HMG SHARES U.S. STRATEGY AND CONCERNS REGARDING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 000492

SIPDIS

STATE FOR RICHARD NEPHEW AND MATT GOLDSTEIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018
TAGS: KNNP PARM IAEA MNUC TRGY IR SYR UK
SUBJECT: HMG SHARES U.S. STRATEGY AND CONCERNS REGARDING
IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA

REF: SECSTATE 16285

Classified By: Political Counselor Rick Mills
for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (S) Summary. The UK shares U.S. concerns and has a
similar strategy regarding the IAEA reports on Iran and
Syria's nuclear programs (ref): HMG is urging IAEA Board
Member countries to advocate strong national statements "at
the upcoming Board of Governors meeting (that) will reflect
the continuing concerns of the IAEA on Iran and support its
continuing work on nuclear issues" and to "agree to support
the continuing IAEA investigation in Syria until Syria has
restored confidence in its intentions." HMG has received
preliminary indications that Russia and China have been "a
bit difficult" regarding a proposed P5 1 statement
demanding Iran's immediate and full cooperation with the IAEA
and would appreciate more information about where Russia and
China stand. One FCO officer opined that he was pessimistic
about prospects for getting Russia to agree to anything more
than an extremely anodyne statement, that China would follow
Russia, and E3 1 should therefore set the bar low on a P5 1
result. End Summary.

UK Demarches IAEA Board
--------------


2. (S) The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) sent a
telegram to British Embassies in all IAEA Board Member
countries, except Russia and China, on February 20 with
instructions to urge host countries to advocate strong
national statements "at the upcoming Board of Governors
meeting (that) will reflect the continuing concerns of the
IAEA on Iran and support its continuing work on nuclear
issues," Duncan Johnson, an officer with the FCO
Counterproliferation Department's Regional Issues Section,
told Poloff February 23 (ref). Johnson elaborated by telling
Poloff that the U.S. and UK share virtually identical
concerns and strategies regarding the progress of Iran's and
Syria's nuclear programs. He shared with Poloff a copy of
the points he said had been included in the telegram to
British Embassies. These points are reproduced at paragraph 6.


3. (S) In regard to a possible P5 1 statement demanding
Iran's immediate and full cooperation with the IAEA (ref),
Johnson said that HMG received a telegram February 20 from
Vienna indicating that "the initial feedback is that...the
Russians and Chinese are being a bit difficult." Johnson
said that HMG would appreciate information from the U.S. on
the Russian and Chinese positions. He underscored UK support
for an E3 3 (or a P5 1) statement and said HMG would seek
to coordinate with the U.S. in this regard, noting again that
HMG "wants to see what the Russian and Chinese response will
be."

Syrian Concerns
--------------


4. (S) In regard to Syria's nuclear program, Johnson
stressed that HMG continues to discuss "how best to handle
Syria," adding that "our goal is to get Syria away from the
Iranians." He opined that "some EU countries," singling out
France, are "very keen on reengaging Syria...and are nervous
about pushing the Syrians too hard on the nuclear issue."
The UK has insisted that Syria's EU Association Agreement
move forward only if there is meaningful progress in regard
to Syria's nuclear programs, "but we're the only ones (in the
EU) saying it," Johnson said. He added that HMG was
disappointed by the "non-responsive" reaction of Non-Aligned
Member states when the UK lobbied them last year in regard to
Syria. He noted that HMG's points for delivery in IAEA Board
Member countries (see below at para 6) urges those countries
to "agree to support the continuing IAEA investigation in
Syria until Syria has restored confidence in its intentions."

