Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09LOME108
2009-04-07 15:47:00
SECRET
Embassy Lome
Cable title:  

RESPONSES TO SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE

Tags:  ASEC PTER 
pdf how-to read a cable
R 071547Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY LOME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9053
INFO DIA WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
FBI WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T LOME 000108


DS/IP/AF, DS/TIA/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2029
TAGS: ASEC PTER
SUBJECT: RESPONSES TO SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE
QUESTIONAIRE

REF: STATE 013023

Classified By: RSO Matthew Golbus for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)

POLITICAL VIOLENCE
--------------


I. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS - Responses listed below are keyed to
reftel.


A. No known ethnic or religious communities exist in-country
that are prone to carrying out anti-American demonstrations.
Official GOT estimates place the Muslim community at about
14% of the population, but Embassy officials believe that
figure is higher and non-official sources put the number
closer to 20%. There is a Lebanese expatriate community in
Lome consisting of approximately 1,500 persons, both Muslims
and Christians. The exact number of Muslim Lebanese in Togo
is not known, but their numbers are growing. Post has
received reports that new Lebanese Muslim immigrants are
arriving directly from Lebanon. Other reports suggest that
Lebanese Christian immigrants continue to arrive from the
Ivory Coast.

i. Yes, the Committee of the Oppressed Diversity Visa
Applicants (CODVA) has held a continuous sit-in that began on
Friday, April 18, 2008 and ended in August 2008. The
protestors were present six days a week and typically had
about 100 people on business days. They were not present on
Sundays.

ii. Yes, the demonstration sited above was across the street
from the main CAC.

iii. 100-120 People

iv. The demonstrations were in response to frustrations and
misunderstanding related to the consular green card lottery
program.


B. Peaceful. In previous reporting we noted that the CODVA
had made public threats of violence and kidnapping, naming
American and Togolese employees. RSO determined that these
threats were not serious or credible. Other than the first
week of the sit-in, this behavior did not continue.

i and ii are not applicable.


C. No, however the primary opposition party, the Union de
Forces Changement (UFC),often holds rallies and
demonstrations in the capital. These rallies are generally
peaceful and draw upwards of 300 people. The frequency of
such events is increasing as the presidential elections
campaign season has begun.

i. No

ii. Does not apply

iii. Permitted demonstrations are generally peaceful.
Gatherings for which permits are not issued are usually
dispersed and, on occasion, violence ensues.

iv. No


II. (U) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS



A. No


B. N/A


C. N/A


D. N/A

III. (S) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES


A. No. Gendarmes and Presidential Guard who man several
roadblocks in Lome after dark regularly solicit bribes from
drivers, including those with diplomatic license plates.
Outside of Lome the roadblocks and associated corruption
occur during the day as well. RSO has responded to incidents
of U.S. diplomats being taken into custody by Presidential
Guard elements or the police. In addition, Togo's long,
porous borders make it virtually impossible for GOT officials
to exercise effective border control.


B. Yes, in November 2007 a 1 week course was held with
security officers from the port of Lome. The Naval Criminal
Investigative Service (NCIS) was the lead agency for this
training. Port security elements have implemented tactics
and skills from the training. The Regional Affairs Office in
Accra has held three courses for the Togolese intelligence
service in the area of counter narcotics trade craft. Also,
ICITAP sponsored human trafficking training for 30 police
officers and gendarmes in late June/ early July 2008.


C. Yes, while low level corruption can be seen on a day to
day basis, RSO continues to hear references to and suspicion
of corruption at the Ministerial level.


D. Post does not have confidence in the Togolese government's
ability to detect terrorist activities in Togo, mostly due to
insufficient resources and training. The GOT,s intelligence
and security agency, the Agence Nationale de Renseignement
(National Intelligence Agency - ANR),is the lead agency on
terrorism issues. The agency's Director General has shown a
great deal of interest in working with the Embassy and has
been quick to act on any terrorism related information shared
by Post. However, as this is a young agency it remains to be
seen how
effective it will be.


E. Yes


F. On November 16, 2002, Togolese police arrested an Al-Qaeda
linked Lebanese national identified as Abdallah MOHTADI and
extradited him to Lebanon in March of 2003. In early March
2003 Togolese police arrested a Lebanese citizen, Fakhri
Youssef BAALBAKI, on suspicion that he was planning an attack
against the U.S. Embassy should the USG resort to military
action in Iraq. The GOT deported BAALBAKI on June 22, 2003,
when it failed to build a terrorism or criminal case. The
greatest current terrorism issue in Togo is Hezbollah
financing. In July 2008, a Togolese security service seized
$1.5 million from a known Hezbollah associate and turned it
over to the Ministry of Finance, signaling a readiness to
deal with this issue. In January and February 2009, the
Togolese Minister of Security and Civil Protection signed
expulsion orders for two resident Lebanese nationals who were
allegedly linked to Hezbollah.


