Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09LUSAKA57
2009-01-28 07:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Lusaka
Cable title:  

PERSPECTIVES FROM ZAMBIA ON ZIMBABWE SITUATION

Tags:  PREL PHUM ZI ZA 
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O 280740Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6674
INFO SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
C O N F I D E N T I A L LUSAKA 000057 


STATE FOR AF, ADDIS FOR AU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM ZI ZA
SUBJECT: PERSPECTIVES FROM ZAMBIA ON ZIMBABWE SITUATION

REF: 08 LUSAKA 1183


Classified By: Ambassador Donald E. Booth, reasons 1.4, b/d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L LUSAKA 000057


STATE FOR AF, ADDIS FOR AU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM ZI ZA
SUBJECT: PERSPECTIVES FROM ZAMBIA ON ZIMBABWE SITUATION

REF: 08 LUSAKA 1183


Classified By: Ambassador Donald E. Booth, reasons 1.4, b/d.


1. (C) Summary: In various conversations over the past week,
President Banda, COMESA Secretary General Ngwenya, and
Patriotic Front Deputy Leader Scott have all suggested to us
or the UK High Commission that a direct high level U.S. or UK
approach to Mugabe is needed to break the political impasse
in Zimbabwe. The key, something echoed by Zambian civil
society leaders, is that Mugabe needs assurances for him and
his followers that they can pursue a dignified exit from
power and need not fear retribution or prosecution. End
Summary


2. (C) President Banda: UK High Commissioner briefed
Ambassador on his January 23 meeting with President Banda in
which he (and a colleague from South Africa) provided Banda
an intelligence briefing on the Zimbabwe situation.
According to the High Commissioner, Banda made the following
points: 1) western sanctions are not helpful because Mugabe
and others believe the individuals targeted by the sanctions
are individuals the "West" wants to see stand trial in The
Hague; 2) a solution must include a formula that forgets the
past, such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission process; 3) it is reasonable for Tsvangirai to
demand the release of MDC cadres prior to further
negotiations because Mugabe had made (successfully) the same
demand in 1979 at the beginning of the Lancaster House talks;
4) Mbeki has been one-sided in his approach because he
perceived Mugabe as immovable and thus felt the only way to
make progress was to push Tsavangirai to make concessions; 5)
ZANU-PF (Comment: Perhaps Banda also) perceives that the
"white settlers" back MDC, as they see MDC as a means to get
their land back, and thus the West supports MDC too; and 6)
it will be very difficult for anyone in the region to take
active efforts to unseat Mugabe, a liberation hero for
Africans, as doing so will be seen as following the British
agenda. Banda expressed concern about the impact on Zambia
should Zimbabwe slide into civil war. He also told the UK
High Commissioner that he is upset with Tsvangirai for
failing to visit Zambia as planned back in December.


3. (C) Comment: When he met with Ambassador just before
Christmas (reftel),Banda was quite firm in the position that

Tsvangirai should take the SADC deal (rotating control of the
Home Affairs Ministry) in order to form a government and thus
leave Mugabe a face saving way to cede power. It is
interesting that he offered the UK High Commissioner no clear
ideas on a way forward now. What seemingly has not changed
is Banda's belief that public Western pressure on Mugabe to
leave makes it harder for/less likely that Mugabe will do so.
End Comment


4. (C) COMESA Secretary General Ngwenya (a Zimbabwean): In
a recent one-on-one conversation with Ambassador, Ngwenya
made the following points: 1) Mugabe knows time is not on his
side, as South African policy will be less accommodating if
Zuma is elected in April as expected; 2) Mugabe is too proud
to back down under public pressure or on his own and will not
make concessions to MDC without "outside assurances"; and -
most interestingly - 3) Mugabe is looking for a call from the
U.S. or UK to offer him assurances against
prosecution/retribution - both within Zimbabwe (Mugabe is
mindful of the 5th Brigade's brutal repression in
Matabeleland in the 1980s),as well as from outside courts.
Ngwenya said he believes that if Mugabe was approached
directly at a high level by the USG or HMG, he could be
convinced to make concessions so the power-sharing deal can
be concluded, and thus pave the way for him (Mugabe) to
quietly cede power.


5. (C) Patriotic Front (opposition party) Deputy Leader Guy
Scott: In a lunch meeting hosted by Ambassador on January
26, Scott raised the issue of Zimbabwe and said SADC
mediation will not succeed; it's time for U.S. or UK to call
Mugabe, insist the current situation is unacceptable and ask
Mugabe directly what he needs to fade away and let the
rebuilding of Zimbabwe commence.


6. (SBU) Zambian Civil Society: DCM hosted a lunch for
Zambian civil society leaders on January 27 to discuss
Zimbabwe. The group was almost uniformly negative in their
assessment of Tsvangirai, whom they characterized as a
political opportunist and potential thief, much like Zambia's
champion of democracy from the labor movement - second
president Frederick Chiluba - turned out to be. The civil
society leaders seemed convinced that Tsvangirai's character
and motives are at the root of much of the delay in finding a
solution to the current impasse. They suggested that
Tsvangirai needed to abandon the "power agenda" that he is
"pursuing at the expense of the Zimbabwean people" and effect
change from within a government of national unity. While
they agreed Mugabe needs to go, they thought that he will
need some deal "sweeteners" that would guarantee his dignity
as he transitions out of power.


7. (C) UK Position: According to the UK High Commissioner,
he made the following points to Banda: 1) donors are poised
to assist Zimbabwe's recovery, but it is not enough just for
Tsvangirai to join a government; donors need to see a
commitment by the Zim government to macro economic stability,
respect for the rule of law and restoration of the democratic
process; 2) SADC and its members must play the central role
in delivering change and reform in Zimbabwe; and 3) it is
important for Zambia and other SADC countries to exert
influence on South Africa to break the status quo in Zimbabwe.


8. (C) Comment: It is interesting that three parties who
share little in common have all concluded that direct
high-level U.S. and/or UK engagement with Mugabe is the key
to securing Mugabe's flexibility to resolve the current
impasse and his willingness to quietly cede power. It is
rather disappointing that Zambian civil society has bought
into the Tsvangirai is the obstacle to progress mind set. We
will continue to work to change that. End Comment


BOOTH