GABON AFTER PRESIDENT OMAR BONGO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 LIBREVILLE 000220

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR GB FR
SUBJECT: GABON AFTER PRESIDENT OMAR BONGO

REF: LIBREVILLE 0210

LIBREVILLE 00000220 001.5 OF 006


Classified By: Charge d'affaires Nathan Holt for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Gabonese President El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba,
Africa's longest-serving head of state, is gravely ill.
Following is Embassy Libreville's analysis of the prospects
for succession and stability in Gabon, and the likely impact
on U.S. interests. End Summary.

-------------- -
Short Term Prospects: Illness and Uncertainty
-------------- -


2. (C) Bongo, in power since 1967, is sick, probably with
cancer, and is currently thought to be receiving treatment at
an undisclosed European location. He may not live much
longer. Even if he lives it is clear that Bongo's physical
capacities will be much diminished. In addition to suspected
cancer, Bongo is said to suffer from diabetes, and to be
seriously depressed after the March 14 death of his much
younger wife, Edith Lucie, in Morocco after a protracted
illness.


3. (C) The system Bongo created to govern Gabon, and the
role Bongo and Gabon play in regional and continental
politics, are changing quickly. The risk of instability in
Gabon, where Bongo is respected and feared but not much
loved, is rising. The most likely scenario in the event of
the president's death, however, is that his son and
heir-apparent, Defense Minister Ali Bongo Ondimba, will take
over after a period of mourning and at least formal respect
for constitutional and electoral requirements. With direct
or indirect control over the security forces, Ali Bongo can
probably squelch potential unrest and tilt the outcome
decisively in his favor.


4. (C) Smart and ruthless, Ali Bongo lacks his father's
talent for building alliances. There will be both overt and
covert challenges to his rise from political opponents and
from inside his powerful family. Ali Bongo's success will
ultimately depend on his political skill and the loyalty of
Gabon's security forces. Should Ali's grip weaken, it is far
from clear what other figure--from the current ruling elite,
from the fractured political opposition, or from the shadowy
ranks of the armed forces--would emerge to claim the
presidency. And in those circumstances the transition could
be significantly rockier.


5. (C) It is also possible that President Bongo will enter a
period of prolonged incapacity and decline. This too could
be destabilizing, as the courtiers whom Bongo scornfully
refers to as "little kings" scramble for influence, and to
line their own pockets. Gabon's population, pinched by
rising prices and deteriorating social services, has little
regard for any of the current players, but would likely
reward any leader who delivers better roads, health care,
jobs and education.


6. (C) Gabon after Bongo will be less stable, at least in
the short term, as a new leader moves to consolidate power.
Gabon would likely retain its openness to the United States
and China, and its close ties to France. Both France and
Gabon, however, may seek to adjust their relationship, or at
least cast it in a more favorable public light. Gabon's role
in regional and continental politics, anchored by President
Bongo's seniority and wily leadership, will diminish.
However, Gabon will retain influence through African Union
chairman Jean Ping, a former long-serving Gabonese foreign
minister, and through the regional security initiatives of
the Libreville-based Economic Community of Central African
States (ECCAS, or CEEAC in French).

--------------
Bongo in Retrospect: A Quick Rise
--------------


7. (C) To understand the consequences of Bongo's passing
from power, it is first necessary to take a close look at the
domestic and international impact of this flawed but
remarkable leader.


8. (C) Bongo was born into the minority Bateke ethnic group
in a remote corner of what was then French Equatorial Africa,
reportedly in 1935. Orphaned at an early age, Bongo found
schooling in Brazzaville, and through luck, brains and hard
work emerged as a figure in the ferment of the era's labor
and independence politics. He was also, and not

LIBREVILLE 00000220 002.5 OF 006


coincidentally, employed by a French intelligence service.
With Gabon's independence in 1960, Bongo rose to become
aide-de-camp to first president Leon Mba. Sticking by Mba
during an attempted coup, in which he was briefly imprisoned
by Mba's opponents and rescued by the French, Bongo was
rewarded with the vice presidency. Mba died in France in
1967 and Bongo took office at the announced age of 31--though
his actual age remains uncertain even to this day.

