG's
paper, but also underscored redlines. Both Russia and
Abkhazia rejected the presence of UN police in Abkhazia, and

MOSCOW 00001110 002 OF 003


started from the premise that Russian border guards would
protect the "borders." Kelin said details of the border
guard arrangements (as part of the broader defense MOU
reached earlier with Abkhaz authorities) would be public
"soon" and dismissed our objections to this breach of the
August 12/September 8 agreements. Cautioning that the GOR
was still forging interagency agreement on the
counterproposal it planned to submit before the May 15 SYG
report, he predicted "our proposal will surprise you" with
regard to its degree of transparency.

-------------- --------------
Incident Prevention Mechanism: "Much accomplished"
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Kelin described the first meeting of the Incident
Prevention Mechanism April 23 as a "good start" that had
"accomplished much." He related that DFM Karasin and EU
coordinator Pierre Morel had "resolved" a number of
outstanding questions that remained after the meeting (ref A)
in an April 27 telecon. The EU and Russia would co-chair the
meetings, Ergneti would remain the venue, and English and
Russian were the agreed languages for the mechanism. There
was still discussion on whether to investigate all incidents
since the August conflict, or only new ones as they occurred.
With the next meeting set for the May 1-10 timeframe, Kelin
said the international community should wait to see how the
mechanism worked. Noting that the Mechanism foresaw the
possibility of monitors crossing the ABL in order to
investigate incidents, Kelin called for "prudence" in light
of South Ossetian sensitivities toward the presence of
Georgian monitors in South Ossetia, and vice versa.

--------------
Geneva Process: "No aid for aid's sake"
--------------


7. (C) Kelin was not concerned by the lack of progress in
the second Geneva Process working group on humanitarian
assistance. Deflecting our questions over Russian press
reports onn the abysmal state of South Ossetia's
reconstruction, Kelin said Russia had resolved outstanding
concerns over accountability and that audit commission
chairman Stepashin and Emergency Situations Minister Shoigu
would travel to Tskhinvali to announce the breakthrough.
Russia was prepared to meet the needs in South Ossetia.
Noting Red Cross deliveries of assistance via Vladikavkaz,
Kelin said South Ossetia had no need or desire for aid
deliveries from Georgia "for aid's sake."


8. (C) In a departure from previous GOR statements, Kelin
said Russia now fully supported the Geneva Process. There
were not many venues for international discussion of Georgian
issues, and the Geneva format allowed South Ossetia and
Abkhazia to express their views and talk directly with
Georgian authorities, Kelin said.

--------------
EUMM: "We don't read their reports"
--------------


9. (C) Kelin reiterated criticism of the EU Monitoring
Mission, saying it was hard to judge its effectiveness since
"we don't read the EUMM's reports." He complained that the
EUMM observed but did not prevent incidents, and claimed it
had done nothing about Georgian large-scale exercises at a
tank training range west of Gori, which involved 28 tanks and
17 BMPs conducting live fire exercises since April 23. The
MOU on the EUMM's activities was defective in allowing for
significant military movements, Kelin said.

--------------
Georgia protests
--------------


10. (C) Kelin characterized the Georgian opposition as
divided and leaderless, posing no real challenge to
Saakashvili. The fact that Saakashvili would remain in power
meant that Abkhazia and South Ossetia could continue to be
spurred to deepen their independence. It was "inconceivable"
that Medvedev and Putin would agree to engage with
Saakashvili. Russia would support cooperation with Georgia
on the cultural and humanitarian levels, although requests
from the Georgia Orthodox Church for contact had revealed
there was not much to discuss.

MOSCOW 00001110 003 OF 003



--------------
Nagorno-Karabakh
--------------


11. (C) Kelin was pessimistic that the Turkey-Armenia
rapprochement would help spur a Nagorno-Karabakh resolution,
arguing instead that it had intensified Azerbaijan President
Aliyev's suspicions. Russia favored the rapprochement, Kelin
said, calling the prospective end to the blockade of Armenia
economically beneficial and stressed the "no-win" situation
that Russia found itself in with Aliyev. He confirmed that a
meeting between Aliyev and Armenia President Sargsian on the
margins of the St Petersburg Economic Forum in June was
contingent on the outcome of their May 7 meeting in Prague.
Kelin clarified that Medvedev's talk April 18 of "new
approaches" that could "inject new notes" in resolution talks
(ref B) alluded to the offer that the Minsk Group co-chair
countries guarantee peace in the Lachin corridor, obviating
the need for an international peacekeeping mission. There
were no Russian proposals that bypassed the Minsk Group,
Kelin said.


12. (C) Kelin reiterated that accusations of Russian arms
sales to Armenia were forged, and claimed Azerbaijan finally
had accepted this, too. Kelin contended the notion of
"sales" was unrealistic, as Armenia did not have money to buy
arms, and the amount of equipment in Armenia already
approached CFE ceilings. However, certain circles in both
Azerbaijan and Armenia opposed the settlement of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the disinformation campaign
was designed to raise suspicions at a critical moment in the
negotiations.
BEYRLE