Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09LUSAKA694
2009-10-07 16:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Lusaka
Cable title:  

GRZ DRAWS A LINE UNDER ROW WITH DIPLOATS... IN

Tags:  PREL PGOV KCOR 
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VZCZCXRO4615
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHLS #0694/01 2801605
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071605Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7330
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHLMC/MILENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP 0184
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUSAKA 000694 

SIPDIS

TATE FOR AF/S AND L, LONDON FOR PETER LORD

E.O.1295: DECL: 12/31/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KCOR
SUBJECT: GRZ DRAWS A LINE UNDER ROW WITH DIPLOATS... IN
THE SAND

REF: A. LUSAKA 620
B LUSAKA 654

C. LUSAKA 588

D. LUSAKA 84

E. LUSAKA 689

F. LUSAKA 552

LUSAKA 00000694 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Koplovsky for reasons 1.4 (b,d
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUSAKA 000694

SIPDIS

TATE FOR AF/S AND L, LONDON FOR PETER LORD

E.O.1295: DECL: 12/31/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KCOR
SUBJECT: GRZ DRAWS A LINE UNDER ROW WITH DIPLOATS... IN
THE SAND

REF: A. LUSAKA 620
B LUSAKA 654

C. LUSAKA 588

D. LUSAKA 84

E. LUSAKA 689

F. LUSAKA 552

LUSAKA 00000694 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Koplovsky for reasons 1.4 (b,d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: Zambian Foreign Minister
Kabinga Pande told Charge October 7 that the media tempest
surrounding diplomats and their roles and responsibilities
(ref D) was sparked by some (unnamed) diplomats speaking out
against the Government of Zambia (GRZ) rather than using
private channels. Nevertheless, he felt it was incumbent
upon him to curtail this inflammatory media battle by
reigning in his fellow ministers and by discussing with
diplomats the preferred way of conveying concerns. Charge
outlined firmly the U.S. expectation that diplomats would
meet with government, opposition, businesses, civil society,
religious leaders and anyone else to learn about Zambia and
to convey our views on issues. Furthermore, he reassured
Pande that Washington not only supported this view but
expected its diplomats to use public diplomacy to speak on
issues of national interest. Meanwhile, British High
Commissioner Tom Carter met with Dr. Richard Chembe,
President Banda's economic advisor, to convey the UK view of
Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
to reassure the GRZ of the UK's interest in continuing good
relations, and to underscore continuing UK interest in the
Zambian and UK corruption cases against former President
Chiluba and his request for restoration of immunity.
President Banda subsequently called Carter and expressed
appreciation for the UK's continued partnership. The EU
Heads of Mission decided October 5 not to make a public
statement regarding recent accusations against them but
instead to convey concerns privately to FM Pande and Vice
President Kunda. They have failed, thus far, to get a
meeting with Pande or President Kunda. Embassy requests the
Department underscore to Zambian Ambassador to the United
States Lewanika our policy on the roles and responsibilities
of U.S. diplomats. End Summary.

Pande -- The Unreformable Cultural Relativist

--------------


2. (C) After countless calls to the MFA and finally a direct
call to MFA Permanent Secretary Tens Kapoma explaining that
the Embassy was attempting to convey its messages in private
diplomatic channels per the GRZ's repeated requests, FM Pande
agreed to meet with Charge October 7. Charge conveyed the
USG's firm view that the role of diplomats is to meet with a
broad range of society, both in support of and in opposition
to the government, to learn about our host country and to
convey U.S. views on issues both to these groups and to the
media. Answering the question posed in the media by the
Minister of Information, Charge assured Pande that Washington
not only supported such activities but expected its diplomats
to use public diplomacy to convey and advocate for U.S.
views. Furthermore, the USG believed these activities to be
in full conformity with Article 41 of the Vienna Convention
and supported other countries' diplomats conducting these
same activities while posted in the United States.


3. (C) Charge expressed profound concern about the tone of
the now daily ministerial press statements against diplomats
and the potential deleterious effect they could have on our
bilateral relationship. He noted that, to date, no diplomats
had rebutted the assertions, accusations, and even threats
emanating from GRZ ministers but expected that foreign
governments would only tolerate their images being tarnished
for so long. He urged the GRZ use the same private
diplomatic channels it has implored diplomats to use and to
cease the accusations in the media.


4. (C) Reminiscent of previous conversations about freedom of
speech (refs C and F),Pande listened impassively and then
began his response by noting the importance of diplomats
understanding the laws and culture of Zambia. He asserted
that "some" (unnamed) diplomats were the first to violate the
practice of not talking to the GRZ through the press and that
Zambians who heard these "attacks" expected the GRZ to react.
Pande noted such criticism was culturally inappropriate. He
advised Charge to counsel other diplomats on the imprudence
of criticizing the GRZ publicly. Nevertheless, he took
Charge's points and agreed that the tenor of recent events
had escalated to an unhelpful point. Pande took it upon
himself to "calm things down" by curtailing inflammatory

LUSAKA 00000694 002.2 OF 003


statements from other ministers. In addition, he intended to
reschedule the abruptly postponed MFA meeting with diplomats
to discuss the disagreement and assured Charge that it would
be done behind closed doors. (Note: the venue for previous
summons to diplomats for a meeting October 6 was the
Mulungushi Conference Center, a location unnecessarily large
and public for diplomatic heads of mission and, therefore,
assuredly intended to be the site of a public thrashing
attended by carnivorous journalists.)


