ZAMBIA ON KOSOVO RECOGNITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L LUSAKA 000105

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019
TAGS: PREL AORC ICJ KV ZA
SUBJECT: ZAMBIA ON KOSOVO RECOGNITION

REF: A. STATE 11928

B. 08 LUSAKA 530

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Booth for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Although the decision of whether or not to
recognize Kosovo is still "under consideration" by the
Zambian Government (GRZ),imminent action is unlikely. In a
February 12 meeting, Foreign Ministry senior officials
expressed concerns about the legal precedence that Kosovo
recognition would establish and implied that the GRZ does not
consider Kosovo recognition a priority. They did not refer
to the Serbian resolution on Kosovo at the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA). The GRZ representatives suggested
that Zambia could be persuaded to recognize Kosovo if it
could be shown that Kosovo meets the four criteria of
statehood defined by international law. End Summary.


2. (C) On February 12, DCM discussed the issue and the Ref A
talking points with Foreign Ministry Permanent Secretary Tens
Kapoma and Zambia's Permanent Representative to the United
Nations Lazarous Kapambwe. Although the Zambian officials
did not rule out the possibility of Kosovo recognition, they
indicated by their response that Zambia would be unlikely to
do so in the immediate future. Neither Kapoma nor Kapambwe
mentioned the Serbian-sponsored UNGA resolution seeking an
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice.


3. (C) The GRZ representatives expressed reservations about
the legal precedence that Kosovo recognition would establish.
In particular, they conveyed some concern about the domestic
legal ramifications vis-a-vis the Lozi tribe, an ethnic group
in western Zambia within which remains some support for
greater autonomy or full independence. Kapambwe implied that
the USG's recognition of Kovoso is inconsistent with its
refusal to recognize South Ossetian and Abkhazian secession
from Georgia. Pol/Econ Chief encouraged the GRZ to consider
the Kosovo situation separately and on its own merits.


4. (C) Kapambwe suggested that Zambia could be persuaded to
recognize Kosovo if Kosovo or the international community
could establish that Kosovo meets four conditions for
national sovereignty, according to the criteria for statehood
laid down in the Montevideo Convention, including a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and the
capacity to conduct international relations. The Zambian
officials did not say which of these conditions Kosovo had
failed to meet.


5. (C) Kapoma's tacit and reticent reaction appeared to be a
departure from his 2008 remarks in which he had offered some
faint hope to Ambassador and DCM that the GRZ might recognize
Kosovo based on Zambia's general support for
self-determination (Ref B). Post, however, has tempered its
expectations with a realization that -- particularly given
pressure from the Serbian and Russian Embassies -- Zambia is
likely to equivocate in the absence of either a carrot or
stick from us and/or the European Union donors who have
recognized Kosovo.

BOOTH