NICARAGUA'S OTHER SANDINISTAS: THE MRS' POSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000276

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA'S OTHER SANDINISTAS: THE MRS' POSITION
AFTER THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

REF: A. 08 MANAGUA 1261

B. 08 MANAGUA 761

Classified By: CDA Richard Sanders, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In hindsight after the November 2008
municipal elections, Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS)
President Enrique Saenz believes his party made the correct
choice in supporting candidates opposed to the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN). MRS participation in the
elections as a "coalition" partner allowed the party to
remain a relevant political actor, and increased its
favorable rating among the Nicaraguan electorate. From now
until the 2011 national elections, Saenz stated that his
party would focus on consolidating its political base in the
urban centers along Nicaragua's Pacific coast, and try to
capitalize on newly identified demographic groups of rural
and young voters. The MRS will continue to pursue legal
means to regain its party registration, Saenz stated, and
that with or without registration, the MRS would almost
certainly participate in the 2011 national elections in a
coalition with other opposition parties. End Summary.

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Lessons Learned
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2. (C) In a March 9 meeting, MRS President Enrique Saenz
described to PolOff the party's decision to support the
November 2008 municipal election candidates who opposed the
FSLN candidates (ref A). The decision was contentious and
not all members of the national committee agreed, but at the
end the party followed the decision in unison. The exception
to this was National Assembly Deputy Monica Baltodano, whom
Saenz described as an outsider within the party. Saenz
explained that MRS national figures' participation in the
opposition's campaign allowed the MRS to remain a relevant
political actor rather than fall into the FSLN's trap of
becoming a spectator of the nation's politics. The decision,
he added, gave the MRS a vehicle through which to continue to
promote itself with the electorate. Saenz admitted that
working with the Liberal opposition in the campaign allowed
his party to overcome some biases it had against the Liberals
and similarly allowed the Liberals to overcome some of biases
against the MRS. Finally, the MRS' participation in the
elections allowed for the continuing erosion of the FSLN's
support base.


3. (C) Following the elections, the MRS contracted a polling
group to conduct surveys and focus groups to gain a better
understanding of the party's national standing. The results
confirmed what the party previously knew - i.e., its
strongest base was in urban centers along Nicaragua's Pacific
coast. However, the surveys and focus groups also presented
new data to the party. First, MRS popularity in the rural
areas was increasing. Second, the MRS rated higher than any
other opposition party among Nicaragua's youth. With this
information, Saenz stated that his party would work to
consolidate its bases in urban centers, but also work to
capitalize on these two newly identified demographic groups -
rural and youth voters. In its efforts to strengthen its
organization and support base, Saenz noted the party had one
obstacle it needed to overcome. Saenz admitted that while
Nicaraguans generally viewed the MRS favorably, there was
still an unknown factor that inhibited voters from formally
joining the party.

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Looking to 2011
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4. (C) In June 2008 the government stripped the MRS of its
legal registration, barring the party from participating in
Nicaraguan elections for four years (ref B). Since that time
the party has attempted to regain its legal registration
through legal recourses, both in Nicaragua and through the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. However, Saenz
recognized that only a political decision by Ortega's
government based on one of two reasons would lead to the
party regaining its legal registration. One reason would be
if Ortega needed to portray an image of openness and
commitment to democracy to the international community in

MANAGUA 00000276 002 OF 002


order that foreign assistance resume to Nicaragua. The other
reason would be Ortega's desire to divide the opposition
during elections to strengthen the FSLN's ability to win at
the polls.


5. (C) Saenz was uncertain if the government would return to
the MRS its legal registration, but this was not of utmost
importance to him. The legal registration, he said, was only
needed during elections, which are still two years away. At
this moment the MRS would concentrate on capitalizing on the
political relevance of the party by strengthening its bases
regardless of the legal structure. Ultimately, Saenz
believed that the MRS would almost certainly participate in
the 2011 national elections in a coalition against the ruling
FSLN, rather than go it alone at the polls.

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Comment
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6. (C) Accounting for approximately 10% of the nationwide
electorate, the MRS remains a minority party in Nicaraguan
politics. However, its participation as a coalition partner
in the November 2008 municipal elections was seen as a key
factor that led to the opposition's wins in big cities such
as Managua and Leon, although the government ultimately stole
these elections through fraud. While the MRS decided late in
the electoral calendar to support Liberal opposition
candidates, the party made the right decision and, more
importantly, its leaders recognize that they made the right
decision. Their collaboration in the November elections with
the Liberal opposition and the Conservative Party
demonstrated to all the ability of the MRS to work together
toward a common goal and the necessity of maintaining unity
against the ruling FSLN. Prior to the 2011 national
elections, the MRS, as well as other opposition parties, will
work to strengthen its support base. The MRS has correctly
concluded that Nicaragua's current political environment will
force all opposition parties to work together to defeat
Ortega and the FSLN in 2011. While the national elections
are still two years away, at least the MRS and other
opposition parties appear to be heading in the right
direction.
SANDERS