AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FM ON COLOMBIA AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001177

SIPDIS

DEPT ALSO FOR WHA FRONT OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR SNAR CO HO PE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FM ON COLOMBIA AND
HONDURAS

Classified By: Ambassador P. Michael McKinley for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met with FM Jose Antonio
Garcia Belaunde on August 11 to discuss the Colombia
"non-bases" issue and Honduras. Garcia Belaunde imparted two
key messages: (A) We are not out of the woods on the Colombia
DCA controversy, and B) the USG needs to be seen as doing
considerably more on Honduras or "it risks losing the game."
The exchange below should be seen in the light of President
Garcia and FM Belaunde's strong support for Uribe (evinced
during Uribe's August 4 visit to Lima) and high praise for
the way the USG handled the first few weeks of the Honduran
crisis. End Summary.

Colombia
--------------

2. (C) FM Garcia Belaunde told the Ambassador there were two
discussions at the August 9-10 emergency UNASUR meeting in
Quito. The Foreign Ministers were serious and measured, even
the GBRV's FM Maduro, Garcia Belaunde said. By way of
explaining the dynamic, he mentioned two themes - Colombian
efforts to improve the efficacy of its battle against
narco-terrorism, and its neighbors' focus on the potential
threat stemming from expanded US military defense cooperation
in Colombia. The discussion focused on how to bridge the two
differing views. Leaning left were Chile, Brazil, Uruguay,
and presumably Paraguay - outwardly willing to accept the
sovereignty argument, but wanting greater transparency and
"negative" guarantees. FM Garcia Belaunde said he, as the
GOP's representative, pursued a middle course. Among the
options he noted was a UNASUR document or statement, signed
by Colombia, assuring that the "bases" were not for offensive
purposes; that is, something that clarified what would NOT
happen as a result of the US presence (the "negative"
guarantees).


3. (C) Garcia Belaunde said that in the discussion among the
moderate countries (i.e., not Venezuela, Bolivia and
Ecuador),Brazil was the most forceful in arguing for
guarantees. At that point in the conversation, Ambassador
McKinley (drawing from reftel) presented our arguments and
explanations regarding the USG's long-standing cooperation
with and presence in Colombia. Garcia responded that that
alone was "no longer the issue" and that Uribe's explanations
were insufficient. He observed that the optics of the DCA
needed to be dealt with on a continental basis, through
UNASUR. He recommended that the Secretary consider calling a
meeting of UNASUR FMs on the margins of the next OAS FM
summit.


4. (C) FM Garcia Belaunde indicated that the discussion among
the Presidents decended into the equivalent of a street
brawl. All had been under relative control until Chavez
spoke, and the result of his bombast was later seen in the
media. Discussion among FMs on August 9 had agreed on a
follow-on August 24 UNASUR FMs meeting in Quito, framed
around a general discussion of regional issues such as
security cooperation, the prospect of an arms race etc.
President Kirchner said the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation
Agreement (DCA) issue was too serious for FMs, and offered to
host a presidents meeting in Argentina instead.

Honduras
--------------

5. (C) FM Garcia Belaunde said the US needed to "drive a
stake" into de-facto Honduran President Micheletti, adding
that this was the view of FMs Bermudez of Colombia and
Fernandez of Chile, as well. Fair or not, he said that the
US was losing some of the political capital it gained at the
beginning of the Honduran crisis, and was now seen as capable
of doing more. FM Garcia Belaunde suggested to his
counterparts that an OAS ultimatum not recognizing upcoming
Honduran elections, if Zelaya was not allowed to return,
could be conter-productive - but his real hope was that
Zelaya returned in time for an orderly transition of power.


6. (C) When Ambassador McKinley mentioned the US was working
within an OAS context, as one nation among others, FM

responded that this was not sufficient and asserted that a
higher profile role by the US Secretary of State would be
helpful. Garcia Belaunde concluded by saying that his Chilean
counterpart (FM Fernandez) was going to raise the same points
regarding Honduras with the US Ambassador in Santiago.

Comment: Advice of Close Regional Partner
--------------

7. (C) Colombian Embassy contacts have told us that
President Uribe got a warm welcome reception and sympathetic
ear during his stop in Lima, and that Colombia considers Peru
to be its only real ally in the region. The FM's considered
reflections and advice concerning the U.S. role in helping
address these two controversial issues should be seen in that
light. End Comment.
MCKINLEY