UK-HOSTED P5 CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 08 LONDON 002622

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: KNNP AORC PGOV PREL MNUC IAEA NPT UNGA ENRG
FR, RS, CH, UK
SUBJECT: UK-HOSTED P5 CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING
MEASURES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SEPTEMBER 3-4, 2009
(PART ONE OF THREE)

REF: A. LONDON 2198

B. LONDON 2199

NOTE: FOR TECHNICAL REASONS, THIS CABLE IS BEING TRANSMITTED
IN THREE PARTS. THIS IS PART ONE OF THREE.


1. (SBU/NF) Summary and Introduction: The United Kingdom
(UK) hosted a conference of P5 states on 3-4 September 2009
to discuss confidence building measures (CBMs) on nuclear
disarmament and associated non-proliferation issues. The
conference originated in a proposal made by then Defence
Secretary Des Browne at the Conference on Disarmament and was
reaffirmed by UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown on March 17,

2009. Following initial informal consultations with the P5,
the scope of the conference included technical discussions on
confidence-building measures and the verification and
compliance challenges associated with achieving further
progress toward disarmament and non-proliferation, and steps
to address those challenges. On the margins of the
conference, heads of delegation held discussions on a broader
approach to the NPT Review Conference and other related
issues (Reftels).


2. (SBU/NF) The P5 exchanged views on how information
exchanges and voluntary transparency measures could enhance
strategic stability. Afterwards, each State outlined, as far
as they were able to, their current nuclear doctrine, nuclear
capabilities, and their experiences with nuclear (weapon)
accident response. In general, the United States and the
United Kingdom were highly transparent in their discussion of
these issues, with Russia and France moderately transparent.
China, while delivering a good presentation on the importance
of transparency, was the least transparent of the five
regarding its nuclear doctrine and capabilities.


3. (SBU) The sides also discussed political and technical
challenges associated with verification of nuclear
disarmament, including recordkeeping. The UK briefed on its
work with Norway on technical challenges associated with
managed access, information barriers and chain of custody,
and presented its experiences in publishing accounting
documents for its military HEU and Pu holdings. The United
States' technical briefing covered its experiences with the
Trilateral Initiative and U.S.-UK activities. Additionally,
the P5 addressed the political and technical challenges
associated with assessing and responding to non-compliance
with proliferation obligations, including existing mechanisms
and additional tools and resources needed to determine
breaches. The U.S. and Russian delegations updated the other
P5 on the status of the START follow-on discussions underway
in Geneva.


4. (SBU) All P5 States agreed that the conference was
productive. They supported in principle the idea of future
meetings in this area, but did not set up a formal process.
The P5 agreed to work together on a common glossary on
terminology used in arms control and non-proliferation.
While the United States, France, and UK could agree to
explore the concept of joint nuclear (weapon) accident
exercise, China and Russia would not do so without consulting
their governments. End Summary and Introduction.

Introductory Remarks
--------------


5. (SBU) In a video message to the conference, UK FM
Miliband stated that this conference was a unique, historic
gathering. The spirit of P5 cooperation will be an important
signal to other countries. This conference would lay the
foundation for future work and had three aims: demonstration
of P5 working together; better understanding of one another's
views, redlines, shared interests; and planning of further
work ahead, including a shared agenda for the 2010 NPT Review
Conference. He stated that the P5 were aware of the
potential dangers, and were working on North Korea, Iran, and
strengthening the NPT. Historically, President Kennedy
launched the NPT and dared the international community to
think of the dangers of proliferation. The goal was to
eliminate nuclear weapons. The international community was
facing a new era when a growth in nuclear threats * though
not among the P5 * was a major concern.


6. (SBU) Ryabkov (Russia) stated that it was ready to
cooperate and discuss all issues. He (China) noted that the
P5 had not had such a meeting in at least a decade. This

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conference would send a signal to the world. The issues
raised by this conference were getting new attention and
China pledged its cooperation. France stated that numerous
challenges to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons
exist, and the P5 must play a key role in meeting them. The
key for the P5 was to work on transparency and reciprocity.
Ryabkov (Russia) emphasized the importance of creating
conditions for disarmament. Under Secretary Tauscher stated
that she appreciated Her Majesty's Government convening this
important meeting in preparation for next year's NPT Review
Conference. It was important for the P5 to work together to
ensure unity, leading to success at the RevCon in
strengthening the NPT as a bulwark against the further spread
of nuclear weapons. She said that she welcomed the
opportunity to get to know her P5 colleagues, and looked
forward to a constructive working relationship. Increased
understanding among the P5 on technical issues concerning
verification, as well as on possible confidence-building
measures, could contribute to a successful RevCon next year.
She hoped that this meeting would initiate that process, as
well as enable the P5 to share views and coordinate on NPT
issues.

