SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)-

S E C R E T MONTEVIDEO 000142

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DS/IP/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019
TAGS: ASEC PTER UY
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)-
SPRING 2009

REF: 07558

Classified By: ASCHANDLBAUER, DCM, REASONS 1.4 (C)


1. (C) Summary: The Spring 2009 Security Environment
Profile Questionnaire (SEPQ) reflects continued lack of
police resources and concern over a very porous border. In
general, anti-US protests have declined in size and intensity
since March 2007.

END SUMMARY

Post provides the following numbered responses to the
questions posed in Reftel.

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Political Violence
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1. (SBU) Demonstrations

1-A. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country
capable of carrying out significant anti-American
demonstrations?

A: (S/NF) No, there are no ethnic or religious communities
capable of carrying out significant anti-American
demonstrations. There are Union and Political groups that
have conducted significant anti-American protests but they do
not represent a single ethnic or religious community.

(S/NF) An ethnic/religious group with the potential for
anti-American sentiments are the Muslim communities Located
along the Uruguayan/Brazilian border, such as Hizballah.
Some of these individuals have links to groups in the
tri-border region of Argentina/Brazil/Paraguay. However, the
diminutive Uruguayan Muslim community maintains a low profile
and would be unlikely to conduct public protests in
Montevideo against the U.S. They have however conducted
protest marches in the border town of Chuy.

1-B. Have there been anti-American Demonstrations in the
country within the last 12 months?

A: (SBU) Yes, several. Most recently there have been
protests against the Iraq war, against the Israeli incursion
into Gaza,in which the U.S. is denounced for being an
ally/supporter of Israel, and in support of Bolivia.

1-C. Have demonstrations taken place near or in front of U.S.
diplomatic facilities?

A: Yes.

1-D. What is the average size of an anti-American
demonstration?

A: (SBU) Average size 100. Announcements for planned
protests always advertise far more participants than the
number that actually shows up. Protests range from 50 to 200
with a high of 5,000. The 5,000 person protest took place in
March of 2007 in opposition to the POTUS visit to Uruguay.

1-E. Are anti-American demonstrations usually triggered by
U.S. foreign policy initiatives, military actions, or by
domestic issues?

A: (SBU) The main anti-American demonstrations were
triggered by political events in other parts of the world.
There were several protests in the city against the Israeli
incursion into Gaza, but the U.S. Embassy was not a target.
However, protesters denounce the U.S. as being an
ally/supporter of Israel. Leaflets recovered at the scene of
one Protest against Israel showed the American Flag next to
the Israeli Flag. At another anti-Israel protest, protesters
where heard chanting the phrase "Yankee go home".

1-F. Are demonstrations generally violent or peaceful?

A: (SBU) Generally peaceful with graffiti, minor property
damage, burning posters or effigies and/or throwing bottles,
paint bombs, or fireworks. A small splinter protest of about
20-30 individuals vandalized the Greek Embassy during a
protest against the Israeli Embassy.

1-G. If Violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage
to USG property or injuries to USG employees?

A: (SBU) No injuries and no damage to USG property yet.
Local police are able and willing to man barricades to
augment perimeter security, and have prevented protesters
from accessing the Chancery perimeter in the past.

1-H. If Violent, have any demonstrators ever penetrated our
perimeter security line?

A: (C) No demonstrators have ever penetrated our perimeter
security line. Improvements have been made to the chancery
perimeter, and local police can augment perimeter security
when needed, but protesters can get close enough to harass
the compound with paint bombs and similar nuisances. It is
nearly impossible to close off all the streets surrounding
the Chancery.

1-I. Have there been anti-government demonstrations in the
country within the last 12 months?

A: (SBU) Yes, there have been numerous protests against
both the city and the national government have taken place.
Many are triggered by or are in support of numerous labor
strikes.

1-J. have demonstrations taken place near or in front of U.S.
diplomatic facilities?

A: (SBU) Yes, protests often take place about a mile from
the Chancery, near City Hall, and on one of the main avenues.
An Obelisk, soccer stadium, and city park across the street
from the COMRES are often used as rally points for crowds of
thousands. Anti-American protests that take place in these
areas can easily turn into a march on the Chancery.

1-K. What is the average size of an anti-government
demonstration?

A: (SBU) Between 50-500.

1-L. Are demonstrations generally violent or peaceful?

A: (SBU) Generally peaceful with graffiti, minor property
damage, some throwing of paint bombs and fireworks. During
some protests masked demonstrators engaged in property
crimes, smashing windows, throwing bottles, throwing large
fireworks, attempting to provoke the police, burning tires in
the street, etc.

1-M. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage
to USG property?

A: (SBU) No damage to property yet.


