Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MONROVIA147
2009-02-20 16:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Monrovia
Cable title:  

LIBERIA: VOLUME I OF TRC REPORT PUBLISHED, ICGL

Tags:  PREL PGOV EAID LI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MONROVIA 000147 

SIPDIS

STATE AF/W FOR GAREY AND DRL FOR COOKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID LI
SUBJECT: LIBERIA: VOLUME I OF TRC REPORT PUBLISHED, ICGL
DISCUSSES ONGOING PROBLEMS

REF: 2008 MONROVIA 1064

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield for reasons 1.4 B and D.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MONROVIA 000147

SIPDIS

STATE AF/W FOR GAREY AND DRL FOR COOKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID LI
SUBJECT: LIBERIA: VOLUME I OF TRC REPORT PUBLISHED, ICGL
DISCUSSES ONGOING PROBLEMS

REF: 2008 MONROVIA 1064

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield for reasons 1.4 B and D.


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
submitted Volume I of its Final Report to the GOL December 19
(reftel) and just recently made it public on its website
(www.trcofliberia.org). The report included a list of the
"most significant" warring factions (see paragraph 5) and two
key recommendations for the future: 1) the establishment of
special domestic court to try perpetrators recommended for
prosecution, and 2) the creation of a "National Palava Hut
Forum" to promote reconciliation at all levels. At their
February 5 meeting, members of the International Contact
Group on Liberia (ICGL),including us, were pleased the TRC
managed to submit the report before the December 21 deadline
to avoid possible legal challenges to its mandate (reftel).
However, the ICGL remained concerned about several
significant problems facing the Commission. First, although
all eight TRC Commissioners signed off on the original
report, three have since disassociated themselves from it.
One of those three, Commissioner Shiekh Kafumba Konneh, is
under investigation following allegations he was a recruiter
for the ULIMO-K warring faction. Konneh may have helped his
son-in-law, a TRC transcriber, steal a TRC laptop full of
sensitive data and flee to New York; his son-in-law
subsequently was granted asylum. Another dissenting
Commissioner, Pearl Brown Bull, leaked to former warlord
Prince Johnson a highly classified list of up to 180 names of
perpetrators the TRC was considering recommending for
prosecution. The ICGL agreed there are real risks to the
physical security of the Commissioners and resolved to
petition the President to ask the GOL to provide the TRC more
protection. However, all ICGL members agreed that the
biggest risks to the Commission now are the seemingly
deliberate internal attempts by Konneh and Bull to undermine
it. END SUMMARY.

VOLUME I: FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS
--------------


2. (U) The TRC submitted Volume I of its Final Report to the
President and Legislature December 19, 2008 in order to avoid

any potential legal challenges on the validity of the
Commission's legal mandate (reftel). Volumes II-IV will be
published in June 2009 at the end of the TRC's final
Legislative extension. In Volume I, the TRC found that
economic and political inequalities between the
Americo-Liberian settlers and the indigenous people of
Liberia dating back to 1822 sowed the seeds for the 1989-2003
conflict. Poverty, greed, ethnic tension, and land disputes,
however, fueled the violence. External state actors in
Africa, Europe, and North America aided and abetted the war
in Liberia "for political, economic, and foreign policy
advantages." The TRC found all warring factions used child
soldiers, kept sexual slaves, and committed other human
rights violations to the degree that each one violated
domestic law, international criminal law, international human
rights law, and international humanitarian law, including war
crimes violations. The Commission determined prosecutions
are necessary to promote justice and reconciliation and to
fight impunity, but said it would not recommend anyone for
prosecution who truthfully admitted all his/her wrong-doing
under oath. The TRC deemed reparations at the individual and
community levels are needed to restore human dignity and
declared there would be a general amnesty for all children
and those who committed lesser crimes.

VOLUME I: RECOMMENDATIONS
--------------


3. (U) The TRC made two significant recommendations in Volume

I. First, a special domestic court should be set up to
prosecute the alleged perpetrators the TRC determines were
responsible for "egregious" crimes, "gross" human rights
violations, and "serious" violations of humanitarian law. In
their February 5 meeting, International Contact Group on
Liberia members were concerned about how the GOL would pay
for such a court. The TRC's second recommendation was that
the Independent National Human Rights Commission (INHRC)
would manage a "National Palava Hut Forum" that will set up
Palava Hut Committees in each of Liberia's 64 legislative
districts and will promote reconciliation at the local level.
Delegates from the local Palava Hut Committees would then
represent their district at a National Reconciliation
Conference aimed at fostering collective unity. The ICGL
said it looked forward to details of how the "National Palava
Hut Forum" would specifically lead to reconciliation in
Volumes II-IV. (NOTE: The correct spelling of "Palava" is
"Palaver" but the TRC uses the former spelling. END NOTE.)

