UK-HOSTED P5 CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 LONDON 002616

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP AORC PGOV PREL MNUC IAEA NPT UNGA ENRG
FR, RS, CH, UK
SUBJECT: UK-HOSTED P5 CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING
MEASURES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SEPTEMBER 3-4, 2009
(PART TWO OF THREE)

REF: A. LONDON 2198

B. LONDON 2199

NOTE: FOR TECHNICAL REASONS, THIS CABLE IS BEING TRANSMITTED
IN THREE PARTS. THIS IS PART TWO OF THREE. PARAGRAPH
NUMBERS REFLECT FULL CABLE LENGTH.


38. (SBU) Gower (UK) said that sharing the numbers and types
of weapons was acceptable, but not their actual location or
transit plans. It was important to ensure these weapons were
not intercepted. For example, the UK was comfortable stating
that it had 160 nuclear warheads, but would not release
information on the location of any one of these warheads.


39. (SBU) Briens (France) stated that total transparency was
not desirable, of course, but an agreed minimum level of
transparency was key to confidence building. There should be
an agreed level of reciprocity. It was easier for a state to
be transparent when it possessed a large arsenal, than when
it had a modest one. Look (U.S.) stated that the United
States and Russia were quite transparent with respect to
strategic weapons, but had not learned how to discuss
tactical weapons yet, and this was needed.


40. (SBU) Leslie (UK) asked about the feasibility of holding
non-public (confidential) discussions and the extent to which
P5 discussions of nuclear capabilities were affected by the
existence of nuclear arsenals in non-P5 states.


41. (SBU) Briens (France) stated that currently France had
been updating a document that gives guidance on public
disclosure of its nuclear capabilities. Systems that had
been withdrawn from service were found to be of lesser
sensitivity. Strategic stability among the P5 would improve
once the P5 were able to build confidence in the area of
nuclear capabilities.


42. (SBU) Leslie (UK) stated that the internet had great
potential to expand proliferation; increased computing power
was widely available, and this had an impact on expanded
proliferation threats. The reality that information could be
widely and quickly disseminated would have a braking effect
on transparency. Gower (UK) stated that the impact of
emerging nuclear powers on P5 members depended upon
geographic orientation. Look (U.S.) said that there was
still a community of interest with respect to emerging
nuclear states.

Challenges in Nuclear Accident Response
--------------


43. (SBU) Ushatov (Russia) provided an overview of the last
four exercises regarding nuclear accident response in which
it had participated. These exercises occurred in Russia
during 2004, in the UK during 2005, in the United States
during 2006, and in France during 2007. He noted that a lot
of work had been done jointly by France, Russia, the United
States and the UK. He was convinced that open discussion
would continue to lead to improved cooperation. Russia had
proposed these exercises in 2002 at a meeting in The Hague,
and had been pleased that they were successful.

44. (SBU) After brief description of the four P5 exercises,
Ushatov criticized the United States for not demonstrating
its equipment capabilities during the 2006 exercise and said
that Russia would have "loved" to see the robots and other
technical systems employed in the scenarios. Russia had been
impressed by the U.S. emphasis on interaction with the media
and gauging of public response to the accidents and
consequence management measures. Russia judged the exercise
in France had been the best, showing a high level of
organizational expertise. France also demonstrated a lot of
technical equipment, which Russia appreciated. Russian
political and military leadership saw the advantage of
routine drilling for political and military units to practice
response regimes. Russia also noted a difference between
NATO P5 members and the others (China and Russia) with
respect to levels of nuclear weapons and chains of custody of
nuclear materials. NATO Command and Control capabilities
seemed to enhance the efficiency of the exercises. Russia
could not see technical response teams in the field, but did
see how command and control matters were addressed, which
apparently NATO believed were more critical.


45. (SBU) Sankey (UK) noted that each of the P5 knew how
difficult exercises were, but the totality of all four
exercises combined seemed to have had an overall positive

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(complementary) effect. Cameron (UK) stated that planning
for nuclear accident response was no substitute for planning
for accident prevention.


