Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MONTERREY261
2009-07-07 17:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Monterrey
Cable title:  

PAN FAILS TO RETAKE GOVERNORSHIP OF NUEVO LEON

Tags:  PGOV ECON KCRM KCOG MX 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHMC #0261/01 1881701
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071701Z JUL 09
FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3816
INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 4886
RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 9408
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MONTERREY 000261 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/7/2019
TAGS: PGOV ECON KCRM KCOG MX
SUBJECT: PAN FAILS TO RETAKE GOVERNORSHIP OF NUEVO LEON

MONTERREY 00000261 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Consul General, Monterrey,
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MONTERREY 000261

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/7/2019
TAGS: PGOV ECON KCRM KCOG MX
SUBJECT: PAN FAILS TO RETAKE GOVERNORSHIP OF NUEVO LEON

MONTERREY 00000261 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Consul General, Monterrey,
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (SBU) Summary. The PRI retained the governorship of Nuevo
Leon and took majorities in the state legislative and
congressional delegations in an election that focused heavily on
economic and security issues. The PAN managed to retain control
of the state capital, Monterrey, and other important
municipalities. The election results appear to be clean but
both the PAN and PRI exploited weaknesses in the new election
laws to their advantage. The new governor-elect of Nuevo Leon,
36-year old Rodrigo Medina, is expected to continue the policies
of the current governor. End Summary.


2. (SBU) In the state of Nuevo Leon, the PRI used its much
vaunted party structure to bring out its voters and maintain
control of the governorship despite a strong national effort by
the PAN party. Overall, voter turnout was 53%, but much higher
in PRI regions such as the heavily populated city of Guadalupe
which ended up being the deciding factor in the governor's race.
The PRI was also able to win back the majority in the state
legislature and capture additional seats in the federal
congress. Except for a handful of small towns, the
municipalities held by the PAN or the PRI did not change hands,
including the state capital of Monterrey which remains with the
PAN.


3. (SBU) While President Calderon remains popular in the
state, local economic issues trumped security in the election
booths. Polls show Calderon consistently scores an approval
rating in the high 60's. Dr. Camilo Contreras Delago, a
director at Mexico's Colegio de a Frontera Norte, a publicly
sponsored think tank, believes that Calderon's strong stance
against the drug cartels is largely responsible for his approval
rating. However on economic issues, the local PRI party was
better able to communicate how it would generate employment and
otherwise alleviate the effects of reduced incomes and lowered
remittances (i.e. social spending). Whether talking about the
economy or security issues, candidates from both sides were

rhetorically very similar, highlighting the few ideological
differences between the two parties in Nuevo Leon. The voters
were motivated to chose a candidate they felt would most likely
bring change. Both candidates studied the 2008 presidential
campaign of President Barack Obama and often used the same
language or images of the Obama campaign to invoke this idea of
change.


4. (SBU) Both of the main local political parties worked
vigorously to exploit the new election laws enacted in 2007 and

2008. There were 74 complaints registered with the State
Electoral Commission (CEE) prior to the elections. Most of the
complaints appeared to be legitimate violations but the CEE has
only issued fines in two cases - one against the PAN and one
against the PRI. Starting with the new pre-campaign season
designed to bring transparency to the candidate selection
process, both parties scrapped their plans to have voter
primaries and instead chose their candidates by the traditional
direct designation method (i.e. `dedazo'). By choosing
candidates early on, each party was able to extend the normal
campaign season an additional 60 days. Negative campaigning,
strictly prohibited in the election laws, was rampant. Both
parties also attempted to link the other to drug trafficking
organizations. In one case, the PRI party accused the PAN of
organizing the grenade attacks against the Consulate and the
local Televisa Outlet. Meanwhile, the PAN charged that the PRI
candidate's father had employed relatives of an arrested drug
trafficker in his household staff.


