NUEVO LEON STATE PUBLIC SECURITY SECRETARY SEES A MIXED

210012
2009-06-03 17:37:00
09MONTERREY210
Consulate Monterrey
CONFIDENTIAL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MONTERREY 000210

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS/IP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/3/2019
TAGS: KCRM ASEC SNAR CASC PGOV MX
SUBJECT: NUEVO LEON STATE PUBLIC SECURITY SECRETARY SEES A MIXED
FUTURE FOR ANTI-CRIME EFFORTS

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CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Consul General, Monterrey,
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
1 . (C) Summary. In a recent conversation Nuevo Leon's
chief public security aide told post officials that after nearly
two years in office he was leaving the state in better shape
than he found it. However, he added, significant amounts of
work would need to be done by his successor before Nuevo Leon
could rely on state/local police to confront organized crime.
Indeed, offering `plata o plomo' narco-traffickers were easily
able to recruit allies among the law enforcement community, as
the authorities had no capacity to protect officers threatened
during the course of their official duties. End Summary.


2. (C) On May 28 Consul General and RSO met with Nuevo Leon
state Public Security Secretary Aldo Fasci to get his
perspectives on the status of government efforts against
organized crime. Fasci, a lawyer by trade, has served nearly
six years in Nuevo Leon's law enforcement apparatus - four as
deputy state procurador and coming up on two as public security
secretary. He clearly relished the prospect of handing over the
reins to his successor sometime shortly after the upcoming July
5 gubernatorial election, and hoped that the continuing series
of death threats he received would cease after he left office.


3. (C) Fasci opined that Monterrey had quieted down compared
to the previous year given the emergence of an effective
intel/interdiction capability on the part of the local Mexican
army command. He saw recent attempted mob hits in the area as
friction between the Gulf Cartel and the Arturo Beltran Leyva
band as the narco-traffickers sought to reorganize after a
string of high-profile detentions by the military. Indeed, he
noted that the word on the street was that the two cartels
jointly planned to bring in a high-level figure to help right
operations. Fasci stated that non-narcotics related abductions
were also declining in the wake of arrests by his state police
of members of several kidnappings rings. (One reliable
independent security consultant we spoke with the same day
disputed this assertion, noting that information pools from
various security industry sources had resulted in a tally of 200
non-drug related kidnappings in 2008 and that 2009 was
proceeding at the same rate.)


4. (C) As he does in many of his public statements, Fasci
lamented the precarious condition of Nuevo Leon's
state/municipal police forces. A good number of the region's
local cops worked for the drug cartels, he said, either out of
greed or fear. The state, as well as some cities, had made
progress in raising police salaries to reasonable levels, but
what they were finding is that they have no way to protect
officers who are threatened in the course of their official
duties. In February during the wave of narco-inspired street
demonstrations, a state police commander arrested one of the
protest organizers. Several days after refusing a cartel demand
to release the detainee, the commander was gunned down outside
his house. Note: on June 1-2, subsequent to our meeting with
Fasci, military troops, supported by state police elements,
surrounded municipal police installations in three cities in the
metro area (Monterrey, Apodaca, and San Nicolas) to arrest
suspected narco-cops. Subsequently, the military detained five
`big fish': the Monterrey city Transit Secretary and the
municipal Secretaries of Public Security for the satellite
cities of Guadalupe and Escobedo, along with their police
chiefs. Per preliminary June 3 reports, all five have now been
released.


5. (C) Looking back, Fasci opined that one mistake Nuevo
Leon had made was to view the current wave of violence as simply
a problem to be handled by the police. In reality, he
continued, a multi-disciplinary effort would be needed if any
lasting progress was to be made. Defensive policing could help
to protect the public from common crime, but an offensive
capability - to be supplied by the military forces - was
necessary to attack the cartels. Meanwhile, public relations
and community outreach needed to be undertaken at the political
level to urge citizens to report crimes and other suspicious
events to the authorities. (Note: during the past two years,
Fasci himself has had two relatives kidnapped and it appears
that no one filed an official `denuncia' in either incident
after the victims were released.)


6. (C) Another dead-end, Fasci lamented, had been his efforts
to get neighboring U.S. states, such as Texas, to provide
training to Nuevo Leon's police forces. Discussions on joint
training within the U.S.-Mexico Border Governor's Conference had
foundered, he said, because of disagreements among U.S. states
(California vs. Texas/Arizona) and lack of funding. Meanwhile,
Merida initiative funding although welcome, took so long to

MONTERREY 00000210 002.2 OF 002


disburse that it had not proven any help, he observed. Finally,
while the Governor had inaugurated Nuevo Leon's ballyhooed C-5
center (so named because it would coordinate the activities of
various municipal C-4 centers),Fasci admitted that in many ways
the building remained a hollow shell since the state did not
have funds to pay its contractor - Northrop-Grumann - for needed
communication software.


7. (C) Looking ahead, Fasci hoped to provide informal
assistance and counsel to his successor once he left office.
As there is a tradition in Nuevo Leon, and Mexico in general, of
nominating political insiders - and not security professionals -
to the office of Public Security Secretary, his successor may
have a steep learning curve at the outset. All of his aides
and unit chiefs would be new to the job as fresh faces were
rotated in. Reflecting upon what happened to him, Fasci noted
that upon assuming the Secretary-ship in September 2007, his
staff received unexpected, highly-detailed tips about organized
crime safe houses. After weighing whether the information was a
set-up or not, he decided to send his officers in - whereupon
they seized significant quantities of narcotics, arms, and cash.
Only later did he realize, Fasci commented, that the tips the
Secretariat had received were from the traffickers themselves.
This `gift' upon entering office was intended to trick him into
believing that he oversaw an effective, reliable police force
(which he does not).


8. (C) Comment. Though Fasci claims that the state police
are in better shape now than when he took office, this
contention is debatable. While he has made progress in raising
police salaries, he told post officials upon entering office
that during his tenure he planned to create a separate clean
police force and sideline the corrupt cops by assigning them to
pointless jobs like guarding buildings -- and none of this has
happened. In the end, he likely discovered that there were too
many rotten apples and not enough money to support the few good
ones.
WILLIAMSON