2. (SBU) Macro Conflict Conditions

2-A. Is the Host Country engaged in an interstate or
intrastate conflict? (This may include battles between
organized and violent drug cartels.)

A: (SBU) No. However, Uruguay and neighboring Argentina
have a serious dispute over the construction of a wood
processing plant on the shared Uruguay River. Argentine
protest groups continue to block bridges and trucks for many
weeks at a time. While this is unlikely to evolve into
intrastate conflict the situation is problematic.

2-B. If an intrastate conflict, is it an insurgency limited
to a specific region or is it a countrywide civil war?

A: (SBU) N/A

2-C. If limited to a specific region, are any U.S. diplomatic
facilities located in this region?

A: (SBU) N/A

2-D. Have any of the factions involved in intrastate
conflicts signaled or demonstrated an anti-American
orientation?

A: (SBU) N/A


3. (SBU) Host Country Capabilities

3-A. Are law enforcement agencies professional and well
trained?

A: (S/NF) The Uruguayan National Police are relatively well
trained. However, the RSO classifies them as minimally
effective because of severe resource constraints. The police
do not have a sufficient number of patrol vehicles to conduct
patrols and/or pursue criminals. Most police officers
moonlight from 40-60 hours a week to supplement their
marginal salaries of $150-$200 USD per month. The police
have minimal funds for maintenance of existing vehicles,
equipment or facilities, and due to endless moonlighting the
police are often exhausted.

(C/NF) In their attempts to combat rising crime the police
are spread so thin they are becoming less and less dependable
in manning previously agreed upon police posts protecting our
USG facilities.

(C/NF) Current law heavily favors criminals, making
prosecution difficult, and often resulting in same-day
release with no charges pressed.

3-B. Have they been trained by U.S. agencies? If so, please
elaborate on effectiveness of training.

A: (C/NF) Uruguayan Customs, Immigration, and selected
police units (Intelligence, Narcotics) have received training
from U.S. agencies, however the training has been limited to
relatively small groups. We received a small amount of
funding ($50,000) in 2008 for counter-narcotics.

3-C. Are law enforcement agencies confronted with serious,
widespread corruption inside their agencies?

A: (C/NF) There is some petty corruption at the street
level, but the level of known corruption in Uruguay is
relatively low when compared with the rest of South America.

3-D. Are the intelligence services professional and capable
of deterring terrorist actions?

A: (C/NF) the Uruguayan Intelligence agencies (Military and
Police) are professional and are cooperating with the USG to
deter terrorist threats. The police intelligence service is
relatively effective and works closely with us and
neighboring Intel services on Intel sharing.

3-E. Have the intelligence services been cooperative with
U.S. Embassy requests for information and support?

A: (C/NF) Yes in general.

3-F. Assuming there have been significant terrorist threats
in recent years, have host country security services been
able to score any major anti-terrorism successes?

A: (SBU) There have been no significant threats.

3-G. Has host country been responsive (re: timeliness and
allocation of resources) to Embassy requests for protective
security?

A: (SBU) Yes.

3-H. How does the Embassy assess the overall security at
major airports in the country? (excellent, very good,
good/average, or poor)

A: (C/NF) Good/Average in Montevideo, poor at small airports
in the interior. Since 09/11/01 the Uruguayan government has
enlisted the support of Uruguayan Air Force security
personnel to screen passengers. They are moderately
effective in screening passengers. U.S. carriers also have
their own baggage screening programs. However, U.S. carriers
have reported deficiencies in screening airport vendors,
screening airport personnel and controlling ramp access.
Small airports in the interior have minimal to zero security.

3-I. How effective are customs and immigration control
agencies? (effective, average, or ineffective)

A: (SBU) Average at the airport and seaport in Montevideo.
Ineffective or non-existent outside of Montevideo. Most of
the 985 KM land border between Uruguay and Brazil is
completely open. The new director of Customs has made some
progress, but has a lot of work ahead of him.

3-J. How effective are border patrol forces? ( effective,
average, or ineffective)

A: (SBU) Ineffective. The Uruguayan government controls
only major land and sea border crossings. Most of the 985 KM
long land border with Brazil is wide open with only sporadic
attempts at control and easily avoided fixed checkpoints.

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Indigenous Terrorism
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4. (SBU) Anti-American Terrorist Groups

4-A. Are there indigenous, anti-American terrorist groups in
country?

A: (SBU) No. the only former domestic terrorist group, the
Tupamaros, are now affiliated with the ruling political party
the "Frente Amplio" or Broad Front.

4-B. If yes, how many? Please name groups.

A: (SBU) N/A

4-C. Have groups carried out anti-American attacks within the
last 12 months?