46. (SBU) Li (China) stated that it managed nuclear weapons
very closely. China's weapons were absolutely safe and
reliable. There had been no accidents in 40 years. Command
and Control was highly centralized and under the direct
control of the Central Committee. All management and use of
nuclear materials had strict regulations. All personnel
involved in handling were strictly cleared and controlled.
Technical procedures for storage, handling, movement and
safety of nuclear materials were highly prescribed. Sankey
(UK) replied that China seemed to focus on accident
prevention, whereas the rest of the P5 seemed oriented on
accident response.


47. (SBU) Russia (Leontiev) noted that, with regard to
transparency, the U.S. presentation mentioned an exercise
with France on accident response. He asked under what legal
framework was such a bilateral exercise conducted. The U.S.
side had stated that there were long-standing memoranda of
agreement with the UK and France regarding cooperation in
this area. The United States also had noted that such an
exercise had also been conducted in accordance with the
Bratislava Agreement, where a full-scale field radiological
exercise was conducted in St. Petersburg.


48. (SBU) Sankey (UK) proposed that the P5 agree in
principle to cooperate more in the area of nuclear accident
response, noting that peer review, exercise reviews and a
working group could be part of this cooperation. He
understood that China might have to consult with Beijing
prior to agreeing. The United States (Look) and France
(Briens) supported this proposal, in principle, including the
formation of a working group. Leontiev (Russia) asked about
joint exercises, and what should be considered a joint
exercise. The Sankey (UK) responded that the UK believed
that an exercise with observers and joint participation would
constitute a joint exercise. China (WU) saw the merits of
such a proposal, but needed to consult with the capital
before agreeing. Russia (Leontiev) proposed that the sides
use the word "envisage" further cooperation in the joint
statement flowing from the conference, thereby not requiring
an immediate decision. China said that it could endorse a
result whereby the sides "considered" continued cooperation
in this area. Russia (Leontiev) stated that its HOD,
currently holding a bilateral meeting, would have to approve.
The United States (Look) reiterated the value of working
groups.

Challenges in Verification of Nuclear Disarmament
-------------- --------------


49. (SBU) Chambers (UK) described an exercise on technical
verification/disarmament issues conducted by the UK, Norway
and the Verification Research, Training and Information
Centre (an NGO),as well as briefed on the UK's efforts to
account for all of its fissile materials since the start of
its nuclear programs. The goal of the UK/Norwegian exercise
was to develop methodologies and technologies for nuclear
disarmament verification for both multilateral and bilateral
treaties. During the exercise, the sides developed
inspection methodologies beginning with the initial contact
between a nuclear weapon state (NWS) and a non-nuclear weapon
state (NNWS),and culminating in a mock inspection.
Information barrier technology was used to allow specific
measurements for verification of data, while simultaneously
allowing the host or inspected state to protect sensitive
information. During the exercise, the UK played the role of
a NNWS, while Norway played the role of a NWS that had agreed
to disarmament and a verification inspection.


50. (SBU) Chambers (UK) said that many challenges had been
overcome over the two-year period of the exercise, and the
sides learned many lessons, especially those related to the
importance of negotiating access controls. Access was
necessarily intrusive, as well as resource intensive.
Additionally, the sides learned that maintaining the chain of
custody of fissile materials/components was impossible
without technical measurements and accountability via
seals/control numbers. Moreover, the sides concluded that
the best information barrier was a measurement device that
provided a pass/fail or yes/no indication to a pre-determined
set of criteria or information shared between the two parties
without revealing any other (sensitive) information about the

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item being inspected. The biggest problem to emerge was that
of imprecise records regarding fissile material, especially
for the early years of the UK nuclear program. In the UK
experience, paper records, vice electronic records, were of
more value and more trustworthy. Further, current and
accurate accounting procedures were paramount. With this in
mind, the UK believed that it had accounted for all of its
historical fissile material with an uncertainly level of 1-2
percent of the total.


