Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09LUANDA785
2009-12-29 09:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Luanda
Cable title:  

ANGOLA'S OPPOSITION: WEAK PILLAR IN THE DEMOCRATIC

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM AO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7005
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHLU #0785/01 3630955
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290955Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY LUANDA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5869
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUANDA 000785 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM AO
SUBJECT: ANGOLA'S OPPOSITION: WEAK PILLAR IN THE DEMOCRATIC
EDIFICE

REF: A. LUANDA 750

B. LUANDA 751 AND PREVIOUS

(U) Classified by CDA Jeff Hawkins, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUANDA 000785

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM AO
SUBJECT: ANGOLA'S OPPOSITION: WEAK PILLAR IN THE DEMOCRATIC
EDIFICE

REF: A. LUANDA 750

B. LUANDA 751 AND PREVIOUS

(U) Classified by CDA Jeff Hawkins, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. While Angola's political opposition faces
many institutional obstacles, considerable internal
weaknesses also prevent it from playing fully its role in a
democratic system. Whereas the ruling MPLA, albeit with all
the advantages of decades of incumbency, is well organized,
united, and nationally ubiquitous, the opposition is none of
these things. The opposition parties have weak, and
increasingly fractured, leadership. The parties have failed
to identify political agendas that resonate with the Angolan
people. The opposition parties have largely remained
regional, rather than national, in scope, and even in
traditional strongholds organization appears weak. Finally,
these parties have failed to find a voice or establish a
means of communication with the Angolan electorate. The
opposition can rightfully point to many advantages the MPLA
enjoys; nevertheless, these parties must also put their own
houses in order if the democratization process in Angola is
to move forward. End Summary.


2. (C) The MPLA's recent congress put the power, prestige,
and organization of the ruling party on display for the
Angolan people. Thousands of delegates from every corner of
the country came together in an impressive showing of unity
and support for the party president. The party, in power
since independence, has vast resources and truly national
reach. An MPLA flag flies over just about every village in
the country.


3. (C) This stands in stark contrast to the opposition. The
parties that make up Angola's parliamentary opposition -
UNITA, PRS, FNLA, and Nova Democracia - are relatively minor
actors on the political scene. UNITA and FNLA, given their
history as members of the triumvirate of resistance movements
to the Portuguese, are household names. UNITA represented a
significant force during the long years of the civil war, and
continues to be the most important opposition party. But
these parties no longer have any role in the executive
branch, play a secondary role in parliament, and often seem
unable to shape in any meaningful way the political processes

of the country.


4. (C) The opposition would argue that there are powerful
institutional obstacles to their development, and they have a
point. The MPLA holds Cidade Alta (the Angolan White House)
and has huge majority in the parliament. The state controls
much of the media and has set up limits to the independent
media, particularly radio, which tends to keep opposition
figures and issues out of the news. The government and party
have a number of carrots and sticks to use on potential
opponents. Even Angola's electoral law seems to conspire
against the opposition. In 2009, the Constitutional Court
dissolved many minor parties - a few of which were led by
leaders with some measure of local notoriety - as parties
that won less than 0.5% in the 2008 parliamentary elections
were required by law to disband.


5. (C) However, the opposition is responsible, at least in
part, for its own weakness. In particular, we have
identified four major failings.

--------------
Weak, Fractured Leadership
--------------


6. (C) The opposition does not have strong leadership, and
there are significant internal divisions in nearly all of
them. For the opposition, the days of charismatic
independence movement leaders is over. UNITA head Isaias
Samakuva is an articulate Embassy interlocutor with excellent
English, but he has neither the stature nor the presence of
former UNITA supremo Jonas Savimbi, killed in 2002. Samakuva
did not provide effective leadership in the 2008 elections
and has failed to re-energize his party since its crushing
electoral defeat. Weekly independent "Seminario Angolense"
listed Samakuva in its latest edition as one of the failures
of 2009. For the moment, Samakuva appears to have control
over UNITA, but there may be challengers in the wings,
particularly Abel Chivukuvuku. As for the FNLA, headed from
its creation until 2007 by independence leader Holden
Roberto, the party is in meltdown. In a drawn out battle for
party leadership, the courts recently decided in favor of
Lucas Ngonda, a decision liable to create a schism with
former president Ngola Kubango's supporters. PRS leader
Eduardo Kuangana is a low-key figure with a modest regional
(read ethnic) base whose party has also recently witnessed a
messy parting of the ways between senior leadership. Nova
Democracia head Quintino de Moreira - considered by some to

LUANDA 00000785 002 OF 003


be a shill for the MPLA - is a political non-entity largely
unknown before the 2008 elections.

