GON NON-COOPERATION ON FARC ARMS SMUGGLING CASE

S E C R E T MANAGUA 000871

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, INL/LP, INR/IAA
STATE PASS USAID
DEPT FOR USOAS AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV SNAR PTER PREL NU
SUBJECT: GON NON-COOPERATION ON FARC ARMS SMUGGLING CASE

REF: MANAGUA 868 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Robert Callahan, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY. In a series of communications and meetings
between June 17 and June 19, various senior-level officials
of the Government of Nicaragua (GON) refused to cooperate
with a routine USG request for the transfer of evidence
pertinent to an on-going Department of Justice (DOJ)
investigation related to arms-smuggling by the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The refusal to cooperate by
senior GON cabinet members is of concern given that the
evidence in question was seized during operations that were
initiated based on USG-obtained information and that were
partially funded by the USG. The evidence request was for
samples of high-power rifles seized in two operations carried
out in Nicaragua. Because the USG and the GON do not have a
bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT),previous
evidence transfers involved the physical evidence being
passed directly between law-enforcement representatives of
the two nations. The GON's sudden refusal to cooperate on
such a routine transfer could be a troubling harbinger of
future difficulties in Post's counter narcotics cooperation
with the GON. END SUMMARY.

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Developing The Case
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2. (S) In late 2007, the DOJ started an investigation of
narcotics and arms smuggling networks operating in Colombia,
Panama, Nicaragua, and Honduras. DOJ investigators quickly
discovered that buyers and suppliers of arms often met in
Miami to set up their deals. The investigators soon zeroed
in on one group in Nicaragua, headed by Nicaraguan national
Jimmy Martinez. This group seemed to have access to large
quantities -- possibly metric tons -- of small arms.
Utilizing this information, a DOJ undercover agent contacted
Martinez claiming to be an arms buyer/drug supplier from the
FARC and offered a drugs-for-arms deal. Martinez quickly
agreed to the deal, and detailed negotiations began over how
many rifles would be exchanged and for what quantity of
narcotics.


3. (S) In October 2008, the Nicaraguan Navy seized 158 rifles
off of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua. The seizure was
widely covered in Nicaraguan media. After the seizure,
Martinez contacted the DOJ undercover agent and claimed that
the seized rifles were part of an arms shipment he had
prepared as part of the supposed FARC deal. In April 2009,
the Nicaraguan Navy seized approximately 50 additional
rifles. As had happened months before, Martinez again called
the DOJ undercover agent to inform that the seized rifles
also had been part of his stock. (NOTE: Photos of
Martinez's arms stocks obtained by DOJ were compared with
details about the storage and protection of the weapons
seized by the Navy and support Martinez's claim that the
weapons came from his supply. END NOTE.)


4. (S) When asked whether he could provide "heavier" weapons
such as TOW missiles, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) or
RPG-7s, Martinez confirmed he could. He implied; however,
that obtaining such weapons would require working with yet
another supplier. (NOTE: DOJ sources believe that Martinez
may be working with "The Buddha," a known, notorious arms
trafficker operating along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border.
END NOTE.) According to DOJ investigators, Martinez has
close ties to Steadman Fagoth, an indigenous Resistance
fighter from the 1980s, now aligned with Daniel Ortega's
ruling Sandinista (FSLN) Party. Fagoth is the President of
the Nicaragua Fisheries Agency (INPESCA).

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The Plot Thickens...
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5. (S) Following the two weapons seizures, the DEA Country
Office made the request for evidence transfer. As had
normally happened in the past, senior Nicaraguan National
Police (NNP) officials agreed to the transfer request, and
DEA began making arrangements for a special flight to pick-up
the weapon samples in early June 2009. However, when
U.S.-based law enforcement officials arrived in Nicaragua,
NNP counterparts informed the DEA Country Director that the
request for weapons samples would only be executed with
direct approval from Nicaraguan Attorney General Hernan
Estrada. DEA prepared a letter to Estrada requesting the
evidence transfer. Subsequently, Estrada informed the
Embassy that he could only act upon a request made via the
Ministry of Foreign Relations (MINREX).


6. (S) Upon learning of Estrada's conditions, on June 17,
the Ambassador called Foreign Minister Samuel Santos in an
effort to expedite a solution. During that telcon, Santos
declined to cooperate, arguing that the U.S. request was not
based upon any existing international or bilateral agreement,
and that the issue was the Attorney General's to resolve.
The Ambassador then phoned Estrada and asked whether a
Diplomatic Note to MINREX requesting the evidence would meet
Estrada's needs. He indicated that it would. The Ambassador
then phoned Santos a second time to explain the arrangement
reached with Estrada and that a note would be sent to the
Ministry. Later that day, the Political Counselor
hand-delivered to MINREX, Diplomatic Note 2009-069 (dated 17
June 2009),which formally requested cooperation on the case.


7. (S) The following day, on June 18 DEA representatives
received an e-mail from the NNP stating that Attorney General
Estrada had, in fact, now agreed to the evidence transfer.
However, when U.S. law enforcement personnel arrived at the
transfer site the NNP once again refused to cooperate, and
that only a letter from FM Santos authorizing the transfer
would suffice. Despite Embassy officials' efforts to contact
Santos yet again, he proved "unavailable." After
several-hours delay, aircraft scheduling issues prevented a
further extension and U.S. law enforcement personnel were
forced to return without the evidence.

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Comment
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8. (S) COMMENT: During a recent meeting with MINREX on a
separate evidence transfer request (to be reported SEPTEL) we
raised this case. Our Ministry interlocutors were aware of
it, but indicated that the Minister had been "unable to
comply with his verbal commitments" to the Ambassador due to
unidentified "external factors." We believe this incident
raises serious concerns about the GON's level of commitment
and continued willingness to cooperate on law enforcement
issues outside the realm of direct drug seizure operations
that have characterized our bilateral cooperation for the
last several years. Drug seizures are important, but are of
limited long-term utility if not translated into prosecutions
and convictions of traffickers. We note that direct
transfers of evidence between law enforcement entities are
routine occurrences, even in countries where the U.S. does
not have a formal MLAT arrangement. In fact, such transfers
with Nicaragua have taken place before without incident or
complication. Given this history, we find it highly unusual
that the GON elevated this case to the ministerial level, and
was still unwilling or unable to bring it to resolution.
Furthermore, the GON's reticence to accept the universal
principle of "comity among nations" may indicate a troubling
new departure for this administration.
CALLAHAN