Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MEXICO604
2009-03-03 13:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Mexico
Cable title:  

IMPACT OF A PRI CONGRESSIONAL MAJORITY: THE MATH,

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR MX 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MEXICO 000604 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: IMPACT OF A PRI CONGRESSIONAL MAJORITY: THE MATH,
THE SUBSTANCE, THE SYMBOLISM

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MEXICO 000604

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: IMPACT OF A PRI CONGRESSIONAL MAJORITY: THE MATH,
THE SUBSTANCE, THE SYMBOLISM

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary. The PRI appears to be on the ascendant, and
talk in local press and political circles suggests that more
observers are willing to discuss the prospect of a PRI
majority in the Chamber of Deputies after July's legislative
elections. The vote is still more than four months away, and
this cable does not intend to suggest that a PRI majority --
or even a victory as the Chamber's largest party -- is even
close to being assured. Instead, we offer our take on what a
PRI majority would mean to both the party's ability to impose
on Congress its own agenda and the ability of the Calderon
government to move forward on its reform and law-and-order
agenda. A PRI majority, though symbolically and historically
significant, would nevertheless provide the party with only a
few substantive advantages in the run-up to 2012. A PRI
majority in and of itself, in fact, might not usher in
dramatic changes over the next three years, but instead allow
the party to continue to do more of the same, only better.
End Summary.

How the PRI Could Win Big: Factors and Arithmetic
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The chatter in local press and political circles
suggests that more and more observers are unwilling to
completely discount the prospect of an Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) victory in the July elections so
large as to give them a majority in the Chamber of Deputies.
That an opposition party would win over 250 seats in the 500
seat lower house would be a historic first for Mexico, and
the last time a party won so large was over a decade ago (the
PRI in 1997). Recent polling released in major Mexico City
daily, Reforma, indicates that 41 percent of respondents said
they would vote for the PRI if the July elections were held
today, sparking a new round of "what if" discussions in
op-eds.


3. (C) Several political and economic factors have boosted
the PRI's prospects in the run-up to the July legislative and
gubernatorial vote. Barring dramatic events that
significantly alter the country's course over the coming

months, Mexico's continued struggle with economic
complications driven by the global downturn, such as
unemployment and exchange rate volatility, as well as high
rates of narco-related violence probably will continue to
play in the PRI's favor as it seeks to tar the Calderon
government and his National Action Party (PAN) for
ineffective, insufficient, and inefficient handling of such
issues. Recent polling suggests that Mexicans are
increasingly concerned about the country's economic
prospects, and PAN contacts have noted their concern that
President Calderon may be increasingly blamed for the
problems. The PRI has gone on the rhetorical offensive in
recent weeks, taking advantage of high profile security
incidents, such as the attack on the PRI Governor of
Chihuahua State's convoy, to step up criticism of the
President and his party's inability to staunch the violence
plaguing some regions of the country. Political analyst
Sabino Bastidas also told Poloffs on February 26 that voters
are drawn to the PRI in part because of a sense of nostalgia.
The PRI's public messages continue to hark back to the
"glory days" of the party when the country was "stable." PRI
party contacts have gone so far as to tell Poloff that even
though previous PRI governments were corrupt, at least they
governed strongly and securely.


4. (C) In addition to these factors, the bitter divisiveness
roiling the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) will serve
well the PRI. Disenchanted PRD voters -- many of whom are
defected PRIistas anyway -- may be willing to return to the
fold at least temporarily as their party cannibalizes itself.
The PRI swept local elections in five of six states up for
grabs this year. Analysts almost unanimously agree that few
of the disappointed PRD supporters will turn to the PAN, but
will instead vote PRI or stay home. To further complicate
matters, in districts where 2006 PRD presidential hopeful
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador chooses to support the leftist
Convergencia-Labor Party (PT) coalition over the PRD, the
leftist vote will almost certainly be split. In what may

MEXICO 00000604 002 OF 004


have been a harbinger of things to come, the PRI swept local
elections in five of six states this year, recovering lost
strongholds of Hidalgo, Nayarit, Coahuila, and Quintana Roo
and, capitalizing on a divided left, in Guerrero, to defeat
the PRD.


5. (C) The arithmetic, however, adding up to a 251-plus PRI
majority in the Chamber is more complicated and may be more
difficult to come by. Based on the structure of the
electoral system, the PRI needs to win 167 of the 300
directly elected seats to start. Recent projections by the
Chamber's Center for Social and Public Opinion Research puts
them at about 130. In addition to the 167 winner-takes-all
seats, the party also would have to win over 42 percent of
the popular vote for two reasons: 1) Such a win would
probably provide the party with enough proportional
representation seats to give them the 84 necessary to reach
the 251 majority; and 2) A party's representation in the
Chamber cannot be more than 8 percent of their share of the
popular vote, meaning that if the party were to win 41
percent of the popular vote, they could not receive more than
the number of proportional representation seats that would
keep them at or under 49 percent of the deputies. At this
moment, such a confluence of electoral, political, and
economic conditions seems less likely than a combination that
would make the PRI the largest party in the Chamber but
without an absolute majority.

Impact of PRI Majority: The Substance
--------------


6. (C) "The worst that would happen as a result of a PRI
majority would be that the situation remains the same,"
according to political and security analyst Juan Pardinas.
The PRI since 2006 has, for all intents and purposes, been
the key political force for Calderon in dealing with
Congress. As only the third largest party in the Chamber, 21
seats behind the PRD, it has had a disproportionate amount of
power as Calderon has been forced to look the PRI to build
the coalitions necessary to pass his much needed reform
measures. The PRI has extracted some significant concessions
from the administration, or at least left its mark on various
laws, such as electoral reforms, tax reforms, and more
recently, the "energy reform lite."