--------------
Failure to Articulate a Meaningful Agenda
--------------


7. (C) The opposition has not found an issue set that speaks
to the Angolan people. To the extend that there exists some
groundswell of discontent with the decades of MPLA rule and
Angola's poor social indicators, the opposition has failed to
tap into it. In recent months, UNITA has focused on Dos
Santos's failure to hold 2009 presidential elections and on
the constitutional process. The elections issue has not
gained much traction - perhaps because at least one IRI poll
last year gave a much higher popular favorability rating to
Dos Santos than to Samakuva or any other opposition figure -
and the constitutional debate may be too complicated and
arcane to appeal to a wide cross-section of voters. On
occasion, UNITA reps speak out publicly regarding the
failures of MPLA government, as UNITA's parliamentary whip
did in the October opening session of the National Assembly,
but without offering any credible alternative program. PRS
is a strong proponent of a federal system, but in a country
visibly working to knit itself together after years of civil
war this has only limited, regional appeal. FNLA seems
focused on internal problems, and Nova Democracia tows the
MPLA line.

--------------
Lack of National Representation
--------------


8. (C) The MPLA is the only truly national party in Angola.
While UNITA maintains offices in many parts of the country,
its presence in a number of provinces is beginning to
atrophy; the other parties are not present across Angola.
The 2008 election results suggest none of the opposition
parties have been able to generate even modest support
nationwide and that in their traditional strongholds
opposition parties have lost ground. During the elections,
UNITA's best showing was in the southern and western
provinces that essentially made up its power base during the
war (Huambo, Bie, Benguela, Cuando Cubango, Moxico),but
generally these were only in the 12-18 percent range. UNITA
failed to score even in the low single digits in many other
provinces. The one surprise score in the 2008 elections -
UNITA's 31% showing in Cabinda - is probably a result of a
protest vote by Cabindans with separatist sympathies, not a
reflection of UNITA's organization in the province. The PRS
did well only in its base in the Lundas, and the FNLA only in
its northern stronghold of Zaire. On our travels up-country,
we generally try to meet with representatives of the major
political parties; we rarely, if ever, encounter dynamic,
thoughtful opposition leaders in the provinces. The
opposition's talent and political savvy, such as it is, is
Luanda-based.

--------------
Inability to Reach the Electorate
--------------


9. (C) The opposition has difficulty communicating with
voters. Limits on independent media certainly make this
challenging. UNITA supporters do control Luanda-based Radio
Despertar, although it has periodically been a target of
government restrictions. A number of weekly newspapers,
admittedly with circulations in the low thousands, also cover
opposition positions, as does the influential Luanda-based
Radio Ecclesia. The opposition, however, has largely failed
to take advantage of these limited outlets, and there is no
consistent, targeted message to the audiences available. For
a variety of reasons - some to do with government controls
and others to do with internal organizational problems - the
opposition rarely resorts to more popular means of
communication, like mass meetings or rallies, door-to-door
campaigning, or distribution of leaflets. Samakuva told DCM
this fall that UNITA had considered demonstrations on the
constitutional issue but had ultimately decided against doing
so, "in the interests of public security." UNITA presumably
has enough support in some Luanda neighborhoods to gather a
good crowd, but the party's decision to avoid doing so may
suggest fears about low turnout as much as concerns about
possible violence.


10. (C) Comment. For democracy to take firm root in a
post-conflict country like Angola, a strong, vibrant,
self-assured opposition is vital. There are many external
reasons why Angola's opposition has yet to fully assume this
role, but many of its failures are internal. Longer term,
therefore, political development in Angola may depend as much
on democratization within the MPLA as it does on further

LUANDA 00000785 003 OF 003


development of Angola's weak opposition parties. End
Comment.
HAWKINS