Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MASERU129
2009-04-30 14:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Maseru
Cable title:  

LESOTHO'S NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE NAMES ASSASSINATION

Tags:  PGOV ASEC LT 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3361
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHRN
DE RUEHMR #0129 1201412
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301412Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MASERU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4129
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHMR/AMEMBASSY MASERU 4556
C O N F I D E N T I A L MASERU 000129 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/S, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA, AND DS/DSS/CC
PRETORIA FOR DATT AND ORI
CAPE TOWN FOR ORI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV ASEC LT
SUBJECT: LESOTHO'S NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE NAMES ASSASSINATION
ATTEMPT MASTERMIND

REF: Maseru 126 and previous

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth C. Power, Deputy Chief of Mission.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L MASERU 000129

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/S, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA, AND DS/DSS/CC
PRETORIA FOR DATT AND ORI
CAPE TOWN FOR ORI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV ASEC LT
SUBJECT: LESOTHO'S NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE NAMES ASSASSINATION
ATTEMPT MASTERMIND

REF: Maseru 126 and previous

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth C. Power, Deputy Chief of Mission.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) On Wednesday, April 29, Lesotho's National Security
Service (NSS) allowed post's RSO to read a classified NSS
document stating that they have identified the mastermind behind
the April 22 attempt to assassinate the Prime Minister.
According to NSS information, local businessman Jersey
Ramakatane organized the attack, with another Mosotho national,
Geffory Baloyi, serving as the attack commander on the ground.
NSS states that Baloyi recruited the assailants, including the
two South Africans and five Mozambicans, then brought them all
to a farm in South Africa's Free State on April 12. After
receiving military-style training there, the assailants then
came to Lesotho and carried out the attack on April 22. The NSS
further claims that Makotoko Lerotholi (reftel) provided the
attackers with a map and other information relating to
Makoanyane military barracks, where the attackers stole weapons
and vehicles; there was also a serving member of the Lesotho
Defense Force (LDF) who assisted the attackers at Makoanyane.
Apparently Ramakatane's intent was to capture the Prime Minister
and take him to a local radio station, where he would be forced
to announce his resignation over the air. The NSS did not make
clear whether Ramakatane would then have attempted to install
himself as head of government. Post's Political Assistant also
heard elements of this theory from a contact within the
governing Lesotho Congress for Democracy, who stated that he had
also received the information from the NSS.


2. (C) Ramakatane is a local property developer and
businessman who owns several retail stores and buildings in
Maseru. He is rumored to have been a hitman prior to investing
in businesses, and he is alleged to have engaged in unscrupulous
behavior to build up his business. He has been a member of the
Basotho National Party, which is now a junior opposition party,
but he was never recognized as an active or vocal supporter of
the party and has never engaged in the political sphere. In
2008, Ramakatane fled Lesotho following speculation that he had
been linked to the 2007 attacks on ministers; he is rumored to
have been living in South Africa for the last year. The NSS
document stated that Ramakatane's motive was that he had failed
to obtain some GOL contracts in the recent past.


3. (C) COMMENT: Post's contacts find Ramakatane to be a
credible culprit behind the assassination attempt, given his
allegedly violent background and possible involvement in the
2007 attacks. Lerotholi's involvement in planning the attack is
more likely than his actual physical participation in it, given
his reported ill health, although as the NSS stated, there must
have been LDF insiders involved, as well, since Lerotholi left
the military over 10 years ago. With Ramakatane's largely
apolitical background, the GOL's repeated mention of the
political opposition party, All Basotho Convention, as the
culprit may simply be an attempt to hide the true focus of their
investigation.


4. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Post has developed very good
relations with Lesotho's NSS. With the strong support of the
Office of Regional Issues in Pretoria and Cape Town, a team came
to Maseru last year to provide training to 20 up-and-coming NSS
officers. The focus of this training was anti-terrorism and
transnational crime, and it was actively supported by the NSS
hierarchy. The sharing of information with post's RSO is a
clear indication of the NSS's appreciation of this ORI-sponsored
training.

NOLAN