NUEVO LEON AND COAHUILA LEADERS SEEK TO "OUTSOURCE" PUBLIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MONTERREY 000218

SIPDIS

DS FOR IP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/11/2019
TAGS: KCRM ASEC SNAR CASC PHUM PGOV MX
SUBJECT: NUEVO LEON AND COAHUILA LEADERS SEEK TO "OUTSOURCE" PUBLIC
SECURITY

REF: MONTERREY 213

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CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Principal Officeer, Consulate
Monterrey, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
1 . (C) Summary. Recent confrontations in Nuevo Leon
between military units and local police have left the public
with even less confidence in the capabilities of state/municipal
law enforcement. On June 9, three key Nuevo Leon business
associations publicly called for the military to take over
municipal policing functions in the state. On June 10, Coahuila
Governor Humberto Moreira told us that, at his request, SEDENA
was sending 9 high-ranking military officers to assume command
of three key state security posts and police forces in six major
cities (including the state capital, Saltillo). Meanwhile,
Monterrey's largest companies, following the example of industry
leaders in El Salvador, plan to provide the Nuevo Leon state
police with resources, training, and expertise to help bust up
local kidnapping rings and strengthen the rule of law. Industry
leaders had apparently considered an alternative plan, one in
which privately-funded and operated units dispensed vigilante
justice, but the idea of collaborating with the state to provide
comprehensive assistance won out. Both the calls for the
militarization of municipal policing and business efforts to
upgrade state law enforcement capabilities reflect the
frustration that private sector leaders and ordinary citizens
feel regarding the ever-growing tentacles of organized crime and
the apparent powerlessness of local elected officials to change
the situation. End Summary.


2. (C) With the Mexican military's campaign to arrest corrupt
state/local cops in the Monterrey metro region continuing (see
reftel),on the evening of June 8 the municipal police forces
struck back. When military forces sought to arrest a female
police officer from the working class suburb of San Nicolas, San
Nicolas commanders called for reinforcements -- which resulted
in an impromptu police protest in one of the city's main
thoroughfares. San Nicolas police forced trapped motorists from
their cars at gunpoint, thereby blocking a busy intersection.
Successive requests from both sides for back-up led to a
face-off between 150 military/federal officers, 100 municipal
police from three jurisdictions (Escobedo, Guadalupe, and San
Nicolas),and 40 state officers -- all of whom were armed and a
number with grenades in hand and rifles aimed and ready to fire.
After a nerve-wracking three-hour standoff, federal forces
ended up taking away the female police officer, who happened to
be a key operative for, and the girlfriend of, San Nicolas's
Gulf cartel plaza boss.


3. (SBU) Aghast, on June 9 leaders from Monterrey's three
main business associations -- CAINTRA, COPARMEX, and CANACO --
jointly called for the military to take over the local police
function in Nuevo Leon. With state elections less than 4 weeks
away, Governor Gonzalez Paras (PRI) and state Security of Public
Security Fasci both rejected this proposal, arguing that
protection of the citizenry needed to remain a state/local
responsibility. Even the opposition PAN candidate for governor
agreed, stating that `militarization never will be the right
answer.' Nevertheless, Public Security Secretary Fasci reported
that during questioning the detained female police officer had
admitted that 315 of San Nicolas's 500 officers were on the Gulf
cartel's payroll. To help prevent repetitions of the June 8
stand-off, however, Fasci ordered that all the state's municipal
police forces would be stripped of their long arms and
henceforth would have to rely upon only pistols. Fasci also
prohibited municipal police throughout the state from carrying
cell phones as such devices represent a channel through which
organized crime capos can transmit their orders to `narco' cops
in the field.


4. (C) For its part, after a brief lull the military plans to
continue with its wave of detentions, which now totals 96, 78 of
which have already been arraigned. The campaign will hit all
cities within the Monterrey metro area, with those officers who
end up being convicted going to either federal or, more likely,
state prison.


5. (C) On June 10, CG and DPO received a visit from Coahuila
Governor Humberto Moreira (PRI). The Governor repeated past
statements he has made to us to the effect that on security
issues he trusted no one except the USG and the Mexican
military, pointedly excluding his recently-appointed state
attorney general/security czar from that list. Moreira said
that to improve security in Coahuila state, he had requested
SEDENA military command in Mexico City to send him military
personnel. Within a few days, he continued, he would have in

MONTERREY 00000218 002.2 OF 003


place 5 generals and 2 colonels, three of whom would serve as
the state's police chief, investigations unit chief, and prison
director and four of whom would command the police forces of
four major cities: i.e., Saltillo (the capital),Paras,
Ciudad Acuna, and Piedras Negras.