51. (SBU) Kuznetsov (Russia) noted that Russia would not
allow a second party to observe the actual dismantlement
process within Russia. This position was especially true if
the observing state was an NPT NNWS. Chambers (UK) stressed
that NNWS needed to be involved in the nuclear
disarmament/verification process in order to build their
confidence in NWS disarmament. Kuznetsov (Russia) said that
bilateral arrangements, such as between the U.S. and Russia,
were better than that of the UK/Norwegian framework.
Kuznetsov reiterated that the UK/Norway model would not work
for Russia, since Norway was a NNWS.


52. (SBU) Zhang Chunafei (China) commented that the UK
stated that it could account for all but 1-2 percent of its
fissile material. If the same percentage applied to the
United States, that would mean 1-2 tons of nuclear material
from the U.S. stockpile would be unaccounted for, which was
enough material for a quite a few weapons. The UK responded
by noting that accuracy to within 1-2 percent was likely the
best that could be achieved given the problem of
incomplete/missing records over the course of more than 50
years. Wells (UK) added that accounting precision was much
better for shorter (more recent) timelines and that perhaps
the world community could have confidence that the vast
majority of fissile material had been accounted for.


53. (SBU) Zhang Chunafei (China) described Chinese efforts to
develop verification technology for nuclear disarmament
regimes. He believed that both the U.S. and UK approaches to
disarmament verification were needed. One focused on the
outcome (the United States) and the other on the process to
include the technical aspects (the UK). He said that China
advocated a worldwide nuclear test ban. In order to achieve
the goal of zero nuclear weapons in the world, there needed
to be new international and regional disarmament
accords/treaties. He noted that the Chinese Academy of
Engineering Physics had been working for 10 years on the
issue of disarmament verification technologies, primarily
chain of custody (of fissile materials) and authentication.


54. (SBU) Zhang (China) stated that the Chinese Academy had
focused its research on four primary areas. The first was
identification technology on the characteristic signature of
highly enriched uranium. The second was technology to
measure six attributes of plutonium and the associated
information barriers that can authenticate plutonium
components. Next, the Academy studied technological
solutions for both active and passive uranium detection.
Finally, the Academy had investigated the use of template
matching technology to detect characteristic signatures
spontaneously radiated from various types of nuclear
warheads. Zhang also stressed the importance of chain of
custody technology, including tags, seals, tamper detection
devices, and remote/portal monitoring. These measures were
especially important during transportation and storage. In
conclusion, he said that a balance must be struck between
effectiveness and acceptability for the development and use
of verification technology.


55. (SBU) Miraillet (France) listed three main challenges to
verification: non-proliferation, protection of national
classified information, and confidence in the verification
results. Bugaut (France) noted that France unilaterally had
implemented a fissile material production moratorium and that
France had exact measurements and records from initial
dismantlement to end use for its fissile material and that
all parts of a weapon were tracked during the dismantlement/
destruction process. He noted that France even had "birth"
and "death" certificates for its nuclear weapons and fissile
material.


56. (SBU) Coriolis (France) stated that France had invited
international observers to verify French disarmament claims,
specifically, that factories capable of producing weapons
grade fissile material were no longer in operation. Sankey
(UK) said that as more states took unilateral disarmament

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steps, mechanisms for acceptable verification would need to
be developed. China noted that a moratorium on the
production of weapons grade fissile material was complicated
and that a comprehensive treaty would better address the
issue. China also agreed that was difficult to verify
unilateral moratorium actions.


57. (SBU) Look (U.S.) stated that President Obama's Prague
speech articulated the U.S. commitment to "seek the peace and
security of a world without nuclear weapons" and outlined
some of the initial concrete arms control steps that the U.S.
would pursue to help move the international community toward
that end: (1) reductions, initially bilaterally with Russia
but ultimately involving all states with nuclear weapons
capabilities, in nuclear arsenals; (2) ratification and
entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, or CTBT; and (3) a treaty that verifiably ends the
production of fissile materials intended for use in nuclear
weapons, that is, a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty, or FMCT. The speech also made clear that, until the
peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons was
achieved, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal to deter any adversary and
guarantee that defense to its allies. A corollary of this
requirement was that while the United States would take steps
to reduce the level of its nuclear forces and the allies'
role in U.S. security, the United States also would ensure
that it protected sensitive information whose exposure would
undermine our ability to continue to maintain the necessary
nuclear deterrent capabilities.