5. (C) Pande noted, however, that Home Affairs Minister
Mangani had information that diplomats were "inciting
people." He claimed some were putting "cash on the bar" at
filling stations so that civil society organizations (CSOs)
could fill their vehicles to participate in the honking
protests (ref E). Finally he noted that no one had accused
U.S. diplomats of such nefarious activities, but that the
Embassy's rushing in to "protest too much" might lead one to
think otherwise. Charge assured Pande U.S. diplomats were
guiltless of inappropriate behavior and would remain so.
Finally he thanked Pande for his efforts to put relations
with donors back on track so the real work of developing the
country could be resumed.

UK Echoes Points to State House, Pande's Points Echo Back
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Charge met with British High Commissioner Tom Carter
later October 7 and reported what had transpired in his
meeting with Pande. Carter noted that he and DFID Head Mike
Hammond had succeeded in meeting with President Banda's
economic advisor Dr. Richard Chembe October 6. (Note: Carter
said that some months ago Pande had notified EU heads of
mission that he would not/not meet with them bilaterally
because there were "too many of them," despite the fact that
only eight EU countries are represented in Lusaka.) Carter
echoed Charge's points to Chembe noting that UK diplomats
would continue to meet with a wide range of society, that
ensuring civil society voices were heard was a British value,
and that a large portion of UK bilateral assistance does and
would continue to go to civil society for precisely that
reason. Carter also expressed concern that the recent flap
about diplomatic roles and responsibilities might overshadow
HMG's continuing concern about the GRZ's unwillingness to
appeal the Chiluba acquittal (ref X),the failure to register
to the UK verdict in Zambian courts, and Chiluba's request to
have his immunity restored.


7. (C) According to Carter, Chembe replied that Banda "was
too human" and had "too big a heart" to put a former
president in prison, effectively and astonishingly
acknowledging State House intervention in Chiluba's acquittal
and laying to rest any hope of an appeal. More
optimistically, Chembe claimed that the UK verdict was in the
process of being registered and that the Parliamentary Clerk
had written to State House confirming that Parliament would
not/not restore Chiluba's immunity while he remained under
investigation for other charges. Chembe expressed
appreciation for Carter's desire to keep Zambian-UK relations
on track and optimism that a meeting between Carter and Banda
could be arranged as soon as October 17.


8. (C) Later that day, President Banda called Carter and
apparently exuded praise for HMG's outreach and its desire to
maintain good relations. Carter noted Banda was surprisingly
cheerful and affable. Nevertheless, Banda noted that when he
was a diplomat, certain restrictions on what diplomats could
say were observed. Carter repeated the UK's views on the
rights and responsibilities of diplomats to conduct public
diplomacy and support civil society. Banda reportedly
responded, "I guess I have a different view on that." Carter
also noted that the EU had yet to secure a meeting with
either Pande or Vice President Kunda and, therefore, had not
conveyed views on behalf of the grouping yet.

Comment - Nearly Indistinguishable Line Drawn in the Sand
-------------- --------------


9. (C) The Pande meeting was an important opportunity to warn
the GRZ that continuing accusations against diplomats in the
press would eventually necessitate a public response.
Furthermore, we seized the moral high ground by conveying our
views in private, as has been requested often of us, and
forewarned MFA that we would continue to meet with a variety
of interlocutors including civil society. However, the
question of what is appropriately said in the press seemed
largely ill defined by Pande. Pande repeatedly recalled
MFA's earlier complaint about Emboff's remarks in the press
that the pending NGO bill was unnecessary (ref C),citing it

LUSAKA 00000694 003.2 OF 003


as an example of a diplomat "telling" the GRZ what to do. We
suspect the GRZ will be tolerant of press statements, as long
as nothing is said that irritates or criticizes the
government, a blurry distinction could easily entrap us and
other diplomats again, particularly given the biased and
largely inaccurate press.


10. (C) Banda's call to Carter is slightly more encouraging.
Clearly Banda is unhappy with the situation that evolved in
his more than two-week absence and is eager to soothe
tempers. Nevertheless, he too seems to agree with a very
restrictive interpretation of Vienna Convention Article 41.


11. (C) Action Request: Now that Chembe has confirmed that
the GRZ has crossed one of the redlines outlined by the
Cooperating Partners Groups in ref A (refusing to appeal
Chiluba's acquittal),we and other donors will have to decide
what, if any, action to take. The CPG Troika, which includes
the U.S. Embassy, hopes to meet with Chembe early next week.
We would welcome Washington's guidance. In addition, Embassy
recommends the Department call in Zambian Ambassador Lewanika
and underscore the USG's interpretation of appropriate
diplomatic activities under Article 41 of the Vienna
Convention and repeat our request for an official
interpretion (ref D).
KOPLOVSKY