Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MEXICO1247
2009-05-06 22:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Mexico
Cable title:  

PRI SLOW TO FIRE UP CAMPAIGN

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR MX 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHME #1247/01 1262217
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 062217Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6386
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 001247 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: PRI SLOW TO FIRE UP CAMPAIGN

REF: MEXICO 0935

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 001247

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: PRI SLOW TO FIRE UP CAMPAIGN

REF: MEXICO 0935

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary. Popular support for the PRI has declined in
recent weeks, and long-time PRI operative Carlos Flores Rico
says the party's apparent losses in part result from a lack
of electoral leadership from the PRI's federal level
authorities and tardiness in developing its election campaign
strategy. Other analysts agree that the party's factionalism
and powerful governors have complicated its national
campaigning. End Summary.

Party Slow On Propaganda, Strategy
--------------


2. (C) The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) has seen
its fortunes slide a bit in recent weeks as national polls
continue to show a decline in popular support for the party
(ref a). Most observers credit the National Action Party's
(PAN) "guerra sucia," or dirty war, accusing the PRI of being
solely responsible for Mexico's security woes and of being
too intimately involved in narcotics trafficking as
tarnishing its electoral image. In addition to several other
March surveys, a national poll conducted in mid-April and
released last week by Consulta Mitofsky indicated that 31.4
percent of respondents said they would vote from the PRI if
elections were today, with 26.2 for the PAN and 14.8 percent
for the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD),as opposed to
34.4 percent for the PRI in February, 25.5 for the PAN, and
12.7 for the PRD. The April survey was taken with 1,000
Mexicans over the age of 18 with a 3.1 percent margin of
error.


3. (C) Carlos Flores Rico, a long-time PRI operative and
currently a plurinominal congressional candidate highly
ranked on the party's list, told Poloff on April 29 that the
party's apparent losses are not only the result of a
well-orchestrated PAN campaign but also due to a lack of
electoral leadership from the PRI's federal level authorities
and tardiness in developing its election campaign strategy.
Flores Rico noted that party president Beatriz Paredes had
yet to reveal the nuts-and-bolts national campaign tactics to
win the federal legislative elections, and that her closed,
authoritarian management style precluded key national sectors

from developing their own stratagems. Paredes is a secretive
leader with less a small circle of advisors than a small
group of employees, and few outside this immediate coterie
rarely have serious input into her decision-making process,
according to Flores Rico.


4. (C) Despite reports in the press indicating that a lack of
party resources is to blame, Flores Rico argued that the
party has sufficient access to public resources that it has
yet to spend down when asked by Poloff why the PRI had not
yet followed the PAN, PRD, Green Party, and Social Democratic
Party in advertising heavily using billboards and other
mediums to initiate their campaigns. While the federal
campaign period for the July 5 vote does not start until May
3, the other parties have already placed numerous and obvious
advertisements throughout Mexico City, including the PAN and
PRD's heavy billboard use and the Social Democrats strategic
takeover of advertising space on virtually every valet
parking stand in the city. (Note: Poloff noticed that the
PRI finally revealed party billboards on the weekend of May
2-3.) Flores Rico said that the lack of campaign propaganda
is not part of an intentional overarching strategy of which
this is only part, but that instead the party was awaiting
word from its National Executive Committee as to what message
they should portray and from where the funds should come.


5. (C) Flores Rico credited the PRI's continued lead over the
PAN to the efforts of the 18 PRI state governors, who are not
waiting -- nor wanting -- for direction from the party's
central leadership before initiating their own campaigns. He
noted that the party continues to thrive in almost all of
those 18 states, or at least its leaders in each of those
states have developed relatively coherent and unified
electoral strategies there. He noted that the party
organizations in states without PRI governors awaiting
direction from Mexico City are suffering from far greater

MEXICO 00001247 002 OF 002


internal divisions and are at a disadvantage when it comes to
campaign preparation. Flores Rico said he would blame the
PRI's slow start in taking up its electoral crusade should
the party fail to obtain a majority in the Chamber of
Deputies.


6. (C) Mexico City analysts agree that Paredes has not been
able to articulate or implement an effective national
campaign strategy, nor has she been able to coordinate a
timely response to German Martinez' continued volley of
attacks. Juan Pardinas told Poloff that he was surprised by
Paredes' silence since she generally is a sharp public
commentator and quick to answer rival politicians. He
suspects that PRI's sluggishness in communicating a national
campaign message and in coordinating a response to the PAN is
probably due to the strength of the party's competing
factions -- particularly the various governors -- who have
their own take on what steps should be taken. Academic and
analyst Jeff Weldon also noted the PRI's difficulties in
effectively campaigning in "orphan states" -- those without
PRI governors -- and reported that the party has not in
recent years been centralized enough in order to do so.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Despite its publicly unified face, the PRI is a party
still divided into various factions and with governors acting
as virtual feudal lords over the politics of their states.
The party has been relatively successful thus far in
negotiating differences behind closed doors and keeping
internal disputes at a minimum in the run up to the July
elections. Moreover, powerful governors in 18 states may be
able to effectively mobilize their political machinery to
deliver votes. Nevertheless, such divisiveness, latent or
private as it may be, continues to be an obstacle the PRI may
continue to face as it plots its political future,
particularly as it nears the 2012 presidential contest.

Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
BASSETT