--------------
Domestic Politics: Keeping Friends
Close and Enemies Closer
--------------


8. (C) Pragmatic, cynical, flush with oil revenue, hard
working, fiercely intelligent and by any standard highly
corrupt, Bongo brought his country peace and a measure of
prosperity. He also soon proved himself a master of domestic
and regional politics.


9. (C) Less than a year into his presidency, Bongo made
Gabon a one-party state. Within the ruling Parti
Democratique Gabonais (PDG),however, Bongo deftly balanced
ethnic and regional interests, dispensing money and patronage
to local "barons" and consolidating his control. From his
earliest days in power and throughout his career, Bongo has
been particularly adept at dividing and neutralizing the
Fang, Gabon's largest ethnic group (with about 30 percent of
the population). Carefully maintaining an alliance with the
family of former President Leon Mba, an ethnic Fang, Bongo
ensured that generations of Fang politicians got enough power
and benefits to keep them placated, but not enough to pose a
serious challenge to his regime. Other groups were handled
with similar skill. Though he did not hesitate to jail
political opponents, Bongo showed an early preference for
carrots over sticks in domestic politics, and with an oil
boom that began in the 1970s he had many carrots to dispense.



10. (C) Bongo successfully weathered the most serious
challenge to his presidency during the wave of protest,
constitutional reform and democratization that swept Africa
in the early 1990s. Bongo reintroduced multi-party politics,
granted freedom of the press--and by many accounts stole the
1993 election against former Roman Catholic priest Paul Mba
Abessole. Scores died in post-election rioting, but Bongo's
control was never seriously in doubt. Today, Mba Abessole is
a well-paid deputy prime minister and a half-dozen former
opposition leaders are in cabinet, their various parties
subsumed and almost indistinguishable in the PDG's
parliamentary and electoral coalition. One exception is
Pierre Mamboundou, who took refuge in the South African
Embassy citing fears for his personal safety after losing the
2005 presidential election with about 14 percent of the vote.
Mamboundou, who still asserts there are plots against him,
is widely known to have negotiated with Bongo for a senior
post in government, but has so far been unable to strike a
deal.

-------------- -
International Politics: There's France, and
Then There's Everyone Else
-------------- -


11. (C) Bongo also pursued a sophisticated international
agenda. Siding with the West during the Cold War, Bongo
assiduously sought a closer relationship with the United
States, particularly at the presidential level. Overcoming
French-fueled suspicion of U.S. involvement in the 1964
anti-Mba coup and other early episodes, he opened the door to
U.S. investment in the oil sector and met with U.S.
presidents from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush. More
recently, Bongo has strengthened economic and military ties
to China, signing a $3.6 billion 25-year deal to develop iron
resources in eastern Gabon and associated infrastructure.


12. (C) Bongo's links to France, however, were and remain of
another order entirely. An astute judge of French politics
and politicians, Bongo facilitated billions of dollars of
French trade and investment in Gabon, including the notorious
activities of the now-dissolved oil company Elf Aquitaine.
He also secured for Gabon one of four French military bases
in Africa and, from the outset of his rule, a guarantee of
French support should his regime be challenged. Sometimes
mislabeled a French puppet, Bongo grew over time into a
sophisticated partner in French diplomatic, military and
business initiatives and an independent voice whose counsel
was valued at the senior levels in Paris.

--------------
Regional Peacemaker
--------------


LIBREVILLE 00000220 003.5 OF 006



13. (C) Bongo's most lasting achievement, however, was his
role as a regional peacemaker and power broker. With
seniority among fellow African leaders and significant
financial resources, Bongo brought tenacity, credibility and
an undeniable gift for deal-making to dozens of efforts to
end war and civil conflict. In matters as diverse as
Angola's civil war, Cote d'Ivoire's various coups and
electoral crises in the last decade, and current efforts to
end low-level conflict and forge a new political order in the
Central African Republic (CAR),Bongo has been a consistent,
respected advocate of compromise and peace. Never an
ideologue, Bongo managed to play these roles despite
well-known deviations from African political orthodoxy:
facilitating arms transfers to UNITA rebels in Angola,
trading with South Africa throughout the era of apartheid,
and forging an unusually close relationship with Morocco
despite AU distress over Western Sahara.