Information Exchange and Voluntary Transparency Measures
-------------- --------------


7. (SBU) Briens (France) noted that transparency led to
confidence, which was the key to disarmament and stability.
He noted that President Sarkozy emphasized need for
transparency and strategic stability in his speech at
Cherbourg in March 2008. The French Presidency had adopted
an action plan, consisting of three key areas: doctrine,
capacity, and concrete actions. On doctrine, France publicly
stated its doctrine at Cherbourg and in 1994 and 2008 white
papers and public speeches at the highest levels. Since the
end of the Cold War, France had been very transparent, which
contributed to deterrence. Former President Mitterand
disclosed all details of their nuclear arsenal in 1994.
President Sarkozy went further in Cherbourg by announcing a
ceiling of 300 weapons. All French nuclear weapons were
operational, and France did not maintain a stockpile. France
had developed the ability to do nuclear tests in the
laboratory. France had ceased production of plutonium and
highly enriched uranium; and irreversibly dismantled two
installations associated with fissile material production for
nuclear weapons and had opened up its dismantlement of its
fissile material production facilities and its Pacific test
sites to the international community, journalists, diplomats,
and experts. France noted that this transparency built
confidence within the country and beyond, and stressed that
the P5 should increase their transparency.


8. (SBU) He (China) stressed that information exchanges
enhanced confidence, but noted that different countries had
different strategic conditions, which led to different
policies. He suggested that, in order to increase
transparency and confidence building, it was necessary for
each nation to retain independence in decision making, to
pursue practical measures -- starting from "easy" measures
and building to more difficult ones.


9. (SBU) Leslie (UK) noted that UK policy was outlined in a
white paper on disarmament published in 2006. All UK
political parties were committed to a defence review after
the general election in 2010. She promised to keep P5
members informed about that review. Leslie added that
nuclear terminology was key to working together. It was "low
on the ladder of easy-to-hard steps" and would be a good
starting point for the P5 to continue cooperation. She
proposed that experts convene to create a dictionary as a
step towards confidence building and transparency and
improved communication.


10. (SBU) Koncher (U.S.) stated that the U.S.-Russian
experience with data exchanges under the START and INF
treaties had demonstrated the mutual exchange of information
regarding nuclear capabilities could be a powerful force for
increasing predictability and confidence that the actions of
other states did not pose an existential threat to one's
security. Moreover, in an era when nuclear deterrence
remained a requirement, the knowledge that could be imparted
through such exchanges also could help states appropriately
develop, size, and structure their nuclear doctrine and
forces to meet their deterrence requirements. Some had
suggested that the ambiguity and uncertainty that derive from

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a lack of information exchange best serves national interests
and most effectively deters nuclear threats to one's national
security and survival. An alternative perspective, to which
the United States subscribed, was that a lack of transparency
necessarily adversely affects the thinking and force planning
of other states, and most particularly that of other states
which possess nuclear weapons capabilities. It could lead to
misunderstandings, miscalculations, and over-reactions. If
it did so, it could increase the difficulty of finding common
ground and increase the amount of time required to take
meaningful steps toward the NPT's nuclear disarmament
objective.


