CIUDAD JUAREZ AT A TIPPING POINT

196778
2009-03-13 13:36:00
09MEXICO748
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
09CIUDADJUAREZ22
VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHME #0748/01 0721336
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 131336Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5614
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC


C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 000748

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: CIUDAD JUAREZ AT A TIPPING POINT

REF: CIUDAD JUAREZ 000022

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary. The federal government has dramatically
expanded the size and scope of Joint Operation Chihuahua by
ordering the deployment of an additional 5,000 troops and
some 2,000 federal police officers to Ciudad Juarez in an
attempt to combat high rates of violence in the area. The
chain of command and division of responsibilities remains
unclear. More clear is the dramatic -- if possibly temporary
-- drop in violence since the arrival of the federal forces.
No one seems to know for sure what is responsible for the
diminution in violence, but Consulate officers do note a
reduction in tension among the city,s residents. There
seems to be broad agreement in Ciudad Juarez in identifying
several key next steps necessary to achieving any lasting
improvement in the city's security situation. While local
observers do not necessarily see Joint Operation Chihuahua as
infinitely sustainable or desirable, the presence of federal
forces bearing the burden of local law enforcement activities
may provide a window of opportunity for reconstructing the
city's ruinous municipal police, which is critical to a
long-term, sustainable improvement in Ciudad Juarez's
security environment. The window is closing fast, however,
as the local government moves forward with its efforts to
create a 3,000-strong police force, with or without a clear
strategy or endgame in mind. End Summary.

Joint Operation Chihuahua: Mechanics...
--------------


2. (C) In response to a then unprecedented spasm of violence
in Ciudad Juarez and throughout the State of Chihuahua during
the first three months of last year, the federal, state, and
local governments announced in March 2008 the start of Joint
Operation Chihuahua. The centerpiece of the Operation was
the deployment of some 2,000 military and 500 federal police
forces who were reportedly instructed to work with their
state and local law enforcement counterparts to combat the
insecurity resulting from a bloody feud between the competing
Juarez and Sinaloa cartels (ref a). While Joint Operation
Chihuahua succeeded to an extent in disrupting the cartels,
narcotics trafficking networks, as a public security effort
the Operation proved to be a significant failure.
Recognizing this, on February 25, 2009, the National Security
Council unveiled a new plan to dramatically increase the size
and scope of the operation as bloodshed in Juarez continued
to escalate in the first months of 2009. Federal, state, and
local leaders in Juarez, as well as state delegates from the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the National
Action (PAN),told Poloffs that the federal government's
decision to expand Operation Chihuahua was a response to a
direct petition by PRI Governor Jose Reyes Baeza for help in
quelling the violence, although Operation spokesman Enrique
Torres Valadez indicated that the federal government pressed
the governor to accept additional aid. The federal
government has announced plans to deploy an additional 5000
troops and 2000 federal police officers to the area to retake
control of what was a quickly deteriorating situation. So
far, some 2000 of those additional soldiers and 500
additional federal police have arrived on station and begun
to take up policing duties in Ciudad Juarez.


3. (C) Secretary of Public Security (SSP) Genaro Garcia Luna
laid out for Embassy NAS Director on February 27 a six-point
strategy for the Operation, which contacts in Juarez across
the board indicated is being implemented. The strategy
includes: 1) retaking control of the streets; 2) closing down
hubs for blackmarket activities; 3) seizing the city's two
Centers of Communication, Command, and Control (C-4s),which
serve as a sort of local security coordination center; 4)
installing throughout the city a number of new surveillance
cameras; 5) assuming customs responsibilities; and 6) taking
control of the municipal police leadership, which has been
absent since the second in command was assassinated on
February 17, 2009 and the police chief resigned three days
later. According to contacts in local government and from
the Operation, they have already done the first three items,
will be taking control of customs this week, and are
formalizing authority over municipal police responsibilities
on March 13.


4. (C) The chain of command and division of responsibilities
in Joint Operation Chihuahua is unclear. According to Torres
Valadez and Consulate law enforcement officials, the military
is the top Operation authority and General Felipe de Jesus
Espitia, the Commander of Zone 5 who is based in Chihuahua
City but frequently travels to Juarez, is primarily running
the show. The city is divided into six sections, with a
colonel responsible for each one. The military runs its own
command center in Juarez, which is not an integrated
facility, and contacts were vague on the role C-4 centers
will play in the process. There appears to be a great deal
of suspicion among the various entities, the exception being
a generally effective working relationship between the army
command and the state attorney general,s office. There is
limited information sharing, although some contacts reported
that -- with the exception of the Juarez municipal police,
with which no other organization shares reporting -- this
problem may be in the process of resolution. The top
military, federal, state, and local police officials, as well
as the mayor and officials from the governor's office, meet
on a weekly basis to coordinate activities.



