FRENCH AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES MADAGASCAR AND THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MAPUTO 000960

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MZ MA
SUBJECT: FRENCH AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES MADAGASCAR AND THE
MAPUTO I TALKS

REF: A. MAPUTO 916

B. PORT LOUIS 146

C. PORT LOUIS 144

D. PORT LOUIS 143

E. PORT LOUIS 132

F. ANTANANARIVO 150

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Todd C. Chapman, Reasons 1.4(b+d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Charge met with French Ambassador to
Mozambique Christian Daziano on August 18 in the interlude
between Maputo I and Maputo II talks to discuss ongoing
Madagascar negotiations. Daziano was frank in the
discussion, and was not overly optimistic that the Maputo II
talks will lead to lasting peace in Madagascar. The main
priority of the French government is to protect stability in
the South West Indian Ocean (SWIO) region because it is home
to protectorates Mayotte and Reunion, and because a sizable
number of French residents live in Madagascar. END SUMMARY.
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NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS
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2. (C) According to Daziano, a great deal of negotiations
took place before the Maputo I talks began. Several other
countries considered for the talks were rejected by
Ratsiraka. Mauritius was abandoned because of its complicated
history with the French, Ethiopia was out because the
altitude was too high for ailing former Malagasy President
Didier Ratsiraka,s health, and Angola was rejected outright
on logistical grounds. SADC mediator Chissano originally
wanted the resort island of Pemba for the talks, but
President Guebuza recommended Maputo for logistical reasons,
including superior hotel and conference facilities.


3. (C) Once the location had been decided, the UN, AU and
international mediators negotiated to get the exiled
Ratsiraka to the talks. The old president could not afford
to travel, and according to Daziano, France graciously lent a
Presidential plane to take Ratsiraka, his family and his
entourage to and from the talks.

4. (C) Each of the four "presidents" came with their
negotiating team and a large staff. Chissano insisted the
talks comprise only the four leaders and the international
mediators; the rest of the delegation had to stay in the
hallways, with Daziano who explained that he and the French
Foreign Ministry,s Madagascar desk officer conferred with
the four Malagasy presidents on the margins of the mediation.
Daziano commended Chissano for insisting that all parties
agree to not speak with the press, describing Chissano,s
negotiation style as "smart," which paved the way for
productive talks.

5. (C) Like other observers, Daziano stressed the importance
of annulment for Ratsiraka. The former President refused to
participate in talks until all prior charges against him had
been annulled, and amnesty was inappropriate because it
suggests guilt. Daziano said that the AU brought in a
constitutional law specialist who expended great effort to
design language for Ratsiraka that offered amnesty without
using the actual term.
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RAVALOMANANA AGREES TO STAY AWAY
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6. (C) Daziano echoed other observers' comments saying that
Ravalomanana has a strong desire to return to Madagascar (Ref
A). The ousted President expressed interest in a SADC-led,
military-style forced return to regain entry to the country.
Daziano opined that Swaziland's King Mswati supported this
idea, and Ravalomanana used the Mswati's support to try to
keep the military option on the table. Daziano complimented
Chissano's negotiating skill because he was able to convince
Ravalomanana a return was not possible because the risk of
instability and civil war was far too high.

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KEY ISSUES TO RESOLVE
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7. (C) The Maputo I agreement states that Ravalomanana will
remain out of the country until the security situation
improves. Charge asked Daziano who will decide when the
situation is safe, and the Ambassador admitted the agreement

MAPUTO 00000960 002 OF 003


was unclear. He said that Rajoelina believes that he will be
the one to make the decision, while the international
mediators are under the impression they will decide when
Ravalomanana can come home. The Ambassador pointed out that
if Ravalomanana wants to and is eligible to run in the
election, he will have to return within 12 months to have
adequate time to campaign, though he seemed pessimistic that
the security would reach any measure of stability for
Ravalomanana's return.