11. (SBU) The United States recognized the sensitivity of
certain information and also the obligation of the P5 to
protect proliferation-sensitive information. Nonetheless,
U.S. experience suggested that it was possible to share
information, particularly among the P5 but also, albeit to a
lesser extent because of proliferation sensitivities, with
the broader international community. Transparency among
states had the potential to make a quite meaningful
contribution to strategic stability and to lay the foundation
for progressive steps, including reductions, toward the goal
of nuclear disarmament. Making information available
publicly also had the potential to enhance stability and the
prospects for constructive steps toward nuclear disarmament.
Look added that, as the U.S. and then-Soviet Union became
more comfortable with exchanging information over time, not
only did the amount of information exchanged increase, but
also the scope and extent of reductions. This did not mean
that the U.S.-Russia experience should be duplicated, but
rather to point out that there was something useful to be
learned from that experience. While arms control-related
exchanges clearly had their place, arms control agreements
were not the only vehicle for the dissemination of
information on nuclear capabilities. In the United States,
much useful information related to U.S. intentions, doctrine,
and capabilities was readily available in official public
documents and in Congressional testimony. Further, because
we were intent on pursuing constructive relations within the
P5 and with other countries, the United States intended, once
the current Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was completed, to
brief its conclusions to the P5, and to explain the thought
process and considerations that underpin those conclusions.
The United States also intended to communicate the results
publicly and to the broader international community.


12. (SBU) Koncher stated that information exchanges that
increase transparency and reduce uncertainties regarding
current and future intentions and capabilities were relevant.
Of course, the level of detail in the information that was
provided will need to vary; more detailed information could
be shared in confidential exchanges among P5 states, for
example, than if the intended recipients were non-nuclear
weapons states or the public. While the level of detail
will vary, consistent with security and proliferation
sensitivities, we would suggest that there were several areas
worthy of consideration for all of these types of exchanges:
(1) nuclear doctrine(s); (2) nuclear capabilities; and (3)
nuclear budgets.


13. (SBU) Briens (France) responded that the key to progress
in this area was for the P5 to become more transparent. He
noted that several key documents on terminology were extant,
but there was nothing recognized by all the P5. Even in
those documents, some terms were defined, but not explained.
France supported the UK proposal. Addressing terminology
could be a good start. Ryabkov (Russia) responded initially
that Russia would "contribute actively," suggesting the
Chinese or UK lead the effort. Russia would help to expand
it. Leslie (UK) urged the sides to consider how the sides
could build on the existing U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia
glossaries.

Nuclear Doctrine
--------------


14. (SBU) Li (China) stated that in the 1960s China proposed
a summit for prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons;
this remained a long-term goal. China had been forced to
create nuclear weapons, and its nuclear forces had been
designed to deter nuclear strikes or threats of strikes
against China. China's command and control for its nuclear
forces was highly centralized and had strict safety controls.
In short, China's doctrine was to survive a nuclear strike

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and respond. He reiterated China's long-standing policy of
no first use, as well as its support for the establishment of
nuclear weapon free zones. He called upon the other P5 to
commit to this policy, suggesting that it should be codified
in a legally-binding international instrument. The size and
composition of China's nuclear arsenal was "very restrained,
and China would not expend precious resources on an arms
race." China pledged not to deploy nuclear weapons on
foreign soil, and opposed the creation of "nuclear umbrellas."


15. (SBU) The UK (Wells) noted that it believed that a
number of countries would retain nuclear arms for the
foreseeable future and that the risk of proliferation was
growing. To address this situation, the UK believed that
nuclear weapons should be used for defence and deterrence,
not offensive military objectives. The UK retained the
minimum nuclear weapons needed for deterrence, having only
one type of delivery system, one type of launcher, and one
type of warhead. Currently, the UK had approximately 160
nuclear warheads. The UK maintained ambiguity regarding the
conditions in which it would use them, which increased their
deterrence value. The UK stated that its nuclear forces did
not have the size or strategic depth that other nuclear
powers had, so it could not commit to a no first use policy.


16. (SBU) Further, the UK believed that, with further
reductions in nuclear arms, the risk of a pre-emptive strike
would increase. Therefore, the UK required a second strike
capability to deter a first strike. Furthermore, with
further reductions, transparency became more important, but
also more problematic. While the UK was working toward a
world without nuclear weapons, for now, it needed to maintain
a modest arsenal.


17. (SBU) Russia (Ushatov) said its nuclear doctrine was set
forth in a series of national security documents and laws,
especially in the Military Doctrine of the Russian
Federation, dated April 21, 2001. In this document, Russia
stated that it wanted to reduce the threat of all-out nuclear
war, deter extremism, combat regional arms races, and deter
proliferation. Russia was threatened by states that tried to
create dominance over others by developing highly accurate
targeting for strategic forces, unilateral defense systems,
and militarization of outer space. Such practices would lead
to another arms race.


