Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MADRID1133
2009-11-25 16:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:  

SPAIN'S KEY PLAYERS IN EMERGENT IRAN POLICY

Tags:  PINR PREL SP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8759
PP RUEHLA
DE RUEHMD #1133 3291617
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251617Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1488
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 4229
C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001133 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE, INR, P

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2029
TAGS: PINR PREL SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN'S KEY PLAYERS IN EMERGENT IRAN POLICY
(C-RE9-02335)

REF: A. (A) STATE 120010

B. (B) MADRID 1087

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Arnold Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001133

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE, INR, P

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2029
TAGS: PINR PREL SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN'S KEY PLAYERS IN EMERGENT IRAN POLICY
(C-RE9-02335)

REF: A. (A) STATE 120010

B. (B) MADRID 1087

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Arnold Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)


1. (C) Please refer to Madrid 1087 dated November 6 for more
details regarding Spain's evolving policy towards Iran and
post's recommendations for future engagement. Questions from
ref (A) are detailed in subparagraphs below.

(A) Foreign Minister Moratinos does not set Iran policy
alone, but in coordination with President Zapatero's key
foreign policy advisor, Secretary General of the Presidency
(and former Deputy Foreign Minister) Bernardino Leon.
Moratinos has a deep bench of players who are involved in
Iran policy. The most important advisors include Assistant
Secretary-equivalent Fidel Sendagorta and P-equivalent
Alfonso Lucini. Assistant Secretary-equivalent for Strategic
Affairs and Terrorism Carme Bujan could also contribute to
policy development given her non-proliferation interests.
Moratinos takes personal pride in his working relationships
with Iranian leaders and considers it critically important
that Spain not take any actions that would be perceived in a
negative light by counterparts in Tehran. Spain wants to
preserve what it views as its primary contribution to
international efforts -- acting as a special messenger or
intermediary. President Zapatero concurs with this view,
placing a premium on dialogue as the focus of Spanish foreign
policy.

(B) Yes, there are signs of division between working level
contacts at the MFA and Foreign Minister Moratinos' policy,
primarily between the non-proliferation side of the house and
the geographic/economic bureaus. Two contacts in the MFA
working on non-proliferation matters have expressed their
personal view that the international community needs to
engage actively to prevent Iran from further developing its
weaponization capacity. They have also expressed their view
that it is unfortunate that Iran has been allowed to develop
its capabilities thus far through prolonged negotiations and
stalling tactics. But they also note that senior Spanish
foreign policy makers do not believe that Spain can or should
take any strong steps against Iran, apart from continued
dialogue. However, many other MFA staffers, including
Director General for International Economic Relations Rafael
Conde, working on Iran issues are deeply skeptical that
increased pressure or additional sanctions could bring
positive change in Iranian actions, while believing that
those steps could provoke negative reactions or unintended
consequences in the region. There is also great reluctance
for Spain to take a hard line. Many at the MFA discount U.S.
and EU efforts when China, Russia, India and other key
countries are unlikely to support additional pressure on
Iran.

(C) Foreign Minister Moratinos will defer to any directives
from President Zapatero on Iran policy.

(D) The MFA, in coordination with the Presidency, takes the
lead in developing Spanish policy on Iran. The Ministry of
Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and
Commerce have the opportunity for input, but the emphasis is
on implementation of Spanish policy, EU directives and UN
sanctions. Both ministries' offices that deal with Iran
sanctions, as well as the Central Bank, appear to implement
conscientiously existing sanctions.

(E) Post is not aware of any key contacts at the Ministry of
Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and
Commerce, or the Central Bank who might influence President
Zapatero or Foreign Minister Moratinos regarding Iran policy.
At most, MITYC Minister Miguel Sebastian might be able to
speak authoritatively to Zapatero and Moratinos about the
impact of lack of significant impact of sanctions on Spanish
companies' interests, but if Zapatero and Moratinos are to
take stronger stances on sanctions, it will be because of
political and geopolitical considerations and in spite of
economic ones.
CHACON