EVO MORALES SEEKS INCREASED TRADE AND POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 000422

SIPDIS

WHA/BSC FOR MARY DASCHBACH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON SNAR EPET UY
SUBJECT: EVO MORALES SEEKS INCREASED TRADE AND POLITICAL
SUPPORT IN URUGUAY

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Robin H. Matthewman,
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

Summary
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1. (SBU) Bolivian President Evo Morales came to Uruguay on
July 13. During a seven-hour visit, he met separately with
President Tabare Vazquez, Vice President Rodolfo Nin Novoa,
and Governor of Montevideo Ricardo Ehrlich, and then gave a
midnight press conference before his departure. The most
substantial agreement signed, the Joint Communique
(Comunicado Conjunto),envisions increased cooperation on
economic and political issues, most notably Bolivian access
to Uruguayan ports, Uruguayan access to Bolivian gas, and
Uruguayan support for the Bolivian effort in the UN to obtain
international legalization of coca leaves (President Vazquez
called for a Ministry of Public Health study on the effects
of the coca leaf). The governments also signed an MOU on
consular issues, and Morales signed an MOU on biotechnology
cooperation between between the Uruguayan Pasteur Institute
and the Bolivian Ministry of Planning and Development. End
Summary.

Agenda and Highlights
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2. (SBU) Morales' visit began with a visit to the Uruguayan
Parliament and a call on Vice President Rodolfo Nin Novoa.
He then met with President Vazquez at the president's
residence, followed by a meeting with Montevideo's mayor,
Ricardo Ehrlich. In Montevideo City Hall, Morales addressed
an audience of 200 union leaders, government workers and
civil society leaders during which he praised Uruguay's
respect for democracy, high levels of literacy, and low
levels of discrimination. At that event, Morales recognized
the presence of Jose Mujica, the presidential candidate for
the ruling Frente Amplio (FA) coalition, with a strong
handshake and a hug (later, in a press conference, he noted
his admiration for Mujica and mentioned thinking of him as an
older brother to whom he would go for advice). After a
dinner with President Vazquez, the foreign ministers and the
ambassadors, Morales gave a press conference where he called
for equal rights for small countries in Latin America such as
Uruguay, Bolivia, and Paraguay, and the strengthening of
institutions like ALBA (the Bolivarian Alliance for the
Americas),which he compared favorably to what he described
as the "conditional" and "neoliberal" institutions supported
by the U.S.


3. (SBU) Morales also took the opportunity to claim
"first-hand knowledge" that "the empire, specifically
SouthCom" is responsible for the current situation in
Honduras, though no local news sources focused on this
accusation. His inflammatory remarks aside, Morales' primary
goals for the visit seemed to be the pursuit of access to
Uruguayan ports, re-opening of discussions on the
sub-regional integration project Urupabol (a currently
moribund association of Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia that
has been under discussion since 1963),and firming up support
for international legalization of the coca leaf.

Expanding Uruguayan-Bolivian Relations: Gas and Ports
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4. (U) The five-page Joint Communique touts "excellent
bilateral relations" and highlights in detail areas where
Uruguay and Bolivia are working together as well as areas in
which both presidents would like to deepen cooperation.
Politically, the document celebrates the countries' agreement
on: respect for national sovereignty; the value of
democratic institutions and support for Zelaya as the only
legal president of Honduras; the need for innovative social
programs to fight poverty; the importance of lifting the OAS
ban on Cuba's participation; the need to reform the United
Nations to allow for more equal participation; support for
each country's bid for a non-permanent UN Security Council
seat in 2016-2017 (Uruguay) and 2017-2018 (Bolivia); the need
for sustainable development and commitment to an
international response to climate change; support for the
elimination of coca leaves from the UN Commission on
Narcotics list of illegal substances; and the need to
strengthen UNASUR and its workgroups, specifically its
Counternarcotics Workgroup.


5. (U) Economically, the document outlines: Bolivian support
for Uruguay's upcoming Mercosur presidency; the need for a
meeting of the Administrative Commission for the Agreement of
Complementary Economic Relations between Bolivia and
Mercosur; progress on allowing Bolivian use of the ports in

Montevideo and Nueva Palmira; the importance of cooperation
on the Paraguay-Parana waterway; the importance of continued
science, technology and cultural cooperation; and Uruguay's
desire to share best practices on the One-Laptop-per-Child
Program.


6. (C) A principal Uruguayan goal in its relations with
Bolivia is improving Uruguayan access to Bolivian gas. Such
access could free Uruguay from its dependence on Argentina,
which has been an unreliable intermediary and provider in the
past. A pipeline constructed in 2002 between Buenos Aires
and Montevideo raised Uruguay's hopes of switching from
petroleum dependance to a gas-based economy (neither of which
are national resources). However, Argentina has been unable
to deliver at promised levels -- the pipeline has never
exceeded 5 percent of capacity -- and companies that had
outfitted for gas have had to revert back to oil. The GOU
continues to seek alternate sources, but no pipelines
currently exist that connect Uruguay to other countries.
Discussions of the possibility of expanding the pipeline
network in the southern cone and of Uruguay building a
regasification plant to allow the importation of liquified
gas continue, but absent a significant infrastructure project
there is no way for Uruguay to improve its access to Bolivian
gas that does not continue to involve Argentina.


7. (C) Meanwhile, it appears that Bolivia's priority for
relations with Uruguay is seeking access to the Atlantic
through Uruguayan riverine ports. At first glance, Uruguayan
ports could be a solution to Bolivia's ocean access troubles:
it is estimated that Bolivia can save USD 15 (25 percent
savings) per ton of exported soy by shipping it down the
Paraguay-Parana waterway to the Uruguayan port of Nueva
Palmira, as opposed to the Chilean port of Arica. Although
the GOU welcomes Bolivian use of their ports, the waterway
originates in Bolivia and goes through Paraguay and Brazil
before reaching Uruguay and Argentina, and several logistical
problems present themselves along the way. Political will to
remedy these problems (such as Brazil's failure to dredge the
Tamengo canal) is currently lacking.

Comment
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8. (C) The communique is packed with good intentions, but
those have been often manifested and rarely effectively
followed up in the region's recent history. Even considering
its frustration with Mercosur, it is doubtful that Uruguay
sees an enhanced relationship with Bolivia (or Paraguay) as
the lever via which to tilt the regional balance its way. FM
Fernandez told the Charge July 15 that the Communique
accurately described the results of the visit. In that case,
it appears that Morales's trip to Montevideo was basically a
feel-good exercise that may not have any tangible results.

Matthewman