FORMER FM SIMAO DISCUSSES MADAGASCAR TALKS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MAPUTO 000916

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MZ MA
SUBJECT: FORMER FM SIMAO DISCUSSES MADAGASCAR TALKS

REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 586

B. ANTANANARIVO 589

C. ANTANANARIVO 573

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Todd C. Chapman, reasons 1.4(b+d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Former Chissano-era Foreign Minister
Leonardo Simao provided detailed feedback to the Charge on
August 13 on the Madagascar Peace and Reconciliation
discussions leading to the August 9 agreement in Maputo
between the Malagasy "Big Four." Simao described the
negotiations as difficult, stating that agreement was reached
only after former President Marc Ravalomanana agreed to delay
his return to Madagascar in order to allow for greater
stability. Simao explained that another Maputo meeting
(Maputo II) will take place within 10 days of the August 9
agreement in order to define the conditions of the 15 month
transition period leading-up to elections. Simao said the
August 9 agreement fails to consider the military component
of instability in Madagascar, perhaps the most challenging
aspect. Mauritian High Commissioner in Mozambique Georges
Alain Laridon, who has a personal relationship with
Ravalomanana, told the Charge that he sees things
differently, and thinks that Ravalomanana will return early
to Madagascar, and will likely run for office, perhaps in
coalition with Ratsiraka. Laridon also directly addressed
French involvement in Madagascar, specifically their support
of the Rajoelina coup. Simao called on the United States and
the international donor community to continue its support of
Madagascar in the ensuing fragile 15 months by maintaining
AGOA and resuming bilateral assistance as soon as possible in
order to mitigate economic risks. END SUMMARY.

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SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE MAPUTO TALKS
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2. (C) Former FM Simao, now the executive director of the
Joaquim Chissano Foundation, one of former president
Chissano,s closest advisors, and a key interlocutor in the
SADC-led process to resolve the impasse in Madagascar,
explained to the Charge on August 13 that Ravalomanana took
advantage of his time in Swaziland to manipulate King Mswati
into believing that the only solution for Madagascar was a
SADC-sponsored military intervention in order to reinstate
the deposed president. Simao pointed out that this would be
in King Mswati's interest were he to also be deposed,
commenting that Swaziland is "not exactly democratic." Simao
said that SADC leadership immediately realized this was an
untenable solution, and decided to send a group, including
representatives from the African Union, SADC, the UN, the
Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and the International
Francophone Organization (OIF) to Swaziland to dissuade them
of this course of action. Simao spoke with former Swazi
Prime Minister Dlamini, to convince him that recommending
military intervention was a bad course of action considering
the animosity in Madagascar against Ravalomanana, who,
according to Simao, is viewed there as unpopular and corrupt.
While the former Prime Minister was persuaded, Simao said
that King Mswati was unconvinced. SADC then decided to
upgrade its mediator, choosing former President Chissano
because he was a strong SADC leader, trusted by all sides.


3. (C) Simao explained the timeline of events thereafter:
Chissano immediately traveled to Antananarivo and met with
transitional leader Andry Rajoelina, who apparently was
unhappy with the SADC appointment of Chissano. However,
after a long tete-a-tete Rajoelina realized that there was
good chemistry between them. Chissano then traveled to the
UN and met with the diplomatic community and the UN Secretary
General to discuss perspectives on Madagascar and the UN's
role in the talks. Chissano raised concerns about the
suspension of AGOA, and the possible impact on Madagascar's
economy, according to Simao. Chissano then traveled to Paris
to meet with exiled former Malagasy President Didier
Ratsiraka. Finally, Chissano met with Ravalomanana and
convinced him that it was not realistic to expect to return
to power through a military intervention. Simao noted that
there were rumors that Ravalomanana was actively recruiting
South African mercenaries in order to build an invasion force
at the time that Chissano met with him.

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MAPUTO TALKS AT IMPASSE ON EXILED LEADERS

MAPUTO 00000916 002 OF 003


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4. (C) Simao described the Maputo talks as stalled until
August 8 because former President Ratsiraka demanded a return
from exile, but refused amnesty saying it suggested he was at
fault for being exiled. Ratsiraka eventually negotiated an
annulment of his terms of exile. As a result, Ravalomanana
demanded the same terms, according to Simao, who explained
that Malagasy military representatives were dead-set against
Ravalomanana's return, fearing that he would fund a counter
coup. Simao also commented that the unnamed military aide
who supported Rajoelina throughout the negotiations appeared
extremely nervous and unwilling to compromise with the
Ravalomanana faction; however, as the negotiations progressed
he visibly relaxed. (Note: This may be because, by Simao's
own admission, military issues were not discussed during the
negotiations. End Note.)

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SUCCESSFUL COMPROMISE
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5. (C) Simao stated that Ravalomanana successfully
negotiated to have all accusations against him nullified,
except for undefined "high crimes," and in return he agreed
not to return to Madagascar until the international mediation
team found that the security and political situation
warranted it. Ravalomanana also accepted to state publicly
that his militant supporters in Madagascar should disband and
that he had chosen to become part of the solution and sign
the charter, which he did in front of the international
press. Simao indicated that this compromise was particularly
sensitive and difficult because Rajoelina was paranoid about
Ravalomanana's return. Since the signing, Chissano traveled
to Swaziland to brief King Mswati, and on to South Africa to
brief President Zuma.