18. (SBU) Russia (Ushatov) said that Russia must be prepared
to deter any threat in any circumstance in order to ensure
the security of itself and its allies. Russia retained the
right to use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear strike
on the homeland or on the territory of its allies, as well as
in response to a major conventional attack. Russia would
never use nuclear weapons against an NPT non-nuclear weapon
state or a non-nuclear power unless attacked.


19. (SBU) Russia (Ushatov) noted that there was a
correlation between conditions for reductions and reductions.
The international community must create the conditions
first, and reductions will follow. For instance, reductions
were negotiated with the United States in the context of the
strategic situation. If the situation changes again, Russia
would have to adjust its force structure. Russia was
revising its military doctrine this autumn.


20. (SBU) Plumb (U.S.) stated that President Obama's speech
in Prague made it clear that the United States would reduce
its nuclear arsenal, with the aim of achieving a
nuclear-weapons-free world. He also promised that as long as
nuclear weapons existed, the United States would maintain a
safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary
and guarantee that defense to our allies. He said the
policies of successive U.S. administrations showed a marked
continuity with respect to the purposes assigned to nuclear
forces; namely, deterrence. U.S. nuclear forces were
designed to: (1) deter acts of aggression involving nuclear
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction; (2) help deter,
in concert with general purpose forces, major conventional
attacks; and (3) support deterrence by holding at risk key
targets that cannot be threatened effectively by non-nuclear
weapons.


21. (SBU) The U.S. nuclear arsenal had defended not only the
United States and its military forces, but also U.S. allies
in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. Assurance remained an
essential instrument of allied security and U.S.

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non-proliferation policy, and significantly reduced the need
for allies to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. The
United States sought to assure its allies and friends that
the U.S. nuclear deterrent continued to serve as the ultimate
guarantor of the collective security, obviating any need to
develop independent nuclear capabilities. Credible U.S.
nuclear capabilities and its security commitment to allies
remained an indispensable part of U.S. efforts to limit
nuclear proliferation. Continued allied confidence in the
U.S. extended deterrent was an essential element of U.S.
nuclear non-proliferation policy. U.S. nuclear commitments
to allies were completely consistent with U.S. obligations
under the NPT. The United States continued to assure allies
and friends through its strategic capabilities, effective
conventional forces, missile defense, and non-strategic
nuclear forces.


22. (SBU) The 2010 NPR would address the United States'
nuclear deterrence policy and strategy for the next 5-10
years. The review was led by the Department of Defense in
conjunction with the Departments of State and Energy. This
"whole-of-government" approach was essential to its success.
The NPR specifically was addressing: (1) deterrence strategy
and policy; (2) the size and composition of nuclear forces
necessary to support that strategy; (3) the steps necessary
to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent;
and (4) the requirements for extended deterrence and
assurance of U.S. allies.


23. (SBU) The NPR was framing choices for decision-makers
that were based upon strategy, not simply numerical
reductions. There was no pre-determined level of reductions
for the U.S. arsenal. Although the review would examine ways
to reduce both the role and number of nuclear weapons, the
elimination of nuclear weapons was not anticipated in the
timeframe of this review. The review was taking a very broad
view of the US strategic posture, including other strategic
military capabilities and also other elements of national
power relevant to reducing nuclear dangers. The United
States was committed to ensuring that any decisions about
nuclear force structure and posture were based on strong
analysis and a keen awareness of our deterrence and assurance
requirements. The review was serving as a vehicle for both
DoD decision-making and strategic communication with the
Congress, the public and other interested stakeholders. The
United States was committed to engaging with key allies and
friends throughout the conduct of the review to seek their
views on the requirements of extended deterrence and
assurance as well as other nuclear issues of interest to our
allies. Extended deterrence to allies would remain a central
element of U.S. nuclear policy. The United States believed
this could be accomplished in a manner consistent with the
long-term goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and reducing
the role of nuclear weapons in national security of the
United States and that of other countries around the globe.
The review was closely integrated with the ongoing
Quadrennial Defense Review, Ballistic Missile Defense Review,
and Space Posture Review. The NPR final report was due to
Congress in February 2010.