7. (C) The PRI's 2009-2012 campaign platform provides some
clues as to the kinds of policies the party will try to
pursue -- probably with greater force should they win a
majority -- over the next three years in Congress. The party
may try to increase the state's role in the economy, claiming
that it is time to reconsider "the role of the state as
director of the economy," clarifying that while it does "not
want a state that is owner of the means of production" it
does favor one one that regulates them effectively. The
party is already arguing for increased regulation of banks,
for example, and its Director for International Relations,
Ceslo Delgado, has told Poloff that the party will seek
renegotiation of NAFTA with a greater emphasis on protection
for the country's rural and agricultural sectors. In terms
of security, the party seems to lack a markedly different
approach from the Calderon government, and instead focuses
its platform on complying with promises made in the August
2008 75 point pact, making progress on the new justice
system, and implementing measures, such as police vetting
procedures, from recently passed legislation. Analysts also
vaguely suggest that the PRI may look to legislation that
would strengthen the presidency, but would only look to do so
in the third year of this legislative period if they were
almost assured of a presidential victory.


8. (C) Even with a majority, the PRI still would control only
one congressional house, and the Senate is not up for grabs
until 2012. Any bill proposed by the party in the lower
house would have to secure approval also in the Senate, where
the PRI has only 33 of 128 Senators, as opposed to the PAN's

52. More importantly, the PAN's 41 percent control of the
Senate gives it the ability to sustain a presidential veto --
a two-thirds vote in both houses is required to override a
veto, while it can be sustained by winning the support from
one-third of the legislators in only a single chamber. A PRI
majority in the Chamber will not significantly impact its

MEXICO 00000604 003 OF 004


ability to override Calderon's veto authority, unless the PAN
fails to win the one-third, over 167 seats, necessary to bloc
a veto. The PAN's ability to win a one-third bloc is not
assured of at this point; in fact, it would be nearly
impossible for the PAN to win 168 seats were the PRI to win
over 251, since that would leave the rest of the parties in
the Chamber (including the PRD) with only some 81 seats.


9. (C) One important area in which the PRI could exercise
greater congressional authority would be the yearly budgeting
process, which will be increasingly significant as the 2012
presidential elections draw closer and parties look to build
support for their candidates through government spending.
The yearly expenditure budget is submitted by the President
only to the Chamber of Deputies for approval, leaving the
Senate with no override authority. As such, if the PRI were
to amend Calderon's budget proposal to the displeasure of
PAN, without a one-third share of the Chamber, the PAN by
itself would not be able to sustain a presidential veto. Of
course, it is unlikely a dispute over the budget would ever
produce a veto: the way budget debates work in Mexico, PRI
would likely exercise its leverage and win concessions from
PAN through a process of negotiation and compromise.


10. (C) A PRI-controlled budget would differ from this year's
end result, but perhaps not as dramatically as expected. PRI
contacts have told us -- and demonstrated in the 2009 budget
debates -- that they are still willing to devote significant
resources to security matters. They probably would, however,
funnel more resources into the agricultural and rural sector,
an important PRI constituency, and probably would also work
hard to deliver money into the hands of PRI governors for
various spending projects.

Impact of a PRI Majority: The Symbolic
--------------


11. (C) A PRI sweep of the July legislative elections may not
drastically change its ability to drive Mexican politics, but
it will certainly have a symbolic effect on the country and
the Calderon government. A hit to the ruling party during
midterm elections would not be out of the ordinary in and of
itself. The PRI went from winning 211 seats in 2000 to 241,
in coalition with the Green Party, in the 2003 midterms.
Nevertheless, the PRI's ability to win a historic majority as
an opposition party would not only put them in a strong
position going into 2012, but also allow them to cast such a
victory as proof of profound public unhappiness with the
Calderon government. A congressional majority would give the
party a valuable platform from which to launch its bid for
the presidency, which it is desperate to re-capture.


12. (C) Nevertheless, even with a majority, the PRI will have
to tread carefully if it wants to cultivate its image as a
party that knows how to govern and cares about security.
Most observers suggest that the PRI's current popularity is
at least in part due to its work with Calderon over the past
three years on securing the passage of important reforms. A
PRI turned overly obstructionist and aggressive toward the
President -- whom the Mexican public inherently and
culturally respects -- probably would tarnish its image as a
responsible and responsive political player. Moreover, the
party will have to continue to focus effort and resources on
security issues in order to demonstrate its commitment to
bettering the situation and proving that it has moved beyond
what many voters still think of as the "old days" of
corruption and government negotiation with the cartels.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) A PRI sweep of the July 2009 elections would have
only limited substantive impact on the country's political
scene, but probably would have more of a symbolic effect on
both the party and the Calderon government. Nevertheless, as
analysts have opined, a "business as usual" result even if
PRI wins a majority probably is most likely as the party
would continue to be constrained by political, public
relations, and systemic limitations. Any GOM struggles
post-election would certainly not be attributable exclusively
to a PRI win, but rather to a series of complicating

MEXICO 00000604 004 OF 004


political, economic, and security factors outside of the
electoral landscape. It is not possible to overstate,
moreover, that the legislative elections are still over four
months away with candidate selection still in process.
Recent polling may be indicative of a favorable trend toward
the PRI, but a clearer snapshot of the electoral picture will
not be possible until the candidate lists are finalized.

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