Only USG Can Influence Russia
--------------


5. (S) FCO Iran Coordination Group Multilateral Team Leader
Will Gelling told London Iran Watcher February 24 that HMG
is in full accord with USG views on the need for strong
statements from the IAEA Board of Governors and in the P5 1.
HMG believes it &is worth it8 to press for a useful and
specific statement in the P5 1, and the elements of such a
statement should include the UNSCR,s and the IAEA report.
Gelling argued suspension did not need to be specifically
cited as it is already contained in the UNSCRs. He was
pessimistic, however, about prospects for getting Russia to
agree to anything more than an extremely anodyne statement,
that China would follow Russia, and E3 1 should therefore set
the bar low on a P5 1 result. Gelling pointedly said that
HMG sees moving Russia as being entirely beyond the ability
of E3 governments and &in effect completely up to the United
States at this point,8 as HMG has, in Gelling,s view, no
leverage with Russia in the P5 1 context. Gelling also
mentioned that the volumes of LEU cited in our demarche were
"puzzling;" the FCO,s Johnson in his February 23 meeting
with Poloff also flagged this topic and underscored that the
FCO wanted to be &in synch8 with the U.S. in regard to what
we state publicly about LEU volumes.


6. (S) The text of the points sent by FCO to British
Embassies, as referred to in paragraph 2, follows:

Iran
We continue to have serious concerns about Iran,s nuclear
programme. The latest IAEA report makes clear that Iran has
refused to suspend it proliferation sensitive activities,
including its uranium enrichment at Natanz and construction
of the heavy water reactor (suitable for plutonium
production) at Arak in defiance of five UN Security Council
Resolutions calling for them to stop.

Despite five UNSCRs calling on Iran to suspend enrichment,
the IAEA report says Iran now has more than 5500 centrifuges
either fed with Uranium gas or running in a vacuum. It also
states Iran has produced 1010 kg of Low Enriched Uranium.

We are extremely concerned that Iran has refused IAEA
inspectors access to the Heavy Water Reactor at Arak for a
second time. The IAEA say this could hamper their ability to
carry out safeguards at the facility, as requested by the
UNSC.

In the IAEA Director General,s last four reports he
expressed concern at Iran,s failure to answer IAEA questions
relating to studies with a possible military dimension. His
last report in November 2008 highlighted the lack of any
substantive progress on the issue. We call upon Iran to
answer the IAEA,s questions and implement the transparency
measures in the IAEA Director General,s reports.

UNSCR 1835 was adopted unanimously on 27 September,
demonstrating E3 3 unity and international determination to
resolve the Iranian impasse diplomatically.

We have made clear many times that we do not deny right,s to
civil nuclear power under the Non Proliferation Treaty. In
2008, the E3 3 governments refreshed their broad ranging
offer of June 2006 to Iran. This offer included help to
develop civil nuclear power if it suspends enrichment, as
well as co-operation in a range of other areas. But Iran has
failed to respond substantively to this offer and has so far
not seriously engaged on the suggestion of a
freeze-for-freeze agreement.

We and our E3 3 will continue our dual track strategy:
sanctions to persuade Iran to change course and dialogue to
lead to full negotiations if the Iranians suspend their
enrichment-related activities.

Iran needs to adhere to UNSCRs and suspend its
enrichment-related activities and comply fully with IAEA
requests. Once that has been achieved we will be able to
forge a more productive and positive relationship between
Iran and the international community.

Hope that your national statement at the upcoming Board of
Governors meeting will reflect the continuing concerns of the
IAEA on Iran and support its continuing work on nuclear
issues.

Syria
Evidence produced in April 2008 relating to the Al Kibar site
raised a number of serious concerns and questions about the
likelihood that Syria was building a nuclear site with North
Korean co-operation.

We were disappointed that Syria did not provide access to all
the sites the IAEA requested during its visit in June 2008.
The latest IAEA report makes clear that Syria still needs to
provide additional information about the site and about other
locations alleged to be related to the site.

Syria previously claimed that uranium traces found at the
site were the result of the Israeli bombing. The latest IAEA
report states that the particles were inconsistent with what
would be expected from the use uranium based munitions.

Critical therefore that Syria answers all the Agency,s
questions and co-operates with them in a timely and
comprehensive way.

This reflects the importance of adopting and implementing the
Additional Protocol as resulted by the IAEA (Syria has a
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement but not the Additional
Protocol which is universally recognized as the model
safeguards agreement).

Hope that you will agree to support the continuing IAEA
investigation in Syria until Syria has restored confidence in
its intentions.

End text.

Visit London's Classified Website:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom

LEBARON