24. (SBU) France (Miraillet) believed its nuclear weapons
offered the ultimate protection against all types of
aggression; however, France would only use its nuclear
weapons for defensive purposes. Nevertheless, its arsenal
must remain credible. France had not engaged in an arms race
and had exercised restraint in designing its forces. It did
not target its nuclear weapons. All French nuclear weapons
were strategic, not tactical. It had SSBNs on continuous
patrol and had the capability of air-launched nuclear
weapons. France no longer conducted nuclear tests, but
relied upon laboratory simulation programs to sustain its
arsenal. French nuclear forces were comprised of fewer than
300 warheads, less than half of Cold War levels.

Nuclear Capabilities
--------------


25. (SBU) Leslie (UK) thanked the delegation for their
technical presentations, and noted that nuclear capabilities
were the "other side of doctrine...the more we were open, the
better we can reduce uncertainty..." Gower (UK) reported
that the UK currently had four SSBNs ("Vanguard" Class ) the
replacement for the "Resolution" Class),and maintained one
SSBN on patrol at all times. The SSBNs were armed with U.S.
D-5 Trident submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs),

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and each SSBN had 16 missile tubes with Trident D5, having a
range of 6,000 nautical miles. He noted that the last
Strategic Defence Review determined that each SSBN should
carry no more than 48 warheads; the UK retained the option to
deploy lower yield systems at some point, if there was a
requirement to do so. Warheads on these SLBMs were of UK
design. He said missiles were routinely de-armed and were
not targeted; several days' notice was required to activate
and target a weapon.


26. (SBU) Gower (UK) stated that the UK used some U.S.-based
infrastructure, but that the SSBNs were based in Clyde,
Scotland. Weapons were stored at the Royal Navy Armament
Depot in Coulport. Devonport (Plymouth) was the refuel and
refitting facility for the Vanguard Class SSBNs. Weapons
research was conducted at Aldermaston Burghfield. The
Defence Logistics Organisation at Abbey Wood (Bristol) had a
Strategic Director (Rear Admiral Lloyd) and staff that worked
hard to keep one SSBN on constant patrol. He reported that
the UK shared infrastructure at various U.S. facilities, like
Kings Bay, Georgia, and numerous off-shore ranges.


27. (SBU) Gower also stated that the Vanguard Class
submarines had a 25-year design life, which could be (and had
been) extended by five years. The UK test fired SLBMs after
each refit. The HMS Vanguard was due to be retired from
service in 2022, and the HMS Victoria in 2024. The UK 2006
White Paper called for the design of a new class of SSBN and
options to consider for employment of nuclear weapons. Those
options included: submarine-launched, surface-launched,
silo-launched, and air-launched. Due to cost, political
considerations (silos, especially) and relative
invulnerability of submarine-based weapons, SSBNs had been
chosen to continue as the sole nuclear capability. In March
2007, Parliament voted to replace the SSBNs. The UK and U.S.
were working jointly on a successor system to the Trident D-5
SLBM. All planned doctrine for any future employment would
be consistent with current doctrine. The design for a new
SSBN was still in the concept phase; the acquisition phase
was planned to begin in five years. It was anticipated that
the successor would have 12 tubes (a 25 percent decrease),
while maintaining an overall warhead ceiling of 48 per SSBN.
The decision was pending on whether three or four SSBNs would
suffice to ensure continuous operational patrol.


28. (SBU) France (Miraillet) stated that it published a
paper on its nuclear capabilities in 2008. Currently, France
used sea and air platforms to deliver nuclear weapons. In
2010, the M51 missile would be deployed on SSBNs. By 2015,
France would deploy new warheads on its SLBMs. 2009 would
see improved versions of the Mirage and Rafale aircraft,
which would be equipped with new warheads. This capability
was validated during tests in 1995. The Command and Control
infrastructure allowed the President to employ nuclear
weapons if required.


29. (SBU) Leslie (UK) said a pattern of issues had developed
during the presentations, primarily with systems, sites,
warhead types and numbers; however, the conference had not
discussed stockpiles, transport, or sensitive public issues,
such as security from criminal or terrorist interference.