14. (C) Privately dismissive of several fellow heads of
state, and particularly appalled by the pretensions of
Libya's Muamar Qadhafi, Bongo nevertheless wields his
seniority with a light touch. Aides speak of Bongo's
disarming humility, careful respect for the egos and
sensitivities of fellow leaders, and readiness to cede the
limelight--all the while privately prodding even intractable
foes toward negotiation and compromise. The election of
Gabonese Foreign Minister Jean Ping to the chairmanship of
the African Union in 2008, with two-thirds of the vote on the
first ballot, was unquestionably a tribute to Ping's
extraordinary acumen. It was also a result of Bongo's
effective lobbying and the political capital he accumulated
over four decades in power.

--------------
Challenges for a Successor
--------------


15. (C) For all his skills, however, Bongo leaves a Gabon
beset by pressing problems that will make it considerably
more difficult for Gabon's next president to consolidate
power and govern. Gabon's oil production has declined
significantly from its peak in the mid-1990s, and a chokehold
of corruption and monopolies, centered on the Bongo family,
thwart genuine competition and much-needed economic
diversification. Unemployment is rising. Popular confidence
in government, and in electoral politics, is worrisomely low.
As Gabon's powerful unions press for concessions in the oil,
education and health sectors, finance ministry officials and
IMF advisors fret that the shrinking national budget cannot
accommodate their demands. Meanwhile, the quality of
schools, hospitals and roads deteriorates despite what on
paper appear to be massive public investments.


16. (C) France, for many years a guarantor of Bongo's rule,
may be unwilling to play that role for a successor--though
with 850 troops based in Gabon, France wlll at minimum
respond to any threat to the safety of the estimated 10,000
French citizens here. France is thought to be re-evaluating
its need for a Gabonese military base, and redefining its
security cooperation with Gabon, consistent with a 2008
defense white paper. Gabon's prolonged courtship of the
United States, and its more recent economic and military
overtures to China, provide no comparable or counterbalancing
security guarantees. And while Gabon does not expect
interference in its succession process by neighboring states,
a welter of overlapping ethnicities and political connections
ensure that such interference cannot be ruled out.

--------------
Mechanics of Succession
--------------


17. (C) How, then, will succession play out? The
constitutional mechanics are fairly straightforward, though
few expect the script to be followed precisely. Should
President Bongo die, power passes to the President of the
Senate, who then has between 30 and 45 days to organize an
election. The current incumbent is a recently-installed,
little-known politician named Rose Francine Rogombe, chosen
specifically for her perceived pliability.


18. (C) More complex, and potentially more important, are
the mechanics of succession to the presidency of the ruling
PDG--a post currently held by Omar Bongo. The PDG has never
lost an election and it is widely assumed that whoever
succeeds Omar Bongo to the PDG presidency will, fairly or
otherwise, win any ensuing national election. As currently
constituted the PDG has seven vice presidents, including Ali
Bongo. Four vice presidents, including the prime minister
and the president of the Senate, hold office by virtue of
their position in national government. Ali Bongo is one of
three vice-presidents directly elected at the last party
congress. He also chairs the party's security council.

LIBREVILLE 00000220 004.5 OF 006


Party insiders say that in the event of a vacancy, several
vice presidents will be disqualified because of their duties
in national government. Based on these rather arcane rules,
and backroom deals involving Ali and other power brokers,
insiders predict that Ali would be the one of two or three
vice presidents eligible, and the only one selected, to head
the party. As the PDG standard bearer, he will then be the
heavy favorite to win the election.


19. (C) Finally, there is the question of succession in the
event of the president's incapacity. Here the rules are also
complex. The constitution requires that either an absolute
majority of cabinet ministers, or an absolute majority of the
two houses of the national legislature (Senate and National
Assembly) sitting together as one body, seek a final and
binding judgment from the Constitutional Court declaring the
president incapable of governing. At that point the same
process unfolds as if the president had died, with elections
organized by the President of the Senate no more than 45 days
later.