MONROVIA 00000147 002 OF 004



VOLUME I: LIST OF WARRING FACTIONS
--------------


4. (SBU) As noted in reftel, the Commissioners intentionally
withheld the names of the perpetrators the TRC is considering
recommending for prosecution from Volume I because they
feared for the safety of TRC staff and their families. They
did, however, publish a list of warring factions and divided
them into "Significant Violator Groups" and "Less Significant
Violator Groups" based upon the number of violations reported
to the TRC. (NOTE: The quantity and types of violations were
analyzed by the California-based human rights NGO Benetech
through their DRL grant. Benetech's final report will become
an annex to the TRC's final report when it is published in
June. END NOTE.) The ICGL was pleased the list of warring
factions was included and felt it constituted enough
information in this initial report to withstand possible
legal challenges by perpetrators after the December 21, 2008
deadline.

SIGNIFICANT VIOLATOR GROUPS:
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)
Liberia Peace Council (LPC)
Militia (NOTE: It is not clear to Post what this means. END
NOTE.)
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)
United Liberation Movement (ULIMO)
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)
United Liberation Movement-K (ULIMO-K)
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL)
United Liberation Movement-J (ULIMO-J)
Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU)

LESS SIGNIFICANT VIOLATOR GROUPS
Vigilantes
Lofa Defense Force (LDF)
Liberia National Police (LNP)
Special Operations Division of the LNP (SOD)
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SATU)
Special Security Unit (SSU)
Special Security Service (SSS)
National Security Agency (NSA)
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Criminal Investment Division (CID)
Rapid Response Unit (RRU)

PROBLEMS WITHIN THE COMMISSION
--------------


5. (C) All eight Commissioners originally signed off on
Volume I of the report, but four Commissioners -- Vice
Chairman Dede Dolopei, Rev. Gerald Coleman, Sheikh Kafumba
Konneh, and Counselor Pearl Brown Bull, subsequently
disassociated themselves from it. They felt the TRC should
not have bowed to ICGL pressure to turn part of the report in
by December 21 and instead should have completed the entire
report at the end of the Commission's mandate in June 2009.
Coleman, who has always been cooperative with the ICGL, has
since abandoned his dissension and now agrees the Commission
needed to turn in Volume I on time. Dolopei, Konneh, and
Bull claim that, while they do not dispute the contents of
the report, they never had a chance to submit their input.
TRC Chairman Jerome Verdier, however, argues the three
refused to be part of the drafting process all along.
(COMMENT: Embassy notes that Dolopei, Konneh, and Bull have
not been as engaged on the TRC as the other Commissioners and
have had ongoing personality clashes with most of the TRC
staff. END COMMENT.)

KONNEH POSSIBLY PART OF WARRING FACTION
--------------


6. (C) Four TRC witnesses have publicly testified that
Commissioner Konneh recruited them to join the ULIMO-K
warring faction. Konneh, who is the only Muslim member of
the Commission and was selected to help show religious
diversity on the TRC, denies ever working for ULIMO-K.
President Sirleaf appointed a magistrate to investigate but
he recently died of malaria and the investigation stalled.
(COMMENT: Surprisingly, Konneh's possible connection with
ULIMO-K never surfaced during the international community's
vetting process of the Commissioners in 2004-2005. END
COMMENT.)