G. For the most part the GOT has been responsive, but a lack
of resources has hindered its ability to fulfill some Embassy
requests. The GOT provides compound security elements who
are poorly motivated and do not show a high level of
discipline on duty. Requests related to VIP and/or military
visits have been adequately resourced. Post was disappointed
with a lack of willingness to confront demonstrators when
they became aggressive and/or harassed employees.


H. POOR. In fact Air France does not rely on Togolese
government security personnel entirely, but rather has a
contract security company to conduct screening of passengers,
luggage, and supplies. Post has been informed by French law
enforcement personnel, who provide advice to the GOT Civil
Aviation Administration, that overall security at the airport
is very poor. A new security administration for the airport
assumed control January 1, 2007, though no significant
changes have been made thus far. In a recent evaluation
conducted by INL, it was determined that as of March 2009
airport security in Togo remains far below internationally
accepted standards.


I. INEFFECTIVE. The Security Officer for the French Mission
stated that he had provided tips to the GOT about suspected
drug dealers transiting Togo. The Togolese customs and
immigration agencies did not stop these individuals. In
fact, it was reported that a customs officer escorted the two
suspected drug dealers past all immigration and custom
controls. The chief of airport security recently confided to
RSO that he does not have any staff he can trust and that his
higher ups are unresponsive to his pleas for assistance and a
freer hand in instituting procedural change.


J. INEFFECTIVE. Border patrol forces are corrupt and
regularly solicit bribes. In addition, they are only
stationed at official border crossings. It reportedly only
costs the equivalent of $1 to bribe one,s way across a land
border.

--------------
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM
--------------


I. (U) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS


A. No



B. N/A


C. N/A


D. N/A


E. N/A


F. N/A


G. N/A


H. N/A

II. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS


A. No


B. N/A


C. No. However, one opposition political group did stage an
IED attack against the main Gendarme camp in Lome in February

2006. Allegedly the attack was in retaliation against the GOT
for its attempted arrest of an opposition leader. No one was
killed or injured in the incident. Additionally, two Molotov
cocktails were tossed over the wall of the German Embassy in
July 2006. The devices malfunctioned and the attack, believed
to be the work of Togolese soccer fans angry after being
denied visas to attend the World Cup in Germany, caused no
injuries or damages.


D. No


E. No

--------------
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
--------------


I. (S) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS


A. Yes. Post has received reports that some members of the
Muslim Lebanese community in Togo are associated with
Hezbollah. Post has also received information from customs
officials regarding large sums of cash crossing the borders
of Benin-Togo and Ghana-Togo.


B. Post believes their primary focus is fundraising and due
to their reported success in this regard, it is unlikely that
Hezbollah would consider Togo as an operational theater.


C. Post does not have any information to indicate that the
GOT is sympathetic to Hezbollah; however, due to the level of
corruption, it is likely that in the interest of personal
gain, some Togolese government officials may allow members of
the Lebanese community to engage in illegal activities such
as narcotics trafficking and money laundering. The GOT has
not made any public statements in support of a
terrorist-supporting country on a terrorism related issue.
The GOT has been, and continues to be pro-American and
supportive of our efforts in the Global War on Terrorism.
President Faure has sited Hezbollah fundraising as a specific
issue of concern in consultations with two U.S. Ambassadors.


D. Yes. The Agence des Musulmans d'Afrique (AMA). English
translation: Africa Muslim Agency. A French police officer
assigned to Lome as an advisor to the GOT reported that AMA
has three offices in Togo, and that it is a Kuwaiti financed
NGO that may be involved in arms smuggling throughout West
Africa. The French police advisor also reported that this
group has strong ties to the Algerian Islamic Movement and
that the country director for Togo is Algerian. The President
of Togo voiced concerns to post of possible GSPC activities
in Togo. ANR provided post with a list of individuals of
concern traveling to Sudan for advanced Muslim studies in
April 2007. The list included 10 individuals affiliated with
the AMA.

Also, the Islamic NGO 'al muntada' has had a presence in Togo
since the mid-1990's. Post has received information that this
group has spent approximately $400,000 on charitable
activities in Togo, such as building mosques and Islamic
educational programs. Embassy officials have noted that many
new mosques have been built in Togo in the past few years.

There is also a known connection between some members of the
Togolese Muslim community and the Accra based "Islamic
Research and Reformation Center", which is an Islamic NGO.
It is not known if any of these Islamic NGO's are associated
with Hezbollah.


E. Unknown. Togo's Muslim community, which comprises anywhere
from 12-20% of the population, has historically been
moderate. A recent influx of Lebanese Muslims and growing
population of Nigerian Muslims has raised concerns among some
observers about the prospects for radicalization of the
indigenous Muslim community. Thus far we have not seen
evidence to suggest this has happened.


F. Low


G. Corruption and porous borders mean that weapons and
explosives could easily be smuggled into Togo. Major
narcotics trafficking routes transit Togo highlighting the
ease with which any contraband could be imported.


HAWKINS