SCENESETTER ON UN ISSUES FOR LIBERIA VISIT OF UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONROVIA 000318


USUN FOR AMBASSADOR RICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019
TAGS: UNSC PREL PGOV ECON OVIP LI
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER ON UN ISSUES FOR LIBERIA VISIT OF UN
SECURITY COUNCIL, MAY 19-20, 2009

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Brooks Robinson for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (U) America has always had a special place in the hearts
of Liberians and that esteem has grown since the end of the
civil war. Thousands of Liberians found refuge in the United
States during the war, and around 400,000 Liberians, from a
population of fewer than four million, now call America home.
The United States expedited Charles Taylor's departure by
sending Marines to facilitate the arrival of Nigerian
peacekeepers, and advocated deployment of the United Nations
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Liberians appreciate that the
United States is the country's leading donor, with bilateral
assistance since 2003 of over $1 billion plus an equal amount
in assessed contributions to support UNMIL. American aid
targets security and judicial sector reform, education,
health, and overall economic revitalization, including
infrastructure rehabilitation.


2. (U) Progress is clear. The Department supported
elimination of UN sanctions on Liberian timber and diamond
exports and is working to create the monitoring program that
will keep those resources from funding future violence.
Electrical power is slowly returning to Monrovia, with U.S.
and other funding, and the main roads are being repaved with
World Bank funds. The number of commercial flights is
increasing, and Delta Airlines may begin service later this
year.


3. (C) Despite the progress, Liberia remains a fragile state.
Liberian security forces will require additional staffing,
training and equipment to secure the gains made in
establishing peace and security. Other donors, mainly China,
vie for influence in Liberia but share our commitment to
stability and growth. President Sirleaf has been
particularly astute in maintaining a beneficial relationship
with China while ensuring that Liberia remains firmly aligned
with the United States, and our relations with our Chinese
counterparts are collegial. France and Great Britain also
view a stable Liberia as important for the security of their
interests in the region, and other European presence is
increasing. All donor partners coordinate closely and are
committed to establishing a stable, peaceful and prosperous
Liberia.


4. (C) From our meetings with the recently-concluded
Technical Assessment Mission (TAM),we have the impression
the TAM shares our conclusion that the situation in Liberia
remains far too fragile for a precipitous UNMIL withdrawal.
Perhaps both President Sirleaf and UNMIL are victims of their
own success; President Sirleaf by providing donors and
investors the confidence to take risks in Liberia, and UNMIL
by maintaining peace and stability so well that it can be
taken for granted.

Inclusion is Key
--------------


5. (C) Perhaps the most difficult challenge for President
Sirleaf is to maintain the confidence of the Liberian people
that all will benefit from her economic and political
initiatives. Too often we hear that the old elite, who found
safe haven in the United States or elsewhere during the war,
are now returning to retake their prerogatives. The reality
is far more complex: a delicate balance of power has emerged
between the established families and the warlords who created
their power bases during the war and whose representatives
now serve in the Legislature and even the Cabinet. As
evidence of change, Liberian society is the most open it has
ever been. The press, including radio, is free and
frequently (albeit often irresponsibly) criticizes the
government. The government, through outreach such as the
Poverty Reduction Strategy consultations, is making
unprecedented efforts to include formerly ignored or
marginalized populations, holding meetings in each county and
specifically with women, elders, youth, the business
community and civil society organizations.


6. (C) Liberia cannot return to the 1970's status quo, where
a few families controlled the resources while indigenous
Liberians from the "hinterland" remained uneducated and
without hope of having political and economic influence.
Samuel Doe's 1980 coup and the civil war that began in 1990
ripped the oligarchy from power, but the former families are
back, they still have power (and land),and many have mixed
feelings about sharing access to resources with their fellow
Liberians. Liberians must recast themselves as members of a
peaceful, prosperous, diverse West African state that has a
unique relationship with the United States, but also works
closely with their democratic neighbors. Despite almost six
years of peace, Liberians remain wary, fearing this is just
another lull before the country again falls into violent
chaos. The desire for reform is tempered by fear of change.
This ambivalence must be confronted quickly, or Liberia will
be unable to attract the talent and the investment needed to
create a brighter future (especially jobs) for Liberians so
they will not be lured back into conflict.

Peace and Security
--------------


7. (U) Under the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the
United States was given the lead to establish a 2,000 soldier
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) outside of the UN system. To
date, slightly over 2,000 troops have been recruited, vetted
and trained in basic military skills Once SSR training is
complete (by December),the U.S. contractors will be phased
out and the United States will continue training through
active duty military mentors and traditional mil-to-mil
training programs. At that point, UNMIL will also
participate in the training.


8. (U) However, the AFL will not be a fully operational,
independent army any time soon. Senior officers need to be
selected so the command structure can mature. By 2012, the
AFL should be sufficiently trained at the company level to
allow for some joint patrolling with UNMIL, relieving UNMIL
of some of the burden.


9. (C) The 2,000 figure was chosen only for budgetary
reasons, without regard to a threat assessment. A more
reasonable number based on likely threats would be closer to
5,000, but the GOL has not yet demonstrated that it can
sustain even the present number. For that reason, it appears
most practical to leave the number as it is, and grow the
number when the GOL can afford it. The other alternative,
adding 3,000 ill-trained, ill-equipped and under-paid
soldiers to the AFL would create more problems than it would
solve. We understand that President Sirleaf and the TAM have
come the same conclusion.