58. (SBU) She said that both sides were seeking what would
amount to a 30 percent reduction in U.S. deployed nuclear
weapons. The NPR would move the U.S. towards the President's
goals and develop a U.S. nuclear posture that preserved the
effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent for as long as it was
required, reduced the potential for conflict and nuclear use,
enhanced strategic stability world-wide, and strengthened the
non-proliferation regime. It was only after the P5 decided
how it wanted to proceed toward achieving the vision of a
world free of nuclear weapons ) and determined what should
be limited at each step along the path to zero and how much
confidence in compliance was required ) that the P5 could
begin to decide how to verify those commitments. A second
difficult issue that the P5 would need to address was how to
assure the ban on nuclear weapons was being complied with and
that there were no new ) emerging ) nuclear weapons states.
Once the P5 decided what types of limitations might be
required and how it was going to achieve those limitations as
a policy matter, the challenge would be to see if it had, or
could develop, the technological tools to help the P5 meet
the associated verification challenges.


59. (SBU) Look (U.S.) added that the INF and START Treaties
and the Trilateral Initiative were especially relevant to the
issue of elimination of nuclear weapons. In the INF and
START treaties and in the Trilateral Initiative, the parties
had to grapple with some of the same kinds of issues that
were raised by any serious examination of the steps required
to achieve and verify disarmament. In order to inform
collaboration on a way forward among the P5, Koncher (U.S.)
briefed the conference on the results of the Trilateral
Initiative undertaken by the United States, Russia, and the
IAEA in the 1990s to develop an approach to verify that
material declared to have been removed from nuclear weapons
and declared excess to defense needs was used only for
peaceful purposes. He also outlined some more recent work
undertaken by the United States and the United Kingdom on
warhead verification and authentication.

Challenges in Verification of Treaty Compliance
-------------- --


60. (SBU) Sankey (UK) asserted that there were technical
challenges to implementing the CTBT treaty. He noted that
there had been progress made in deploying the international
monitoring system (IMS),which at present was nearly 75
percent complete, but said that it was expensive to maintain
and update. Nonetheless, the IMS network worked well for the
May 2009 North Korea event.


61. (SBU) China (Wu) stated that, in terms of compliance,
states must look at symptoms as well as root causes.
Non-compliance should be dealt with via legitimate
international means. It was very serious to accuse countries
without solid evidence. The IAEA was key and its role in

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safeguards should be strengthened.


62. (SBU) China had signed all relevant agreements and
complied with them. It had taken part in diplomatic efforts
to promote dialogue to address non-compliance. China had set
up its own domestic controls. For example, its state system
of accounting and control of nuclear material had been in
place since 1987, and it had revised its legal code to make
it a crime to transport nuclear material under certain
situations. China constantly reviewed its nuclear export
controls to make sure they were in line with international
practice. It had signed bilateral agreements for civilian
nuclear use, and was active in international exchanges,
including with IAEA. States should use diplomatic and
political means to make sure that the IAEA safeguards system
was uniform and fair.


63. (SBU) Russia (Leontiev) noted that, in the area of
compliance, the United States and Russia had had an agreement
regarding enriched uranium. He said that the United States
had been confident this material originated in Russian
nuclear warheads, and Russia had been confident that United
States had downblended this material and converted it to
civilian use. The United States and Russia had had 15-16
years of experience with on-site inspections.


64. (SBU) In addressing China's statement, Briens (France)
said that France found it difficult to regard compliance as a
gray area. Treaty obligations were clear, and there could be
no intermediate solutions. France knew of three key
violators of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, two of
which were the source of major insecurity. It was dangerous
to talk about margins of tolerance in such situations.


65. (SBU) Russia (Leontiev) stated that intrusiveness was a
part of any verification regime. The procedures of 15 years
ago reflected the situation at that time, but now the United
States and Russia enjoyed better relations. Russia saw
things differently, and would like to reduce and streamline
those procedures to reduce cost.