5. (C) It is similarly difficult to discern how the Joint
Operation Chihuahua surge will play out on the ground and the
role the municipal government will or will not play. The
military was scheduled to assume full control of municipal
police leadership and responsibilities on March 13, and
Consulate law enforcement officials and local contacts noted
that municipal officers are technically supposed to ride
along with soldiers to make arrests for non-federal offenses.
Poloffs did not see any such joint patrols or fixed posts
and question whether the military, which has a distrust of
the police at all levels, is so willing to deeply engage
their civilian counterparts. Operation Spokesman Torres
Valdez vaguely said that "all forces" are supposed to arrive
on the scene when arrests are made, but offered few details
as to the mechanics or legality of such a convergence.
Ciudad Mayor Jose Reyes Ferriz, who has for years resided in
El Paso, supposedly has at least some authority over city
security policy and rebuilding the municipal police force,
but the military will also reportedly be involved in the
efforts and the extent to which it consults with him is
ambiguous.

...Atmospherics...
--------------


6. (C) Consulate officers and contacts noted a sense of
relief in the city's population following the new arrival of
troops and federal police. Local businesses, such as
restaurants and other social establishments, appeared to be
more frequented than in the past several months, and streets
seemed overall busier. Poloffs observed Ciudad Juarez
residents walking in city parks and running alongside heavily
trafficked roads. Consulate officers suggested that Juarez
residents tend to quickly take advantage of temporary
improvements in the security situation, then return to their
houses when conditions deteriorate.


7. (C) Poloffs were struck by the high number of federal
police officers patrolling the major streets and the
relatively less frequent sightings of troops, except for in
the border regions, other critical infrastructure points, and
at checkpoints. Torres Valadez explained the disparity as a
result of the different deployment patterns of the different
forces. The military is reportedly focused on the areas of
higher levels of crime and violence, which tend to be on the
outskirts of the city. Conversely, the federal police have
been specially charged with securing the commercial
districts, which are more often traveled by US officials.



...Short-Term Impact.
--------------


8. (C) Ciudad Juarez contacts ranging from political leaders,
federal and state prosecutors, and officials from the mayor
and governor's offices were cautiously positive when
discussing the results thus far from the expanded Operation
Chihuahua. Murder rates have dramatically dropped since
February 25, from about ten homicides a day to about 2-3 per
day over the past week, and residents generally feel safer
due to the troop presence. Nevertheless, contacts were quick
to point out that violence levels similarly dropped soon
after the initial March 2008 deployment, only to hit even
higher levels in May 2008, levels that were sustained until
the most recent federal surge. Local officials credit the
operation with providing better intelligence into organized
crime activities, which could lead to a greater number of
arrests.


9. (C) Theories vary on what is responsible for the
diminution in violence. The Juarez city government, perhaps
optimistically, suggests the Operation is causing the
"cockroach effect," forcing cartel operatives to scatter and
relocate to other border states. Mayor Reyes Ferriz says he
expects the cartel wars to move to Sonora. U.S. law
enforcement officials hold a different view. They indicated
that organized crime elements are lying low to observe and
collect intelligence on military and federal police
activities so as to better avoid the patrols and determine
their next steps in Juarez, as they did after the March 2008
deployment, and that the cartels will renew the fight in the
coming weeks. The Mexican army generals in charge of the
regional zone and the Juarez garrison agree with the U.S. LEA
assessment, as does the Chihuahua state attorney general,
although they suggest that monthly homicide figures going
forward will be about half the 230 recorded in February 2009.


10. (C) Not unexpectedly, opinions are mixed as to who stands
to gain or lose the most politically from the results of the
Operation. PAN State legislators suggested that the federal
government could benefit from a successful deployment, since
President Calderon showed resolve and action in responding to
a clearly overwhelmed PRI mayor and governor. PAN deputy
Hiram Apolo Conteras noted, however, that the party's
opportunity to profit from any security improvements come
election time may be limited by the state and local
government's strong influence over the local media outlets.
PRI state legislator Antonio Andreu noted that the party's
prospects could be rocky for the July vote since he perceived
the population to be blaming the regional leaders for
security woes rather than the federal government. The troop
presence currently has wide public support -- Apolo Conteras
reported up to a 90 percent approval rating for the military
presence -- but some observers voiced their fear that
organized crime elements will use false accusations of human
rights abuses by military and police elements to erode public
tolerance of the Operation. (Note: Chihuahua Attorney
General Patricia Gonzalez says that some of these reports of
abuse, especially as carried out by the federal police, are
true. End note.) Regardless, most politicians opined that
at the end of the day, voters may privilege economic concerns
-- particularly employment -- over security problems,
suggesting that election results are far from certain.