7. (C) It now appears that Konneh may have helped his
son-in-law Amara Kamara, a TRC transcriber, travel to America
to claim asylum with a TRC laptop that may contain the

MONROVIA 00000147 003 OF 004


evidence linking him to ULIMO-K. Verdier told PolOff that
Amara Kamara was one of the TRC's brightest transcribers and
they began a project in 2007 to track perpetrators whose
names came up repeatedly in witness testimony. Verdier first
became aware of Konneh's potential link with ULIMO-K through
Kamara's work, but did not know at the time that Kamara was
Konneh's son-in-law. Commissioners Konneh and Dolopei
allegedly added Kamara to the TRC official delegation list to
attend Diaspora hearings in Minnesota without Verdier's
knowledge. Kamara was issued a visa for the trip, but he
skipped out with his TRC laptop, which Verdier worries
contains all the information Kamara had compiled on Konneh.
Konneh claimed and was granted political asylum in New York,
but Post only learned of his case when the Consular Section
received a petition for his wife and child to join him.
(COMMENT: It is believed that Konneh deliberately helped his
son-in-law use the TRC hearings to travel to the States not
only to immigrate to America, but also to cover up any trail
that may have proved he was a ULIMO-K recruiter. END
COMMENT.)

BULL LEAKED NAMES OF PURPETRATORS TO WARLORD
--------------


8. (C) Commissioner Bull has long been a problem personality
among the TRC Commissioners, but her recent actions may put
all of the Commissioners' security at risk and may undermine
the entire TRC process. Verdier told PolOff that just after
Volume I was submitted to the Legislators, Bull leaked the
classified list of up to 180 names of perpetrators the TRC is
considering for prosecution to former Independent National
Patriotic Front of Liberia warlord and current Senator Prince
Johnson. Johnson publicly threatened that conflict will
return to Liberia if prosecutions take place. Verdier told
PolOff that Johnson had a photocopy of Bull's
individually-numbered close-hold copy of the list.


9. (C) It appears Bull is now using her close personal
connections with a Supreme Court Justice to get back at
Verdier for confronting her about the leak to Johnson.
Associate Supreme Court Justice Jamesetta Howard-Wolokolie, a
personal friend of Bull's, made a bizarre decision January 28
to suspend Chairman Verdier from practicing law in Liberia
for six months. Wolokolie alleges Verdier did not obey a
court order to reinstate Bull after her suspension for
holding office in two GOL Commissions (something specifically
prohibited in the TRC Act). ICGL members recognize Verdier
allowed Bull full rights as a Commissioner from the moment
the order was issued (even though Bull never resigned from
the other commission) and wonder if the ruling itself was not
illegal. Verdier believes the suspension was unjustified but
told PolOff he is too busy now as TRC Chairman to fight it
and did not plan to practice law again for another six months
anyway. (COMMENT: The ICGL sees Wolokolie's inexplicable
ruling as proof the TRC would not be treated objectively at
the Supreme Court if the Commission were ever legally
challenged. END COMMENT.)

COMMISSIONERS' SECURITY AT RISK
--------------


10. (C) ICGL members are concerned about the physical
security of the Commissioners, especially because the list of
individual perpetrators has been leaked. The TRC asked the
GOL for extra security last September but the GOL has yet to
respond. The Commissioners have each been given $500 out of
the TRC's budget for 24-hour guards at their homes but that
will only last for a few months. Several of the
Commissioners have received threatening phone calls. Deputy
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Henrietta
Mensa-Bonsu asked ICGL members to consider ways to formulate
an "exit strategy" for the Commissioners, possibly by sending
them to university in another country. The Ambassador
suggested that ICGL members should first urge the President
to provide the Commissioners better GOL-led security, which
the ICGL agreed to do.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) The TRC deserves credit for turning in a
comprehensive report to the President and Legislature before
the December 21 deadline to avoid legal challenges. Volumes
II-IV will hopefully provide more detail on the special
domestic court and the National Palava Hut Forum, but Volume
I at least provides a good outline of the TRC's
recommendations should the Supreme Court reject the validity
of the subsequent volumes. That Volume I is as good as it is
is remarkable given the challenges the Commission, and
particularly Chairman Verdier, are facing. All ICGL members

MONROVIA 00000147 004 OF 004


agree the biggest threat to the TRC is undoubtedly internal,
with Konneh and Bull having (unknown) personal vested
interests in the Commission's failure. As evidenced by
Wolokolie's order, Supreme Court rulings related to the TRC
are unlikely to be objective. It is therefore crucial that
the five trustworthy Commissioners double their efforts
between now and the end of the TRC's mandate in June to write
a meaningful report. Volumes II-IV must be contain coherent
recommendations that can be implemented by the Independent
National Human Rights Commission, withstand legal challenges,
and, most importantly, inspire reconciliation among the
Liberian people who want a better future for their country.
THOMAS-GREENFIELD