66. (SBU) Koncher (U.S.) stated that compliance ) and the
ramifications of non-compliance ) could affect fundamentally
the P5's collective ability to achieve a safe and secure
world free of nuclear weapons. Compliance with arms control
and non-proliferation commitments was important because of
the security dimension -- all states depended, at least in
part, on an expectation of compliance by treaty partners to
meet their security requirements. Additionally, the
integrity and validity of arms control and non-proliferation
arrangements depended on states' compliance with their
obligations ) and on the willingness of the international
community to take meaningful action when non-compliance
occurs. The P5 were quite familiar with the basics of the
compliance assessment process because of efforts that the P5
unilaterally undertook to assess the compliance of other
states with agreements to which the P5 were party, and/or
because of P5 involvement in international efforts to assess
compliance. She reiterated the factors that were involved in
the assessment process, as articulated by the 2007 report of
the UN Expert Panel on Verification.


67. (SBU) He said the compliance assessment process was
central to detecting and identifying, in a timely manner,
actions that could affect capabilities to deter and defend
against security threats arising from a violation by another
state of its commitments. The outcome of an assessment
process provided legitimacy to, and helped inform the
determination of, appropriate national and international
responses, if/when violations were uncovered. Some
violations were inadvertent, e.g., the state was not aware
that a certain action undertaken by it or by entities under
its jurisdiction violated its commitments. This could be due
to lack of understanding of the commitment; lack of clarity
in the commitment; different interpretations by states of the
meaning of the commitment; and/or lack of capacity within the
state both to inform society and subordinate units of steps
required to fulfill the commitment, and to monitor domestic
actions. In these cases, the international community should
take steps to help those states which inadvertently have
fallen into non-compliance come back into compliance. This
could require capacity-building assistance if the reason for
the non-compliance was the lack of indigenous resources to
implement obligations fully.


68. (SBU) Koncher (U.S.) stated that other violations were

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deliberate, i.e., a state conducting a prohibited activity to
test the limits of international vigilance and willingness to
hold violators accountable for their actions or to develop
some prohibited capability. In these cases, the
international community likely will have three objectives:
(1) to induce that state back into compliance; (2) to prevent
the violation from providing the violator with a militarily
or politically significant advantage; (3) to deter other
would-be violators by signaling that violations and responses
to violations matter. Look outlined a number of possible
steps that could be taken to address deliberate
non-compliance by a state, as well as encouraged the P5 to
consider how to address, both nationally and through support
for international organizations, the technical gaps in
effective response options to non-compliance, including:
improvements in national and international technical
monitoring capabilities, increases in resources for and
authority to strengthen international inspections; and
utilization of international mechanisms, such as the United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, to educate states
on compliance and how to go about making compliance
assessments.

Update on START
--------------


69. (SBU) Russia (Ryabkov) stated that its position in the
START follow-on negotiations had been set forth by President
Medvedev. The negotiations in Geneva were supposed to
implement the agreement of the U.S and Russian Presidents.
He noted that the U.S. and Russia enjoyed good cooperation on
disarmament and non-proliferation matters. Russia considered
parity key in disarmament. The sides must reduce numbers,
but overall relations needed to improve in parallel.


70. (SBU) Russia (Ryabkov) said the negotiations were in
line with its national security requirements to retain a
nuclear deterrent. These negotiations were covering all
delivery systems: ICBMs, subs, and heavy bombers. The
number of nuclear warheads would be reduced by 25 percent.
Russia believed that there was an organic relationship
between offensive and defensive strategy. Unilateral U.S
systems threatened Russia. The United States abrogated the
ABM Treaty. President Obama understood the ABM-START
relationship, and this understanding was helpful. Russia was
concerned about plans for putting conventional warheads on
strategic missiles because it created a dangerous ambiguity.
Russia called for a new treaty on this issue. Russia also
wanted assurances that strategic offensive weapons would not
be deployed outside the territory of the state. In this
regard, Russia considered the attempt by the United States to
put missile defense installations outside its territory to be
in violation of the principle of equal security. Russia
wanted verification to be cheaper through the use of advanced
technology.