Looking Ahead
--------------


11. (C) There seems to be broad agreement in Ciudad Juarez in
identifying several key next steps necessary to achieving any
lasting improvement in the city's security situation. All
contacts recognized that a sustained military and federal
presence, particularly at its current size, is not a
sustainable solution, if for no other reason than the cost.
Most of the 2000 newly arriving federal police officers will
be housed in area hotels, which may be a boon to the local
tourism industry, but a financial burden on the federal
government.


12. (C) First, contacts all said that the municipal police
force must be rebuilt and reformed so as to provide the most
basic policing services to the population. Criminal elements
in Juarez appear to be devolving into criminal gangs that are
less organized, more erratic, very violent, and involved in a
variety of criminal enterprises, making recapturing the
streets even more complicated and making more necessary the
development of a professional local patrol force. Mayor
Reyes Ferriz has informed Consulate officers that of the
1,600 municipal preventive police officers who were on duty
on January 1, 2008, 800 have been fired, quit to avoid
completing a federal government background check, or been
killed. Their replacements are brand new. The city
government seems to have an idea as to how to go about
purging the force of corrupt elements -- the mayor claimed in
April 2008 that 99 percent has been corrupted by drug
trafficking organizations -- and is continuing with the
application of confidence control tests such as polygraphs,
psychological exams, drug tests, and lifestyle surveys. The
new National Public Security System, created by legislation
passed in the federal congress in December and mimicked by
the Chihuahua state congress, provides a framework for such
measures, but it seems to be coming together only piecemeal
in Ciudad Juarez. Still, the city government wants to build
a force of 3,000 officers by the end of the year. Local
officials are optimistic that there will be few problems with
recruitment as employment in the region has been hit hard by
the economic crisis.


13. (C) Beyond numbers, the municipal government indicated
that the police need higher quality training, salary, and
equipment, such as encrypted communication systems. City
Manager Guillermo Dowell was not able to elaborate for
Poloffs a training strategy that will create a more
professional police force and better inoculate them against
infiltration by organized crime. Moreover, municipal police
lack any sort of investigQe capacity, and the city appears
to either not understand or to be disinterested in taking on
the investigative responsibilities that the state attorney
general says were assigned to them in the 2008 federal
reforms. In practice, this keeps the city police from doing
anything but the most rudimentary arrests and complicates
their ability to complement the state's progressive judicial
reform efforts. Contacts also reported a need for higher
police salaries and the development of a career service and
benefits plan for officers. Most officers currently make 600
to 800 USD a month, which leaves them highly vulnerable to
bribes from drug trafficking organizations. The city
government is uncertain about future federal funding levels.
Last year Juarez reportedly received significant funds as
part of the SUBSEMUN, a special federal subsidy for high
crime areas, but city officials are afraid that the Operation
Chihuahua expansion may cut into future funding.


14. (C) Observers across the board -- from politicians to
federal prosecutors -- highlighted the need to more involve
civil society in combating the violence problem. Ciudad
Juarez is a city of passing or temporary residents, with many
people arriving to try to make their way to the United States
or to work in the maquilas. Perhaps because of the transient
nature of the population, little has evolved by way of civic
identity or consciousness. PRI deputy Andreu indicated that
the state is working to replicate the creation of citizen
security observatory councils to offer insight and input into
security operations and solutions. City Manager Dowell also
highlighted efforts by the city government to encourage
stronger values, sense of community, and an understanding for
the value of civic participation at the community level, in
part through a "Municipal Alliance for Order and Respect."

Comment
--------------


15. (C) Joint Operation Chihuahua at the very least has
provided a momentary respite for residents suffering from
months of escalating crime rates and blood violence. It is
unclear at this point how long the increase in the Joint
Operation is sustainable or even desirable, but most
observers recognize that the expanded deployment is not the
final situation to security woes. In the best case scenario,
the presence of federal forces bearing the burden of local
law enforcement activities may provide a window of
opportunity for rebuilding the city's ruinous municipal
police, which is critical to a long-term, sustainable
improvement in Ciudad Juarez's security environment. Ciudad
Juarez security, municipal, state and federal officials all
indicated they would welcome U.S. assistance, with the
municipal government particularly interested in help from the
United States in training its new police force. The window
is closing fast, however, as the local government will move
forward with its efforts to create a 3,000-strong police
force, with or without a clear strategy or endgame in mind.

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