6. (C) The general being sent to Piedras Negras would replace
a colonel who had been recently assassinated. This time the
general would be accompanied by a contingent of 25 soldiers; the
other detailees would bring with them a military staff of 10,
along with an armored car provided for by the state government.
The state envisions the arrival of two generals to take command
of the municipal police forces in Torreon and Sabinas as well,
although given the conflictive situations in both of these
cities, especially Torreon, these deployments would need to wait
several months. Moreira stated that the state would pay for the
construction of a 250-soldier cuartel in both Torreon and
Monclova, with key U.S. firms in Monclova helping to pick up the
tab there. The current prison in Monclova would be converted to
a maximum-security prison; its existing inmates had already been
redistributed to other institutions around the state. Finally,
he said, the state and Mexican navy were constructed a base
along one of the state's border lakes with Texas to prevent the
smuggling of both narcotics (northbound) and weapons
(southbound).


7. (C) Back in Nuevo Leon, impatient with the progress the
state's law enforcement authorities have made in rolling up
local kidnapping rings, Monterrey's business elite has decided
to lend a helping hand. On May 26 and June 11, representatives
from the Group of Ten (the traditional local heavyweights)
briefed CG and A/Legatt on a private sector initiative to
supplement the state's crime-fighting capabilities via an
integrated support plan. Based on a previous effort undertaken
in El Salvador by industry leaders there, the plan contemplates
that business would: a) work with the state police anti-kidnap
unit to provide training, funding, and equipment, b) push the
state legislature to modernize anti-kidnapping laws and other
criminal statutes, c) improve the state's judicial and
penitentiary systems, and d) inhibit corruption and promote
increased civilian participation and greater civic values.
Industry leaders had apparently considered an alternative plan,
one in which privately-funded and operated units dispensed
vigilante justice, but the idea of collaborating with the state
to provide comprehensive assistance won out.


8. (C) Jose Antonio Fernandez (CEO of the Monterrey-based
FEMSA Corp.) told us that this industry-led and funded effort
sought to draw upon the local tradition of big business pitching
in when the state government encountered difficulties. The
centerpiece of their plan was working with the authorities to
upgrade the state's response to the surge in kidnappings. The
most important step -- and the most difficult one -- would be to
ensure that honest, competent officers were assigned to the
state anti-kidnap unit. Fernandez's right-hand man, security
consultant Mauricio Ramos, observed that the new recruits would
need to be well-vetted and well-compensated; currently, some
officers assigned to that unit earned a mere 6500 pesos (US$500)
per month. Our interlocutors noted that while official state
figures showed a total of 19 kidnappings for 2008 (all of which
had been solved),in reality data compiled by private security
consultants indicated the commission of more than 250 such
crimes last year. Because of the fear of retribution few
families report kidnappings, they said, since the police
themselves may have actually committed the crime.


9. (C) Other elements of the plan would include training for
prosecutors and judges, the institution of a `faceless judges'
system in cases involving organized crime, the establishment of
a pool of psychologists/consultants to help the families of
kidnap victims, reforms to the state's revolving door
penitentiary system, human rights and Culture of Lawfulness
training, and encouragement for ordinary citizens to report
crimes and otherwise involve themselves in the debate on public
security issues. Fernandez noted that Governor Gonzalez Paras
had embraced the concept and that both the PAN and the PRI
gubernatorial candidates had pledged to support it should they
prevail in the upcoming July 5 election. To avoid politicizing
the issue, the consensus was that Fernandez and other business
leaders would not go public with this initiative until after the
election.


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10. (C) Comment. Civil society is desperately seeking
ways to stop organized crime from hijacking control of its local
security institutions. Both the calls for the militarization of
municipal policing and business efforts to upgrade state law
enforcement capabilities reflect the frustration that private
sector leaders and ordinary citizens feel regarding the
ever-growing tentacles of organized crime and the apparent
powerlessness of local elected officials to change the
situation. Post will continue to promote Culture of Lawfulness,
institution-building/rule of law, and human rights training
programs under the Merida Initiative among our local contacts.
In addition, post's A/Legatt will explore the possibility of
providing technical training and assistance to vetted state
anti-kidnap units in the region.
WILLIAMSON