Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MADRID1009
2009-10-16 06:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:  

TFHO1: A/S SHANNON AND SENIOR DIRECTOR RESTREPO

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM HO SP 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1335
INFO ALEDP/ALL EUROPEAN DIPL POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC DIPL POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0517
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001009 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/FO, WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS
NSC FOR RESTREPO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM HO SP
SUBJECT: TFHO1: A/S SHANNON AND SENIOR DIRECTOR RESTREPO
DISCUSS HONDURAS WITH SPANISH MFA SECRETARY OF STATE DE
LAIGLESIA

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ARNOLD A. CHACON. REASON: 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001009

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/FO, WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS
NSC FOR RESTREPO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM HO SP
SUBJECT: TFHO1: A/S SHANNON AND SENIOR DIRECTOR RESTREPO
DISCUSS HONDURAS WITH SPANISH MFA SECRETARY OF STATE DE
LAIGLESIA

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ARNOLD A. CHACON. REASON: 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: WHA Assistant Secretary Tom Shannon and NSC
Senior Director Dan Restrepo outlined U.S. concerns over the
situation in Honduras for MFA Secretary of State (Under
Secretary equivalent) for Latin America Juan Pablo de
Laiglesia during an October 10 meeting in Valencia. Shannon
noted that both President Zelaya and de facto president
Micheletti were "dug in" to their positions, but there could
be a way out through parallel tracks of dialogue and
elections. The international community and Honduran
presidential candidates need to step up efforts to create a
space for free, fair, and transparent elections. End Summary.


2. (C) The meeting took place on the margins of the October
9-10 U.S.-Spain Forum in Valencia. A/S Shannon began with a
readout of his recent visit to Honduras. On the plus side, a
negotiating table ("Mesa de Dialogo") was established;
however, it was not clear how long it would last. Both
Zelaya and Micheletti are dug in, and neither is thinking
about how to end the impasse. What is needed is a new
dynamic. The USG believes the presidential candidates can
help create this new dynamic by demanding results from the
Mesa de Dialogo and insisting that the rhetoric remain under
control. They also need to prevail on Zelaya and Micheletti
to create a space for free elections; otherwise, Honduras
faces a rough road.


3. (C) A/S Shannon predicted that free and fair elections
could push Micheletti and Zelaya towards a resolution.
Micheletti is seeking international assistance for the
elections, but many Foreign Ministers will not want to assist
the de facto regime. However, the candidates could take the
initiative and ask for international assistance.


4. (C) Restrepo commented on the "extremely complicated
dynamic" between the two dominant personalities, Zelaya and
Micheletti. There is no perfect solution to this situation,
he said, and it is important not to let the perfect be the
enemy of the good. Micheletti wants to use the elections to

justify his coup, and Honduras could be facing a serious
division which must be avoided. Some sectors of civil
society are beginning to seek solutions. The elections can
help Honduras out of its bind but are not in themselves the
entire solution. The country needs to go forward, not remain
deadlocked. A key question is who will be the legal leader
of Honduras in January when Zelaya's term ends.


5. (C) A/S Shannon underscored the extremely important role
Spain and the EU can play in Honduras. He expressed doubt as
to whether the OAS could organize election observation given
its leading role in facilitating dialogue. With or without
the OAS, other players could get involved in election
monitoring, such as the EU, the Carter Center, and NDI. It
was clear that Hugo Chavez and his ALBA allies would do their
best to delegitimize elections.


6. (C) De Laiglesia commented that what Micheletti had done
was intolerable, and the elections are likely to be
contaminated by the context in which they are taking place.
Micheletti is not interested in reconciliation. De Laiglesia
was also concerned that Zelaya's people may walk away from
the negotiating table. If the dialogue does not yield a
solution, the focus should be on making the elections
legitimate. The conflict between the Zelaya and Micheletti
remains an obstacle. If Micheletti won't leave office, he
must at least accept Zelaya's return on some sort of
conditional basis. If Zelaya isn't allowed back into office,
then the coup has succeeded, he said. Given that
Micheletti's continued presence delegitimizes any elections
and invalidates the OAS efforts, de Laiglesia doubted that
the OAS or anybody else would want to send observers if
Micheletti insists on remaining.


7. (C) Noting that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal manages
elections, A/S Shannon suggested it might be possible to
separate the elections from the de facto government, and have
the elections and the Mesa de Dialogo run along two parallel
tracks. De Laiglesia agreed that there may be a way to sever
the connection betwen the two processes. It is necessary,
though very difficult, to "decontaminate" the situation so
that the EU and OAS can help.


8. (C) A/S Shannon noted that recent polls revealed that the

MADRID 00001009 002 OF 002


Honduran public wanted both Micheletti and Zelaya out of the
political scene. Honduras's leaders have failed, and the
Honduran people want their democracy back. It is therefore
important to let the people become the protagonist in the
crisis and for the international community to help them. He
reiterated that an international presence is key to holding
elections in an atmosphere of calm.


9. (U) A/S Shannon and Senior Director Restrepo have cleared
this message.
CHACON