SWAZI FOREIGN MINISTER SUGGESTS SOUTH AFRICAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MBABANE 000309

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2014
TAGS: PREL WZ ZI SF SADC
SUBJECT: SWAZI FOREIGN MINISTER SUGGESTS SOUTH AFRICAN
INTERVENTION MAY LEAD TO MOVEMENT IN ZIMBABWE UNITY
GOVERNMENT IMPASSE

Classified By: Ambassador Earl M. Irving
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 11, Swaziland's Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, Lutfo E. Dlamini, told
Ambassador that he recommended a summit on Zimbabwe to King
Mswati III by the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and
Security. He and his troika counterparts judged that only at
that level could Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai be
persuaded to resume their agreement to work together.
Dlamini described Mugabe as acting both bored and arrogant
during the November 5 Maputo meeting on reconciliation. It
was only when South African President Jacob Zuma spoke and
gave Mugabe a deadline for action that the Zimbabwean
president "sat up and paid attention." According to Dlamini,
Zuma made it plain that both Mugabe and Tsvangirai had
fifteen days to re-engage in the coalition government, or he
would send a mediator to Harare to bring the parties
together. The troika ruled out an immediate election in
Zimbabwe, recommending rather that the Zimbabwean parties
wait three or so years, or the alternative would be
untrammeled violence. Dlamini ruled out the possibility of
Mugabe running in the next election because he is physically
frail, and recommended that Tsvangirai begin to market
himself quietly to the SADC heads of state, to persuade them
that he is not "a radical" in the pay of the Western
community. Though vague about details, the Swazi foreign
minister suggested that the SADC troika would like to consult
the European Union and America on the Zimbabwe question. The
Ambassador suggested that the SADC troika might think about
ways to bring about an orderly transfer to a post-Mugabe era
in Zimbabwe, including the possibility of some sort of
amnesty process for security force heads. Dlamini took note
of the idea, asserting that Tsvangirai and Deputy Prime
Minister Arthur Mutambara both had rejected a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission like that in South Africa.
Although convinced of the utility of the SADC mechanism to
influence events in Zimbabwe, he pooh-poohed Joseph Kabila as
"the wrong man" to lead the troika, observing that "he can't
run his own country." END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Swaziland's Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Co-operation, Lutfo E. Dlamini, told Ambassador on November
11 that he recommended a summit on Zimbabwe to King Mswati
III by the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security. His
recommendation was based on a visit to Zimbabwe in late
October. He and his troika counterparts judged that only at
that level could the two key participants in Zimbabwe's
government of national unity, Robert Mugabe and Morgan
Tsvangirai, "who hate each other," be persuaded to resume
their agreement to work together. Dlamini described Mugabe
as acting both bored and arrogant upon arriving in Maputo on
November 5, while the troika heads of state made their pleas
for reconciliation. It was only when South African President
Jacob Zuma, "who invited himself to the Summit," spoke that
Mugabe "sat up and paid attention." According to Dlamini,
Zuma made it plain that both Mugabe and Tsvangirai had
fifteen days to re-engage in the coalition government, or he
would send a mediator to Harare to bring the parties
together. Dlamini made a distinction between Thabo Mbeki,
whom SADC hired to draw up a plan for Zimbabwe, and Zuma, who
was elected partially on his promise to sort things out in
Zimbabwe, but was not formally a part of the SADC mediation
effort. Dlamini conceded that the South African president's
vigorous intervention appeared to yield results.


3. (C) Dlamini said that in spite of the fact that the
Zimbabwean national unity government did not enjoy
legitimacy, it was what SADC had to work with. The troika
ruled out an immediate election in Zimbabwe, recommending
rather that the Zimbabwean parties wait three or so years
before calling them, or the alternative would be untrammeled
violence. He ruled out the possibility of Mugabe running in
that election because he is frail and almost needs a walking
stick to walk. Dlamini stated that employees of
Tsvangirai's office and party earn "an average of USD 7,000 a
month," more than ten times the amount paid to Zimbabwean
government civil servants, because the West "tops them up."
He recommended that Morgan Tsvangirai begin to market himself
quietly to the SADC heads of state, to persuade them that he
is not "a radical" in the pay of the Western community, which
is their current perception. He thought Tsvangirai had more
in common with them than Mugabe, whose rhetoric of
colonialism had little resonance with the new generation of
African leaders.


4. (C) Though vague about details, the Swazi foreign
minister suggested that the SADC troika would like to consult
the European Union and America on the Zimbabwe question. He
attributed the violence in the country as being perpetrated
by a "third force," possibly within the security forces.

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Dlamini seemed surprised to hear from Ambassador that it was
our impression that the violence was meticulously planned and
executed by ZANU-PF with government security force
facilitation, if not participation. We further indicated our
belief that it had not been beneath the ZANU-PF government's
dignity to use food as a weapon in the past. The Ambassador
suggested that the SADC troika might think about ways to
bring about an orderly transfer to a post-Mugabe era in
Zimbabwe, including the possibility of some sort of amnesty
process for security force heads. Dlamini took note of the
idea, asserting that Tsvangirai and Deputy Prime Minister
Arthur Mutambara both had rejected a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission like that in South Africa.


5. (C) COMMENT: Dlamini is an active minister who is
constantly on the road, leaving his ministry demoralized and
not well briefed about his work. Whether his frequent trips
abroad have resulted in tangible benefits for the Kingdom is
unclear, though they have succeeded in keeping his profile
high within the government and in the press. His account of
his work on the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security
illustrates some of the perceptions and misconceptions with
which he and, one might extrapolate, his colleagues in the
troika operate. Although convinced of the utility of the
SADC mechanism to influence events in Zimbabwe, he
pooh-poohed Joseph Kabila as "the wrong man" to lead the
troika, observing that "he can't run his own country." To
illustrate his point, Dlamini reported that when in Kinshasa
for a summit, King Mswati was lodged in a five-star hotel
that had no water. "The king had to wash his hands in a
bucket," he said in disgust.
IRVING