30. (SBU) China (Li) stated that it could not say much about
its nuclear capability, and referred the other delegations to
one of its white papers, which were published every two
years. He said that China would try to be more open, but it
was a gradual process. China was not in a position to
comment further on this matter. A White Paper was available
on the internet website of the MOD. He subsequently provided
a copy of relevant portions of the White Paper to the other
delegations.


31. (SBU) Russia (Ushatov) stated that Russia had taken many
practical steps in this area. Russia understood its
responsibilities as a nuclear power under Article 6 of the
non-proliferation treaty and as a permanent member of the
UNSC. It had made deep reductions, and explained these
matters, and issued a brochure during the last NPT review
conference. Currently, Russia possessed 400 ICBMs and
deployed 3,000 warheads. Russia had 45 submarines and 65
heavy bombers. Steps had been taken that were well known by
all here at the conference. Russia totally fulfilled its
obligations, and two years ago, worked to make the treaty
universal. (Comment: Most likely a reference to the INF
Treaty. End Comment.) Russia would reduce to less than 2200

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operationally deployed warheads, in accordance with the
Treaty of Moscow. Russia had had an ongoing exchange with
the United States that was particularly important. The arms
race had been reversed.


32. (SBU) Leslie (UK) stated that each of the P5 had become
more transparent over the years, and had had to build
confidence, especially during times of crisis. She asked
each delegation to discuss which topics were most difficult
to be transparent about, and what factors, e.g., political,
communications, etc., were determinative in this regard.
Gower (UK) stated that what happened historically in the
1950s, 60s, and 70s might not be relevant to current nuclear
weapon capabilities and posture; consequently, the historical
record of these capabilities and postures should be open to
disclosure. He asked how much could be made available to the
public.


33. (SBU) Russia said the most sensitive issues for it were
connected to future plans; release of such plans would make
future negotiations more difficult. The review of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System in the United States made
further steps toward nuclear disarmament difficult. Until
Russia better understood U.S. BMD intentions, Russia would
have difficulties engaging in discussions of tactical nuclear
weapons. Russia and the United States had a December 2009
deadline for completing the START Follow-on negotiations,
while the United States had a February 2010 deadline to
decide on the future of the Ballistic Missile Defense
program. This timeline made the December negotiations
deadline difficult for Russia.


34. (SBU) Leontiev (Russia) stated that Russian newspapers
had published a lot of information on the Russian defense
review. The UK, United States, and France had shown a lot of
transparency, China less so; the UK understood China's
challenges in this area, as Russia had had the same
challenges when the Soviet Union dissolved and the Russian
Federation was born. The United States knew Russia had been
very transparent from the START I Treaty negotiations onward.
Before the P5 talk about multilateral transparency, Leontiev
would like to seek advice from the United States. He said,
in his personal view, transparency should be expanded to all
P5 members. The media and public force each P5 state to be
more transparent. Russia believed that the UK and France
were leaders in transparency. He joked that once the United
States and Russia reduced their strategic arsenals to the
levels of those states (in terms of numbers of systems),
Russia would be prepared to be more transparent.


35. (SBU) Leontiev (Russia) understood that the United
States would not unilaterally disarm. The challenge to
transparency would be acute for the next two to three years.
Transparency was interconnected to many issues (such as
nuclear terrorism). He said the United States knew Russia's
position on tactical nuclear weapons; all Russian tactical
nuclear weapons had been removed to Russian territory. The
United States has dismantled a large number of tactical
nuclear weapons. Leontiev asked when the United States would
remove all of its tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. He
asked who would decide this matter, the United States or NATO.


36. (SBU) Leslie (UK) stated that fewer nuclear weapons
actually made transparency more difficult, not less so.
Deterrence depended more upon secrecy at that point. States
with small inventories of nuclear weapons might resist
transparency demands even as the nations with larger arsenals
were becoming more transparent.


37. (SBU) Look (U.S.) stated that transparency was a
learning process. It took time. The United States and
Russia would need to learn how to discuss nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. President Obama would decide the overall
U.S. nuclear posture; however, the United States would
consult with its Allies as part of this process. The most
sensitive area, in the U.S. view, was transparency regarding
operational planning. Being transparent on the numbers and
locations of weapons was one thing, but employment plans were
difficult to share, even among entities of the U.S.
government.

END OF PART ONE OF THREE

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