Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MADRID1029
2009-10-20 17:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:  

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OCTOBER 19, 2009, MEETING WITH

Tags:  PREL MOPS KIPR SP AF KV BK LE IR CU HO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4919
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMD #1029/01 2931705
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201705Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1359
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0206
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0222
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 4163
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0520
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0292
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001029 

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KIPR SP AF KV BK LE IR CU HO
SUBJECT: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OCTOBER 19, 2009, MEETING WITH
SPANISH SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PRESIDENCY BERNARDINO LEON

MADRID 00001029 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ARNOLD A. CHACON, REASONS 1.4(B),(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001029

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KIPR SP AF KV BK LE IR CU HO
SUBJECT: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OCTOBER 19, 2009, MEETING WITH
SPANISH SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PRESIDENCY BERNARDINO LEON

MADRID 00001029 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ARNOLD A. CHACON, REASONS 1.4(B),(D).


1. (C) Summary: CDA and Leon discussed President Zapatero's
October 13 meeting with POTUS including Zapatero's plans for
a return visit to Washington in January, Spanish intentions
regarding police trainers in Afghanistan, Guantanamo
detainees, Kosovo, EUFOR, UNIFIL, Iran, Cuba, and Honduras.
Leon stressed the importance of the White House meeting for
Spain and Zapatero's sincerity regarding cooperation with the
U.S. End summary.

Washington Meetings
--------------


2. (C) Leon said Zapatero was very pleased with his
Washington meetings and quite serious about finding ways to
partner effectively with the U.S. internationally. He noted
Zapatero hopes to return to Washington in January at which
time he hopes to address the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and
give a major speech on economic issues, underscoring Spain's
commitment to robust economic and investment ties. In that
regard, Leon acknowledged that the U.S. message on IPR had
been received and that it was now on the GOS radar screen.
He said the January visit would also be an opportunity for
the GOS to engage U.S. critics on IPR.

Afghanistan
--------------


3. (C) Leon explained that before Zapatero's trip to
Washington, there had been extensive interagency
consultations involving the Minister of Interior and the head
of the Guardia Civil and National Police. There was genuine
political will behind Spain's commitment to send more police
trainers beyond the 40 already announced. He said any press
reports to the contrary were unfounded. However, Leon noted
that the first 40 were not yet deployed (arrangements are
still being ironed out with NATO and ISAF) and said Spain
needed to field those trainers before moving on to specifics
regarding additional trainers.

Guantanamo Detainees

--------------


4. (C) Leon mentioned that since the White House meeting he
had received a call from NSC Senior Director for Europe
Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall and said he intended to talk to
S/GC Ambassador Fried. Leon welcomed these interactions and
noted Spain hoped to take five Guantanamo detainees. He
emphasized that Spain had the political will to be helpful
and to give an example to, if not help us convince as EU
President, other European countries. He said it would have
to be done case by case but stressed Spanish willingness to
look at new files. (Note: Spain is preparing to send a team
to Guantanamo the week of October 27 to interview two
detainees it believes might be suitable for resettlement in
Spain. End note.)

Kosovo and EUFOR
--------------


5. (C) Leon expressed surprise that Kosovo had come up in the
White House meeting. He insisted Spain -- while no where
near recognizing Kosovo -- was trying to play a constructive
role (he noted Moratinos had reassured Zapatero of this
following the White House meeting). The CDA enumerated all
the ways (lobbying, support for Serbia's ICJ brief, negative
votes in IFIs, KFOR withdrawal) in which Spain was
emphatically not being helpful. Leon requested a non-paper
on this, which CDA undertook to provide (Post is in touch
with EUR/SCE on this). Leon stressed that Spain did not want
to cause the U.S. problems on the issue of Kosovo.


6. (C) CDA noted that Spanish MOD Chacon's recent public
comments suggesting Spain might pull out of EUFOR in 2010,
raised the specter of another uncoordinated withdrawal from
an international mission, similar to what happened with KFOR.
Leon assured the CDA that Chacon had learned her lesson with
KFOR and any moves with regard to EUFOR would be
well-coordinated with Spain's allies. He said he did not see
anything on the horizon regarding Spain's EUFOR participation
that would come as a surprise to anyone.


MADRID 00001029 002.2 OF 002


UNIFIL
--------------


7. (C) The CDA urged that as Spain prepared to take over the
UNIFIL command, it work with Italy to keep overall troop
levels up. He stressed that European troop levels were
important indicators of international resolve to maintain the
peace in south Lebanon. Leon said Spain was increasing its
commitment there by 200 (the headquarters element) but noted
there had been no request for Spain to increase troop levels
as a condition of Spain taking the command. Leon said he was
present when this issue was discussed with Berlusconi, and it
was clear the Italian Prime Minister wanted to give up the
Italian command of UNIFIL. Leon did not give any indication
that he was aware of a possible extension of the Italian
command nor did he suggest that either Israeli or Lebanese
officials had raised the issue with the Spanish during
Zapatero's visit to the region last week.

Iran
--------------


8. (C) Leon noted that while in Israel, Zapatero had been
very clear with the press regarding Spain's stance: if Iran
did not negotiate seriously, the international community must
be united in taking appropriate measures (i.e., sanctions).
Leon said the U.S. and Spain were on the "same sheet of
music."

Cuba and Honduras
--------------


9. (C) On Cuba, the CDA expressed disappointment that FM
Moratinos' October 17-19 visit there had not included a
meeting with dissidents. He noted the U.S. managed to signal
its willingness to engage the GOC while maintaining a focus
on human rights and the need for democratic change. So far,
the U.S. had not seen improvements in political or human
rights conditions. The CDA stressed the importance of the EU
and Spain keeping a focus on human rights and not allowing
the GOC to believe it could split the EU and the U.S. on that
issue. He also underscored the importance of the EU Common
Position. Leon agreed that Cuba had yet to take any
meaningful measures toward democratic change and respect for
human rights and discounted any possibility of a Zapatero
near-term visit to Cuba. Regarding Honduras, Leon -- in
contrast to what we have been hearing from the MFA --
stressed the need for pragmatism. He described Micheletti as
disagreeable and Zelaya as more so and noted that Venezuela
would like to discredit the Honduran elections.
CHACON