5. (SBU) To circumvent campaign spending limits, candidates
illegally used public resources and also anonymous third parties
to fund campaigns. Both parties used their government employees
to campaign on their behalf and gave away free food and gifts to
win votes. The PRI governor often advertised his
administration's accomplishments or announced new public works
for the benefit of his party. The governor also provided free
water and public transportation for much of the campaign season.
Not to be out done, PAN President Calderon visited the state to
announced discounts on natural gas prices and his secretary of
social development also announced new projects in the state.
On the issue of outside funding, the governor's brother was
discovered to have been operating a call center to make
automated calls disparaging PAN candidates. To bypass
restrictions on television advertising, it is widely speculated
that Rodrigo Medina paid broadcasters to provide positive
coverage. A study by the local newspaper, El Norte, reports
Rodrigo Medina appeared 2.5 times more often in television
interviews.


6. (C) There have been no reports of illicit money having a
direct impact on the campaign. Prior to the elections, both
the head of the CEE and the local IFE representative downplayed
the possibility of drug trafficking organizations influencing
the outcome. They both insisted that the two parties have a
strong incentive to police their own candidates to protect the
national party. (Note: Local experts contend one of the

MONTERREY 00000261 002.2 OF 002


reasons for the use of the dedazo during the primary season was
to prevent the embarrassment of choosing a corrupt official.
Originally, one of the leading gubernatorial candidates for the
PAN was Adalberto Madero, the current mayor of Monterrey whom
business leaders have accused of engaging in `corruption
without limits.' End Note.) Meanwhile, the controversy
surrounding PAN candidate (now mayor-elect) of San Pedro,
Mauricio Fernandez and a clandestinely-taped recording
indicating that he was willing to negotiate with drug
traffickers to keep the city safe did not stick. The tape was
only a partial inconclusive recording of a conversation and
Fernandez has a strong reputation for transparent government.
While PRI Senator Eloy Cantu believes that the PRI made a strong
effort to shield its campaign from narco-influence, he does not
think that the same can be said about the PAN. Cantu contended
that the worse police force in the Monterrey region was that in
San Nicolas - where one of the female officers was the
girlfriend of the Gulf Cartel plaza boss and many officers were
on the take. The fact that the PAN ran the San Nicolas Police
chief on its ticket for federal deputy - something it did not
have to do since that seat is a safe one for the PAN - showed
the party's true colors.


7. (SBU) Post fielded a team of 11 election observers to
monitor polling stations in the metro Monterrey area and also
the CEE headquarters. The election process throughout the state
was generally very peaceful and orderly, with only scattered
complaints of late openings at some polling stations. From a
planning and logistics perspective, the CEE also received high
marks from both the observers and the political parties. There
was one unconfirmed report in the small border town of Anahuac
that an armed gang was terrorizing PAN supporters.


8. (C) Comment. The recent election was less a referendum on
President Calderon than a vote on local economic issues. This
election did, however, provide some insight into what to expect
in the 2012 election if the electoral commissions are not given
sufficient authority or if there are no changes to the election
reform laws: shortened campaign seasons will result in negative
advertising, and campaign spending limits will encourage the use
of public resources by incumbent parties and the use of
unaccountable third parties.


9. (C) Comment continued. Governor-Elect Rodrigo Medina will
likely continue the policies of the current governor, Jose
Natividad Gonzalez Paras, with emphasis on small businesses,
trade and education. Medina joined Gonzalez Para's cabinet in
2007 and the latter has been mentoring him ever since. Post
officers know Medina well and have had frequent and positive
contact with him. Because the majority in the local legislature
will pass from the PAN to the PRI, Medina will not encounter the
same kind resistance that Gonzalez Paras faced. Medina's
efforts to increase social spending will be hampered only by
budget deficits caused by the economic recession. On the issue
of security, Medina has called for increased cooperation with
the federal government to take on drug trafficking
organizations, and he appears serious about cleaning up local
police forces through additional training, mandatory lie
detector tests and drug tests. End Comment.
WILLIAMSONB