SAN PEDRO MAYOR-ELECT PLANS HARDHITTING CAMPAIGN TO IMPROVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MONTERREY 000344

SIPDIS

DS FOR IP/ITA AND IP/WHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/17/2019
TAGS: KCRM PINS SNAR ASEC PHUM PGOV MX
SUBJECT: SAN PEDRO MAYOR-ELECT PLANS HARDHITTING CAMPAIGN TO IMPROVE
SECURITY

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CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Principal Officer, Consul
General Monterrey, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary. In a September meeting with the Mayor-elect
of San Pedro, Nuevo Leon (the city with the highest per-capita
income in Mexico),this incoming municipal chief executive
provided us with a pessimistic assessment of the degree of narco
infiltration into the Monterrey area's political leadership and
set forth his aggressive plan to counter such influence in his
jurisdiction. Inter alia, Mayor-elect Mauricio Fernandez (a
former federal Senator) stated that during his campaign
organized crime had offered him a 50 million peso campaign
donation, which he did not accept, although he assumed that many
of the other mayoral candidates in neighboring cities had taken
the money. Subsequent to his victory in the July 5 voting, the
trafficking cartels had contacted him and other area
Mayors-elect to make clear to them what these officials would
and would not be permitted to do in the field of public
security. End Summary.


2. (C ) On September 11, Consul General and RSO met with San
Pedro Mayor-elect Mauricio Fernandez (PAN),at the latter's
request. San Pedro, Nuevo Leon is the home to many of the
area's elite `Group of 10' industrial heavyweights, and is the
city with the highest per capita income in Mexico. Per
Fernandez (and other analysts too),until 2005 narco-capo Arturo
Beltran Leyva resided in the city and to this day cartel family
members continue to live in the municipality under assumed
names. All of the Consulate's direct-hire American employees,
and several of the higher-ranking FSNs, live in San Pedro as
well.


3. (C) During the course of the hour-long conversation,
Fernandez made the following points:

--- While there is public concern about the influence of the
cartels, civil society is in general unaware of the degree to
which the cartels have infiltrated key state and municipal
institutions. All of the region's police forces are controlled
by organized crime. In the case of San Pedro, the ABL cartel
called the shots although a 15-person advance squad from la
Familia was present in the city and trying to gain a foothold
among the police force. (Separately, the former San Pedro
Secretary of Public Security reports that La Familia has been
engaged in such efforts intermittently since 2006.) As for the
other police forces in the area, the Gulf Cartel was the true
master. In general, and as was the case in San Pedro, the
cartels did not attempt to bribe the municipal secretaries of
public security, but bought off the number two and number three
level officials on the force. Note: The mid-September
detention by state law enforcement authorities of the Municipal
Secretary for Public Security of Santiago (a Monterrey suburb)
would represent an exception to this rule. End Note.
--- Notwithstanding the desire of the ABL cartel to keep San
Pedro a safe haven for family members, the cartel sponsored
kidnappings and extorted businesses within the city. All
restaurants paid protection money, ranging up to 50,000, and
even 100,000, pesos per month. As for kidnappings, he said, the
week prior three individuals had been abducted.
--- Organized crime had offered all local mayoral candidates
campaign monies. He himself was offered the grandiose sum of
50 million `even though San Pedro was not a trafficking plaza
and the city had only one casino.' Although Fernandez, already
a wealthy man, did not take the money, he assumed that others
were offered more and had taken the cash. He thought that the
incoming Mayor of Monterrey, former PAN Federal Deputy Fernando
Larrazabal, would have had no choice but to accept the money
given the pressure from the cartels. In any event, organized
crime contacted all of the victorious mayoral candidates after
the election to make clear to them the rules of the road.
--- After an unsuccessful kidnap attempt against his daughter,
Fernandez had moved his immediate family out of the country.
--- San Pedro's vaunted C-4 (communication, coordination, and
control center) had been corrupted by the mob. Cameras only
covered one of the 24 roads leading into the city, seven of the
city's secure radios had disappeared (thus compromising the
network),patrol officers had learned how to disconnect the GPS
devices in their vehicles. Seventy-two San Pedro police
officers were dirty, he said, of which 32 had already been
relieved; he had plans to the works to dismiss the remaining 40.
Note: separate sources report that, based on 2006 polygraph
tests, a full one-fifth of the San Pedro police force had
committed crimes or taken bribes from the cartels. Despite
having had access to this information for three years, the
current Mayor had made no effort to dismiss these officers and
it was estimated that the percentage of narco-cops on the force
was now even higher. End note.