6. (C) Mauritian High Commissioner Georges Alain Laridon
told the Charge later on August 13 that Ravalomanana called
Ratsiraka in Paris and convinced him to attend the Maputo
meetings. He confirmed that the French Ambassador in Maputo
closely watched the meetings from the corridors. Discussing
the French influence, Laridon said the French backed
pro-Rajoelina factions and manipulated the military because
Ravalomanana had led a "frontal attack" on French business
interests, and alienated their government. Laridon said the
French still have a vested interest in keeping Ravalomanana
out of Malagasy politics. Laridon, a personal friend of
Ravalomanana, said Ravalomanana hopes to return to Madagascar
and stand for election. Laridon believes that Ravalomanana
will seek a coalition with an ailing Ratsiraka in order to
win. (Note: Laridon said he spoke with Ratsiraka's physician
who stated that he is 75 percent blind and in poor health,
which is confirmed by poloff observations of a frail
Ratsiraka in need of support to walk at the Maputo meetings.
End Note.) Laridon's assessment is that Ravalomanana can
win, especially in coalition with Ratsiraka. Turning to
economics, Laridon confided that Mauritius is concerned about
the economic situation in post-coup Madagascar, including
Mauritian business ties, largely developed with the former
regime. Laridon said that Rajoelina was forced to negotiate
for fear of losing AGOA privileges, and concerns that he
would not meet government payrolls in the third quarter.
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ROLE OF THE U.S. AND DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY
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7. (C) Discussing the critical 30 days following the August
9 signing, Simao commented that it was important for
bilateral cooperation to resume. Simao approved strongly of
U.S. diplomatic efforts in Antananarivo, both bilaterally and
with the International Contact Group on Madagascar. He also
commended the open and frank discussion that the
International Contact Group had with Ravalomanana which
contributed to international efforts to dissuade the deposed
President from the military option. Simao said the charter
provides evidence that efforts are being made by all parties
in Madagascar to develop a legitimate government, and that
this should give the United States a basis for for continuing
AGOA privileges and ensuring continuity of bilateral
assistance. The Charge responded only that these matters
were under review and that a continuous flow of information
from the mediating team to U.S. officials would be helpful in
that review. In an aside, Simao said he believed the French

MAPUTO 00000916 003 OF 003


Ambassador in Maputo may attempt to use delay tactics in
order to derail efforts to develop the transitional
government. He also commented that the French Ambassador and
an unnamed representative from the Elysee were on the margins
of the talks in Maputo, but were not apparently directly
observing.

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DETAILS OF THE CHARTER
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8. (C) Simao outlined several different commissions to be
formed at future meetings, perhaps as early as next week. He
expects a South African-style Truth and Reconciliation
Commission will be formed quickly, and will be tasked with
examining wrongs perpetuated by politicians recently and in
the past. He thinks this commission will help Malagasy
society understand its political problems and therefore move
forward. Simao said Madagascar would use this committee to
draft a new constitution, to be approved by referendum,
because the current constitution is the source of many
political problems. This commission also would be tasked
with reforming the electoral and voter registration systems.
He also explained that a second Commission on Military and
Security issues will be formed at a later date; opining that
the military is divided and has always been part of
Madagascar's political problems. The military commission,
according to Simao, will look for ways of reducing the size
and power of the Malagasy military without generating
instability. Simao, in another aside, commented that he
believed there was significant tension in the Malagasy
military between flag officers who were reaping the benefits
of installing Rajoelina and resentful mid-level officers who
continued to live in near-poverty conditions.


9. (C) While the talks last week were productive, Simao
acknowledged that there are several difficult points still to
resolve. At the very core of challenging issues to be
discussed is the makeup of the transitional government, and
who will fill the President, Deputy President, Prime
Minister, and three Deputy Prime Minister positions. Simao
said there is a gentlemen,s agreement that none of the
principal negotiators will stand for election in 15 months,
but he is uncertain whether the military will accept that
Rajoelina not run. He confided an elegant solution would be
to retain the constitutional provision that any candidate be
40 years of age, because Rajoelina would then have to wait.
Simao thought this would be acceptable, because Rajoelina
could still keep his job as Mayor of Antananarivo, and
because he has a long enough future in politics that sitting
out one round should not be too burdensome.

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COMMENT: MILITARY ISSUES UNRESOLVED, SIMAO ASKS FOR
CONTINUED SUPPORT
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10. (S/NF) Chissano and Simao are skilled and experienced
diplomatic interlocutors, and Simao was especially open and
frank in his assessments of the state-of-play, even emailing
copies of the agreements to the embassy after meeting with
the Charge. The four main Malagasy parties seem to view
Maputo as a neutral venue, and appear to appreciate
Chissano's efforts. Simao and Laridon emphasized the value
of continued U.S. diplomatic support of Madagascar in the
ensuing fragile 15 months, calling for the maintenance of
AGOA agreements and the resumption of bilateral assistance as
soon as possible in order to mitigate economic risks and
engender greater stability. Separately, rumors continue in
the Mozambican diplomatic community of French efforts to
support Rajoelina as a counter to Ravalomanana. The Charge
will meet with the French Ambassador to Mozambique next week.

CHAPMAN