Police Issues - a Weak Link
--------------


10. (SBU) Progress on rebuilding the Liberia National Police
(LNP) remains slow, despite efforts by UNMIL, the United
States and other donors to turn the LNP into an effective
democratic force. At 3,800 recruits, the LNP force is too
small to fulfill its mandate, which would require a minimum
of 6,000. However, the GOL cannot even sustain the current
number and the sight of police soliciting bribes to survive
is common. The police are not well equipped, and lack
sufficient communications or mobility. The LNP's ability to
investigate crimes remains rudimentary, and the judicial
system is unable to effectively prosecute cases that are
investigated.


11. (C) President Sirleaf has recognized the problem, and
plans to remove present Inspector General of Police Munah
Sieh-Browne (the only female police chief in Africa) with a
younger man from the National Security Agency. (He is
currently finishing a ten-month USG-sponsored training
program in the U.S.) Sirleaf has also repeatedly indicated
that she would like a lead country, preferably the U.S. but
possibly the UK, to take over the rebuilding of the LNP as
the U.S. has done with the AFL. For us to assume UNMIL'S
responsibility for police would require a funds at a level
similar to that of our SSR program (at $50 million each of
the last two fiscal years). Therefore, there is no feasible
alternative to continued UNMIL oversight. What we can do,
however, is take more of a leadership role in coordinating
with UNMIL.


12. (SBU) We have had some success using this model. Under
UN auspices, the United States has taken the lead in training
and equipping an armed Emergency Response Unit (ERU),using
$5 million in FY 2007 supplemental and additional INCLE funds
(and an additional 1 million Euros from Ireland). Training
began in January 2008, and the first 210 of a projected
500-officer force are operational. The U.S. UNPOL contingent
designed lesson plans for the training, chose trainers from
other national contingents to conduct the training, drafted
the Standard Operating Procedures and, once the ERU was
operational, has led the advisor team for the ERU.

UNMIL Drawdown
--------------



13. (C) The preliminary Phase III drawdown plan proposed by
the SYG is premised on the fact that UNMIL will need to
provide significant logistical and security support for the
October 2011 Presidential and Legislative elections. While
support for the elections is not presently part of UNMIL's
mandate, successful elections are key to Liberia's future,
and it is our assessment that the elections will not succeed
without UNMIL's help carrying out he elections. The TAM told
us in their outbrief they agreed.


14. (C) In the several by-elections we observed, the GOL had
to pull resources from other areas of the country, which
would not be possible in a national election. Even then,
UNMIL logistical support was essential. Presidential
elections will bring a higher turnout, more scrutiny and
higher tensions than the by-elections, and require far more
resources than the GOL will command.


15. (C) Given this reality, we agree with the premise that
UNMIL requires a presence in all 15 counties to provide
security throughout the election period. After the
elections, when the police have asserted more authority in
the outlying areas and the AFL can begin joint patrols, the
policy can be revisited during a fourth phase of the drawdown.


16. (C) The TAM has also briefed us that they saw little fat
to cut from UNMIL. They recognized that logistics in Liberia
are far more challenging than in the surrounding countries,
and they saw no mission creep by UNMIL into development.
Development is carried out by the traditional UN agencies,
who need UNMIL to provide the logistical and security support
without which they could not perform their functions. The
UNSC will hear in Buchanan how the major investors would not
have invested without the presence of UNMIL, and would cut
their losses and leave if they believed a premature UNMIL
exit would create instability. Even the U.S. Embassy would
not be able to function effectively without UNMIL
cooperation.

Liberia Sanctions
--------------


17. (C) Since the European Court of Justice decision on the
Qadi case, there has been increasing international pressure
to resolve the cases of individuals on the UN Asset Freeze
and Travel Ban lists. However, two significant events in
June argue a delay in any delistings. The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) will issue its final report
at the end of June, which will include about 150 names
(including perhaps many on the Travel Ban and Assets Freeze
lists) to be recommended for prosecution. The TRC has
conducted extensive hearings from both victims and alleged
perpetrators of the 14-year civil war, and an inquiry unit of
the TRC has analyzed the testimony and has sought
corroborative evidence.


18. (C) At about the same time, the UN Panel of Experts (POE)
will present its interim report, and will provide a database
of all names, with both public and sensitive information
gathered on the individuals and entities. That will enable
the Sanctions Committee to make a more informed decision on
delisting and allow for a substantive response when a
delisting request is denied.


19. (C) It appears the GOL is moving closer to a decision to
work with the POE in freezing and recovering assets from
non-Liberians, primarily the arms dealers, transportation
companies and financiers who profited from the civil war.
However, an unfortunate leak of the discussions between the
POE and GOL has forced President Sirleaf to deny publicly
that the GOL is targetting any Liberians. Her primary motive
appears to be that she does not want to galvanize a
formidable opposition in the 2011 elections. The opposition
is presently weak and in disarray, but if the pro-Taylor
factions believe their livelihoods are in jeopardy they may
move to finance a strong campaign against her.


20. (C) After June, the pressure will mount again to remove
names and entities from the lists. The Liberian government
needs to give a clear indication now as to where it wants the
sanctions to go so that the international community can
develop a new way forward on Liberian sanctions.

ROBINSON