8. (C) Another key issue, which could derail the entire
process, is establishing who is eligible to run for office in
the election to be held in 15 months. Daziano described a
gentlemen's agreement established before Maputo I where none
of the four leaders would run, but during the summit all four
leaders were in agreement that they should, in fact, be
allowed to stand for election. The mediators attempted to
prevent any of them from running, but the four were
consistently insistent, and showed rare consensus on this
issue, so the mediators had to let the provision stand. At
the ongoing Maputo II talks the parties have the complicated
task of determining who will fill which role. Daziano said
it was clear to everyone except Ravalomanana that Rajoelina
will be president of the transitional government.
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STRANGE BEDFELLOWS
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9. (C) Surprisingly, Ratsiraka played a key role as a
mediator among the four leaders, according to Daziano who
does not think Ratsiraka will run for the presidency, and
therefore was more willing to provide diplomatic assistance.
According to the Ambassador, Ratsiraka's goals are to return
to Madagascar, reclaim his two homes and other assets on the
island, and live an honorable life as a well-respected former
President. Daziano also thinks Ratsiraka will want to put
some of his key supporters into government, including his
son. (NOTE: The Ambassador probably was referring to Roland
Ratsiraka, Didier,s nephew. END NOTE.) Both Rajoelina and
Ravalomanana recognize the contracting economy requires a
negotiated settlement of some sort to reopen foreign aid and
trade, but both men believe they are best able to lead the
country. As such, Rajoelina found himself against the other
three leaders fairly often during Maputo I.

10. (C) Daziano described ethnic dimensions in the talks,
with the Merina aligned against the Cotier. He said that
Zafy, a Cotier, played the role of a professor and jockeyed
to take control of the constitutional reform process so he
could protect the rights of the Cotier people. Daziano said
the other three Merina worked mostly as a bloc. (NOTE: He was
referring to Ravalomanana, Rajoelina and Ratsiraka as Merina,
although Ratsiraka is a Cotier. It is unclear if Ratsiraka
was purposefully giving the false impression he is from the
Merina clan, or if the Ambassador and the SWIO desk officer
from Paris were confused. END NOTE.) At times, the three
"Merina" leaders argued among themselves, according to
Daziano, who added that Zafy stayed above the fray. Zafy
told Daziano that he envisions a U.S.-style federalist
constitution for Madagascar, and Daziano believes Zafy will
push to take the lead on drafting the new constitution.
Daziano also suspects the current age restrictions in the
constitution will be removed to allow Rajoelina to run.
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FRENCH DESIRE FOR STABILITY
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11. (S//NF) Daziano said he fears that any military
involvement in the talks will increase tensions, and
indicated that he believed that the risk for civil war is
quite high. He emphasized that the French foreign policy
priority is to maintain stability in the SWIO to protect the
French islands of Reunion and Mayotte, and French citizens
living in Madagascar, Seychelles, Comoros and Mauritius. He
said the area is at high risk for piracy and trafficking
(REFS B, C, D, E) and that Comoros is at almost a constant
state of instability. Daziano then launched into an
unprompted monologue on Comoros, repeating French suspicions
of Iranian influence on Comoran President Sambi (REF F). The
Ambassador claimed Sambi travels to Tehran every three months
and there are many Iranian religious institutions in Comoros.

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FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ACTION

MAPUTO 00000960 003 OF 003


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12. (C) Daziano identified economic recovery as a primary
factor in French policy in Madagascar, saying that when the
AU decides to remove sanctions against the Malagasy
government, France will follow suit and resume aid. Daziano
confided that even with a resumption of foreign aid and
trade, Rajoelina is young and inexperienced and will face the
difficult challenge of confronting the split military on
difficult issues. The Ambassador would not say if the French
have any plans to intervene should military unrest increase.

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COMMENT: FRENCH ENVOY PESSIMISTIC ON PEACE
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13. (C) Daziano was complimentary of U.S. efforts in
Madagascar, and lamented there was no room for observers in
the Maputo talks. He was well informed on the issues, but
was either mistaken or misled on serious ethnic issues within
Malagasy society. Nonetheless, Daziano appears to have
instructions to follow the Maputo talks closely given
France's significant resources in the SWIO region. Post will
follow-up with septel readouts of the Maputo II talks.
CHAPMAN