Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MELBOURNE33
2009-02-26 22:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Consulate Melbourne
Cable title:  

VICTORIA ILL PREPARED FOR TERROR ATTACKS?

Tags:  ASEC PTER PGOV AS 
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R 262214Z FEB 09
FM AMCONSUL MELBOURNE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4895
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 
AMCONSUL PERTH 
AMCONSUL SYDNEY 
WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
NSC WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MELBOURNE 000033 


NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS/IP/EAP AND DS/IP/TIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019
TAGS: ASEC PTER PGOV AS
SUBJECT: VICTORIA ILL PREPARED FOR TERROR ATTACKS?

REF: A. MELBOURNE 18

B. 08 MELBOURNE 141

C. 08 MELBOURNE 117

Classified By: MICHAEL E. THURSTON, CONSUL GENERAL, FOR REASONS 1.4(B)
AND (G)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L MELBOURNE 000033


NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS/IP/EAP AND DS/IP/TIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019
TAGS: ASEC PTER PGOV AS
SUBJECT: VICTORIA ILL PREPARED FOR TERROR ATTACKS?

REF: A. MELBOURNE 18

B. 08 MELBOURNE 141

C. 08 MELBOURNE 117

Classified By: MICHAEL E. THURSTON, CONSUL GENERAL, FOR REASONS 1.4(B)
AND (G)

Summary
--------------


1. (C/NF) Victoria's Inspector General released an audit in
mid-January criticizing the state government's preparation
for a potential terrorist attack. The report found that a
lack of cooperation between police and government agencies
and a confusing tangle of legislation may slow the state's
response to an attack. While Victoria's Premier appears to
be taking the report's findings seriously, the possibility of
a terrorist attack in Australia remains a very remote fear in
the hearts of most Victorians. End Summary.

Better Coordination Needed
--------------


2. (SBU/NF) A report prepared by Victoria Inspector General
(IG) Des Pearson in January finds the state's readiness to
respond to a potential terrorist attack lacking in several
important respects. First, the report says that oversight
and governance structures "could be more effective." The
co-existence of two pieces of legislation providing for the
protection of key infrastructure in the event of a terrorist
attack (the Terrorism (community protection) Act of 2003 and
the Victorian Framework for Critical Infrastructure
Protection from Terrorism of 2007) "is confusing and hinders
coordination" between state authorities and police. The
roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved in
implementing the two pieces of legislation are "unclear" and
the state has not developed adequate metrics for measuring
Victoria's readiness to respond to a terrorist attack as
required by the legislation.


3. (SBU/NF) Second, the IG's report finds that three lead
agencies in Victoria (Human Services, Justice, and the
Department of Innovation, Industry and Regional Development)
"were not aware" that some infrastructure in their industry
sectors is considered to be "critical." In addition, the
terms for mandated audits of risk management plans for
essential services have not been defined. The report
declares, however, that arrangements for an emergency

response in the energy, water, and transport sectors are
"considered reasonable."


4. (SBU/NF) Finally, the report recommends that the
Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) should exercise
"firmer leadership" in administering implementation of the
legislation. Other recommendations include clarifying the
roles and responsibilities of key actors as well as providing
definitive guidance on what constitutes an essential service.
Police and DPC officials were also encouraged to standardize
reporting on training exercises in order to better identify
lessons learned.

Reaction
--------------


5. (C/NF) According to an experienced officer in the Victoria
police's security intelligence group, the IG's report was a
justified wake up call to Premier John Brumby. The rapid
creation of several pieces of legislation (background
included below) aimed at preparing Australia and Victoria to
respond to terrorist attacks was a "knee-jerk" reaction to
9/11 and has since "lost steam." He agreed with the report's
assessment that cooperation between the DPC and the police is
insufficient and noted that there is still substantial
confusion over what constitutes "critical infrastructure."


6. (C/NF) The officer noted that Victoria's plan for
responding to a terrorist attack is too complex. Similar to
the IG's report, he indicated that overlapping jurisdiction -
between various pieces of legislation as well as between the
state and federal governments - has weakened the laws'
effectiveness. Finally, there are several vulnerabilities
not included in existing laws or emergency planning such as
addressing threats to major events (to which Melbourne is
frequently home) as well as places where people are known to
congregate such as major intersections in the city's central
business district.

Background
--------------


7. (SBU/NF) According to the report, "Australia's
counter-terrorism capability operates through a cooperative
partnership between national, state and territory
jurisdictions, with joint responsibility for developing and
maintaining nationwide capability. The Commonwealth (federal
government) has the national coordination responsibility."
The National Counter-Terrorism Committee (formed in 2002) is
comprised of federal, state and territory governments and is
responsible for maintaining the national counter-terrorism
plan.


8. (SBU/NF) In November 2002, the Victorian government
released its counter-terrorism policy statement entitled
"Enhancing Victoria's Domestic Security: New measures for the
fight against terrorism." The document recommends that the
Victoria police assist operators of "essential services"
including electricity, gas, water, transport and fuel in the
development, validation, and audit of their risk management
plans. Much of the state's essential services and critical
infrastructure is privately owned or operated. Primary
responsibility for providing adequate protection rests with
owners/operators.


9. (SBU/NF) The Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) and the
Terrorism (Community Protection) acts were introduced in
2003, establishing new counter-terrorism powers including
provisions for the protection of declared essential services.
According to the IG's report, Victoria was the only
jurisdiction to introduce legislation requiring critical
infrastructure to be protected. Victoria later released two
additional counter-terrorism policy papers in 2005 and 2006
aimed at bolstering community integration initiatives as an
attempt to remove the base causes of terrorism.


10. (U) A copy of the IG's report may be found online at:
http://www.audit.vic.gov.au/reports_publicati ons/reports_by
_year/2009/20090121_terrorism_response.aspx

Comment
--------------


11. (C/NF) While the release of the IG's report created at
least one spectacular front page headline ("Victoria
ill-prepared for terror attacks, says auditor"),the story
has not gained significant traction in the public domain.
Victoria has invested A$255 million (US$165 million) in
counter-terrorism initiatives since 2002 including a wide
array of preventative measures such as community policing
(septel). Post has talked off-line with contacts in the
Victoria government who have said that the Premier is taking
this issue seriously and intends to respond in full to the
report. For many Victorians, however, the thought of a
terrorist attack in Australia is at most a fleeting fear
brought to the fore only occasionally. The recent trial of
Abdul Nacer Benbrika and his co-conspirators (reftels) served
to raise the profile of a potential terrorist attack in
Australia, but only for a moment.


THURSTON