A: (SBU) No.

4-D. Were any of these lethal attacks?

A: (SBU) N/A

4-E. Have groups attacked U.S. diplomatic targets?

A: (SBU) N/A

4-F. Have groups attacked U.S. business, U.S. Military, or
U.S. related targets?

A: (SBU) Not since the 1970's when they kidnapped and killed
an American Citizen U.S. Embassy employee.

4-G. Have groups limited their attacks to specific regions or
do they operate countrywide?

A: (SBU) N/A

4-H. If attacks are limited to regions, are there any U.S.
diplomatic facilities located in these regions?

A: (SBU) N/A


5. (SBU) Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups

5-A. Are there other indigenous terrorist groups (not
anti-American) in country?

A: (SBU) No.

5-B. If yes, how many? Please name groups.

A: (SBU) N/A

5-C. Have groups carried out attacks in the capital or in
areas where U.S. diplomatic facilities are located?

A: (SBU) N/A

5-D. Were attacks lethal and/or indiscriminate?

A: (SBU) N/A

5-E. Have any Americans been killed or injured in these
attacks?

A: (SBU) N/A

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Transnational Terrorism
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6. (SBU) Transnational Terrorist Indicators

6-A. Are there any foreign terrorist groups that have a
presence in country? Provide names.

A: (S/NF) Hamas and Hizballah do not have a presence in
Uruguay but they do have a permanent presence on the
Brazilian side of the Uruguay/Brazilian border and in the
tri-border region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. Some
ETA members and many sympathizers reside in Uruguay.

6-B. How does post assess this presence? Is it an operational
cell? Financial cell? Support cell? Propaganda cell?

A: (S/NF) Post is not aware of functioning operational
terrorist cells in Uruguay. However Hamas and Hizballah
conduct fundraising and financial operations on the Brazilian
side of the Brazil/Uruguay borders. There is anecdotal
evidence of possible money-laundering activities in Uruguay
and banking secrecy laws would tend to support this activity.

6-C. Is the host government sympathetic to these groups?

A: (C/NF) Post is not aware of the government's views
toward foreign terrorist groups. However the Uruguayan
government is partially sympathetic to the governments of
Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, and increasingly more with
China.

6-D. Are there suspect non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
in the country that have a relationship with any of these
groups?

A: (SBU) No.

6-E. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country
that are sympathetic to these groups?

A: (S/NF) Yes, there is a small Muslim community located
along the 985 KM Uruguayan /Brazilian border, in the
Uruguayan departments of Rivera and Rocha. Some estimates
put as many as 9 million persons of Middle Eastern extraction
living in Southern Brazil. Some may have links to other
groups in the tri-border region of Argentina/Brazil/Paraguay.

6-F. How does post assess the level, intent, and scope of
hostile intelligence services ( Iran, Cuba, Russia, China,
Syria, Venezuela, Sudan, et. al.) in country relative to
potential anti-American terrorist acts?

A: (S/NF) Venezuela, Cuba, Russia, China and Iran all have
a relatively large embassy presence in Uruguay. Some of the
officers in these embassies are known hostile intelligence
officers. The Russian Embassy has an inordinate amount of
known hostile intelligence officers. The EAC is aware of the
presence of the Iranian Embassy as a potential operations
platform for Hizballah activities in the region. The EAC
believes that Cuban and Venezuelan intelligence operatives
may become more active in the future. China is making
political inroads in Uruguay through donations of technical
equipment and selling military equipment to the host
government. The EAC has no knowledge of planning for
terrorist acts.

6-G. How does post assess the availability of weapons and
explosives in country or from nearby countries for hostile
terrorist elements?

A: (C/NF) Weapons and explosives are readily available due
to the porous land borders with Argentina and Brazil. Both
Argentina and Brazil manufacture weapons and explosives.
Montevideo has a sizable seaport which serves neighboring
countries. Small shipments of weapons have been discovered
mixed in with legitimate cargo and in vehicles that were
randomly stopped crossing the border. The potential for
weapons or explosives trans-shipment through Uruguay to/from
Paraguay is high. Furthermore Uruguay is a largely
agricultural country that utilizes both fertilizers and
explosives for farming and mining. These readily available
elements have the potential to be used to construct an IED.

(C/NF) Since Paraguay is landlocked almost all container
traffic comes through the port of Montevideo, Uruguay. If
illegal arms shipments, drugs, counterfeit merchandise are
going to or from Paraguay via container, odds are that they
transited the ports of Colonia and/or Montevideo.


7. (U) Point of Contact is RSO William A. Maxwell at
Commercial Tel (011)5982-418-7777 ext. 2319, IVG
818-223-0000, STU x 2190.
Matthewman