MONTERREY 00000344 002.2 OF 002




4. (C) Fernandez stated that he had recently met with
high-level officials such as Jorge Tello Peon, President
Calderon's Deputy National Security Advisor (and a part-time
Monterrey resident); General Luis Moreno Serrano, the Army's top
general in Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, and San Luis Potosi; and
Javier Trevino Cantu, the transition chief for the Nuevo Leon
Governor elect. The consensus was, he continued, was that
working together, PRI Governor elect Rodrigo Medina and other
elected officials in the area had approximately a year in which
to reverse the situation; otherwise, it would be difficult to
reclaim lost ground. He envisioned a working partnership
between the military, the PGR, the state, and San Pedro, noting
that the region's other municipalities were too far gone to join
the fight. (An inter-city anti-drug strike force contemplated
by various other incoming mayors will likely end up being too
corrupted to do much good.)


5. (C) Specifically, Fernandez outlined the following
program, part of which he had already started to implement, to
safeguard San Pedro. First, he would work with the private
sector to establish dedicated taxi companies for the city so
that residents would have confidence in the reliability of
public transport. Second, he would support those neighborhoods
which wished to restrict public access to vehicular and foot
traffic. In addition, the city would seek to regulate real
estate rental contracts to prevent gangsters from occupying
houses in residential neighborhoods. Note: Others close to
Fernandez are advocating that individual neighborhoods
contribute to pension plans that would help officers assigned to
their district when they retire. End Note.


6. (C) Third, Fernandez noted his prior announcement that
retired Army General Miguel Gonzalo Adalid Mier, who previously
held a variety of security-related positions in Mexico, would
serve as his municipal Secretary of Public Security. In the
past, Adalid Mier has served as state Security Secretary in
Michoacan, Chief of Staff of the PFP, and Secretary (and prior
to that Under Secretary) for Public Security in Mexico's Federal
District. Fernandez stated that Alier would serve as the public
face of his security team, a figure whose presence and career
experience would generate increased citizen confidence. Adalid
Mier's deputy, another Army veteran, would head a team of
experts designed to gather information on the activities and
whereabouts of cartel elements. This intelligence would then be
turned over to a 13-15 member reaction squad, which would be
directed by the Mayor but not officially appear on the city's
payroll. CG noted the difficulties that Colombia had
experienced with private entities engaging in law enforcement
activities, pointing out, in particular, that such groups, once
constituted, are prone to abuses themselves. Fernandez said
that the information-gathering unit had already identified the
new ABL plaza boss for the city and that the reaction squad had
already been partially established and had undertaken a few
tasks.


7. (C) Fernandez said that he had met with the Group of Ten in
an effort to pay for equipment/salaries for the intel and the
reaction squad. He still needed US$1.4 million for the intel
unit and US$500,000 for the reaction unit. In the end, he felt
that business contributions would fund the entire program as
well-heeled companies would prefer to pony up to make the city
safe than to pay protection money to the cartels. In follow-up
meetings between post RSO officials and General Adalid Mier,
however, the latter inquired about the possibility of Merida
Initiative funding for vetting, training and equipment.


8. (C) Comment. During the mayoral campaign, charges were
raised that, if elected, Fernandez would seek to "negotiate"
security with the ABL cartel. Based upon our conversation with
him, it looks as if he has gone in the other direction:
removing his family from the country, formulating a plan to
concentrate security decision-making in the mayor's office, and
reaching out to the powerful local business community for
support. He admits, however, that even if he is successful, his
recipe is one that likely could not be duplicated by other
Mexican municipalities. Few cities have such powerful corporate
benefactors and, even more importantly, while the ABL cartel
might not take kindly to a smaller presence in the city, a safer
San Pedro would prevent rival cartels (read la Familia) from
moving in and would help protect those ABL family members
residing in the city.
WILLIAMSON