71. (SBU) Gottemoeller (U.S.) stated that the United States
and Russia had had many years of experience in implementing
the START I, INF, and Moscow Treaties, and they served as
guiding principles in negotiating a replacement for the START
Treaty by December. The U.S. delegation met with its Russian
colleagues four times leading up to the July Moscow Summit;
the fifth meeting was now in progress. These talks had been
"businesslike and productive" and allowed the sides to
conclude the Joint Understanding at the Summit. The Joint
Understanding provides an outline of what the new treaty
would look like, but a great deal of work remained. The new
Treaty will combine the predictability of the START Treaty
with the flexibility of the Moscow Treaty, but at lower
numbers of delivery vehicles and their associated warheads.
This flexibility gave the sides freedom to determine their
nuclear force structure within set limits established by the
new treaty. This flexibility was clearly stated in paragraph
4 of the Joint Understanding, which underscores that each
party will be able to determine the structure of its
strategic forces for itself. The Moscow Summit's Joint
Understanding set two separate limits ) one for strategic
delivery vehicles and the other for their associated
warheads. The Joint Understanding stated a wide range of
500-1100 delivery vehicles and 1500-1675 warheads. These
ranges will be narrowed through further negotiation. The new
treaty will also draw from the START verification regime;
and, therefore, will provide predictability regarding the
strategic forces on both sides ) both for existing force
structures and modernization programs.


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72. (SBU) In the Joint Understanding, Presidents Obama and
Medvedev reaffirmed the long-standing common position that
acknowledged the interrelationship between offensive and
defensive systems. The new Treaty was breaking no new ground
on this issue. Both Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed in
their April 1 statement in London that the new START Treaty
was about strategic offensive arms. While the United States
had long agreed that there was a relationship between missile
offense and defense, it believed the START Follow-on Treaty
was not the appropriate vehicle for addressing missile
defense. The United States agreed, however, to continue to
discuss the topic of missile defense with Russia in a
separate venue. Some said that START Follow-on would not
induce other countries to give up their weapons programs. In
and of itself, START Follow-on would not serve that purpose.
The new treaty was something that will enhance U.S. and
Russian national security as it served to establish a
strategic balance that reflected the current security
environment in a way that benefits each party and promotes
peace and stability. Moreover, the ability of the United
States to persuade other nations to act collectively against
those states committed to developing nuclear weapons will be
bolstered through reductions in the U.S. and Russian nuclear
arsenals. In conclusion, the START Follow-on Treaty will be
the first step in a process of pursuing further nuclear
weapons reductions. It will begin a narrative for our
post-Cold War world, one that recognizes the need to
eliminate the paralyzing threat of nuclear war by eliminating
nuclear weapons.

Public Statement on the Conference
--------------


73. (U) The P5 issued the following statement describing
the conference:

Begin Statement: The P5 states (China, France, Russia, UK
and US) met in London on 3-4 September for a conference on
confidence building measures towards disarmament and
non-proliferation issues. After the conference they issued a
statement reaffirming their commitment to all objectives of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The conference was originally proposed by the UK Defence
Secretary at the Conference on Disarmament in February 2008
and was referred to by the UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown,
in a speech on 17 March 2009.

The P5 reaffirmed their commitment to all objectives of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and that we should advance on all
fronts to achieve them. They reiterated their enduring
commitment to the fulfillment of their obligations under
Article VI of the NPT and noted that these obligations apply
to all NPT States Parties. They stressed their intention to
work with all States Parties to the NPT in creating the
conditions to enable further progress under Article VI. They
called upon all non-NPT States to work towards the same
objective.

In a wide ranging discussion, the P5 considered the
confidence-building, verification and compliance challenges
associated with achieving further progress toward disarmament
and non-proliferation, and steps to address those challenges.
They looked at ways to increase mutual understanding by
sharing definitions of nuclear terminology and information
about their nuclear doctrines and capabilities. They made
presentations on enhancing P5 strategic stability and
building mutual confidence through voluntary transparency and
other measures. They also considered the international
challenges associated with responding to nuclear accidents
and undertook to consider ways to co-operate to address these
challenges. End Statement.

END PART TWO OF THREE




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