PRIME MINISTER SAYS NATO RATIFICATION PROCEDURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000059

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/CE, EUR/SCE, L/T

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019
TAGS: MARR NATO KTIA PREL HR SI
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER SAYS NATO RATIFICATION PROCEDURE
FOR CROATIA WILL BE CUT SHORT

REF: STATE 20395

Classified By: CDA Brad Freden, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Clearly anticipating the subject of our conversation,
Prime Minister Pahor pre-empted CDA's delivery of reftel's
points on March 5 by opening with the news that the
government believed it had the legal means to cut short the
seven-day follow-up for submission of signatures in favor of
a referendum on Croatia's NATO membership. This would allow
Slovenia to ratify the NATO protocol and deposit its
instrument of ratification before April 2. CDA stressed in
meetings with the Prime Minister and with MFA Acting Director
General (Under Secretary equivalent) Andrej Benedejcic the
need to avoid a photo finish that would risk embarrassing
Slovenia and NATO. CDA told both officials that April 3 was
too late to deposit the instrument of ratification.
Benedejcic assured CDA that Slovenia had registered the USG's
level of concern and the PM emphasized that Slovenia would do
everything legally and politically possible to avoid casting
a shadow over the Summit. End Summary.

Small Chance of Turning Off Referendum before March 26
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The PM said that the government continued to use
different channels to try to persuade the referendum
initiators, the Party of the Slovene Nation (SSN),to
withdraw the referendum initiative before the 35-day period
for gathering 40,000 signatures expires on March 26. Pahor
noted that although he had been criticized for going to
Maribor to meet with the SSN and try to make a deal with
them, it was worth it because his meeting had sent a clear
message to the public of the government's seriousness. He
did not hold out much hope of a deal, explaining that SSN was
biding its time in the hope that outside factors might
revitalize its flagging signature campaign. The problem was
that SSN had no real incentive to give up before the end of
the 35-day period.

Focus on Shortening 7 Day Follow-Up Period
--------------


3. (C/NF) Prime Minister Pahor told CDA that Parliament's
legal experts agreed there was a legal means to cut the
process short the day after the end of the 35-day period on
March 26, rather than wait the legally-mandated seven days
for signatures to be submitted. On March 27 the Speaker of
the House would decide that there was enough evidence that a
quorum had not been reached and that it was crystal clear
that he could send Croatia's ratification forward. Pahor
acknowledged the fear that one of the smaller opposition
parties in Parliament might challenge the legality of the
Speaker's decision. The strategy would only succeed if there
was a political consensus in Parliament. Pahor was confident
that he would be able to achieve the consensus, explaining
that he had been meeting regularly with Zmago Jelincic
(leader of the most anti-Croatian party in parliament),and
other parliamentary leaders to ensure consensus. Jelincic,
he said, was primarily interested in symbolic gestures and
did not seek to torpedo Croatia's NATO membership.

Prime Minister Heavily Engaged
--------------


4. (C) As the experts discuss legal options, Pahor continues
to manage the political process. He described his intense
engagement with Marjan Podobnik, the mercurial leader of the
Institute 25 June and an early proponent of the referendum.
"I spend more time with Podobnik than with my wife," he said
dryly. Pahor told us that he had persuaded Jelincic to
forego the referendum campaign by agreeing not to say
anything during his meeting with Sanader in Mokrice that
would aggravate Jelincic's supporters. After the Mokrice
meeting Jelincic complimented the PM for keeping his end of
the bargain. Pahor also reached out to the Archbishop of
Maribor, where SSN is based, asking him to speak out publicly
against a referendum. The Archbishop did so in interviews on
March 1 and 4. Emphasizing the lengths to which he was
willing to go to ensure the failure of the referendum
initiative, Pahor said the government had recently postponed
a decision after truck drivers had threatened to support the
referendum campaign.


5. (C) Pahor stated that Slovenia would finish the process in
time and Sanader would be at the Summit. He expressed
appreciation for comments this week by Croatian PM Sanader
that, while critical of Slovenia's policy on the border,
acknowledged that Slovenia had separated NATO ratification
from the border issue and that Pahor was doing his best to
ensure ratification. Pahor noted that after NATO was
resolved, both sides would try to build new bridges. The
Mokrice meeting had been just the first step -- it was
important for the publics to see the two leaders talking,
even though during the official meeting "the temperature was
like Minnesota in the winter." The meeting had also resulted
in the two foreign ministers talking and meeting regularly.

Managing Technical Details
--------------


6. (C/NF ) The PM and Benedejcic both welcomed Washington's
offer to accept scanned electronic copies of its instrument
of ratification. Benedejcic noted that the government would
thus not have to tangle with the prickly issue of whether
"formalist" President Turk would sign the law ahead of time
in order to allow the government to pre-position it in
Washington. If all else failed and the process went to the
April 2 deadline, CDA emphasized that Washington was asking
Slovenia to complete its process that same day. Depositing
the instrument on April 3 would likely deny Croatia a seat at
the opening of the Summit, which was not an acceptable
outcome. Benedejcic appreciated the timeline, but asked
whether it would be possible to complete the process if
Slovenia sent scanned copies at one minute past midnight on
April 3. He explained that Article 4 of the Law on
Ratification (for Croatia's Entry into NATO) stated that the
law comes into effect the day after being published in the
official gazette. He subsequently sent a revision to the
timeline we provided (e-mailed to EUR/RPM, USNATO, EUR/CE,
and USEmbassy Zagreb) with an April 2 1801 EST start time.
Benedejcic also undertook to look again at all available
options.

U.S. Offers to Help
--------------


7. (C) Prime Minister Pahor declined, for the moment, our
offer to assist through public diplomacy or additional
private meetings with key stakeholders. As long as the
signature-gathering campaign continues at its current anemic
pace, the potential risks of such assistance outweigh the
benefits. He assured us, however, that the MFA would work
closely with us to ensure that all was in position.
Benedejcic referenced a letter that FM Zbogar recently
received from Elton Gallegly (R-CA),a member of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, and asked for State's assistance
in assuaging concerns on the Hill. Other than that,
Benedejcic noted, it was important that the U.S. and other
NATO allies maintain balance in their public statements in
order to avoid any perception of bias.

Next Steps
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8. (C) We will meet with National Assembly Speaker Pavel
Gantar March 10 to confirm that Pahor's optimism is
well-placed. We ask that Washington consider other possible
incentives that could be used to bring this long-running
drama to a quick and happy ending. We believe that the offer
of a pull-aside meeting or even a photo op with President
Obama -- conditioned, of course, on successful and timely
completion of the ratification process -- would give Pahor a
huge positive incentive to wrap this story up on March 27 and
move forward on resolution of the border dispute with Croatia.
FREDEN