20. (C) There are rumors that Ali Bongo and his allies are
considering changing the constitution to avoid the
requirement of an election within a few weeks of the
president's death. They propose instead that the next head
of state be elected by the Senate or National Assembly. Most
say that the president's illness makes it unlikely that such
a proposal would be brought forward now.

--------------
The Heir Apparent . . .
--------------


21. (C) 50-year old Defense Minister Ali Bongo spent much of
his youth and early adulthood abroad in France and the United
States, where he dabbled in music promotion. Although he was
an unlikely prospect to succeed his father when he returned
to Gabon in the late 1980s, his subsequent ascent has been
extraordinarily rapid. Ali served as foreign minister
(1989-91) and since 1999 as minister of defense. Ali Bongo
also deputizes for his father as head of Gabon's Supreme
Council for Islamic Affairs and, like his father and much of
Gabon's political elite, is a member of an influential
Masonic lodge. And in a clear break with the past practice
of the Omar Bongo regime, all security forces, including the
elite Republican Guard, have since 2008 been headed by
individuals believed to be allies of a single person--Ali
Bongo.


22. (C) A comfortable, persuasive interlocutor with
foreigners, Ali Bongo nevertheless affects exasperation with
France--and behind his back, officials at the French Embassy
in Libreville say little positive about Ali. Ali Bongo can
also be awkward among fellow Gabonese politicians, some of
whom complain that he is gruff and distant. Though arguably
less venal than some fellow family members, Ali Bongo has
inherited the family predilection for fancy cars and other
emblems of conspicuous wealth. Observers across the
political spectrum nevertheless give him credit for skillful
maneuvering in the succession contest. A self-described
reformer, Ali Bongo has also cultivated a cadre of younger,
reform-minded political "renovators" who have sought with
mixed success to modernize the PDG and the government.


23. (C) Ali Bongo's most important constituency, and the key
to his ability to claim the presidency, is the security
forces. As defense minister, Bongo oversaw significant
improvements in the pay, housing, equipment, training and
other benefits for the army, navy, air force, Republican
Guard and paramilitary gendarmerie. A political ally,
Interior Minister Andre Mba Obame, oversees the National
Police, who have not been has heavily favored. While Bongo
has succeeded in placing key allies in senior positions in
various security forces--many of them ethnic Teke and a few
of them his relatives--he may have done so at the cost of
creating real but hidden frustration among non-Teke officers
and enlisted personnel. In any case, several of the senior
officers sidelined or retired as Ali Bongo consolidated
control bear ill feelings toward him, and retain at least
residual influence in the armed forces.

--------------
. . . And His Rivals
--------------


24. (C) Despite Ali Bongo's rapid ascent, his path to the
presidency is not straightforward; nor has he been formally
anointed by either his father or his party. Ali Bongo's most
formidable obstacles may come from his own family and Bateke
ethnic group. Ali's half-sister Pascaline is the president's
powerful chief of staff and key gatekeeper; she is also the
only one of Bongo's dozens of children who regularly travels
with the president, and is thought to be with him now in

LIBREVILLE 00000220 005.5 OF 006


Europe. Relations between Ali and Pascaline Bongo are said
to be fraught, and Ali readily admits that he has struggled
against his sister's long-time consort, Foreign Minister Paul
Toungui, for leadership of the PDG. Pascaline Bongo either
controls or arbitrates the financial and business dealings of
various siblings and family members, and together with
Toungui (finance minister from 2002 to 2008) has great
influence over government contracting and finances.


25. (C) In the wake of President Bongo's current illness, a
family council is said to have decreed that Pascaline would
take care of the family and its money, while Ali would ensure
the security of the state during President Bongo's illness
and ultimately ascend to the presidency. It is not clear,
however, whether these arrangements will last. Some family
members may also be behind rumors that Ali Bongo is a Biafran
orphan adopted by his parents in the mid-1960s--apparently
specious rumors that both Ali Bongo and his mother, a popular
Gabonese singer, have felt compelled to publicly refute.


26. (C) Until very recently, political struggles within the
PDG could be analyzed in terms of Ali Bongo's "renovators", a
group of moderates or "appellists" centered around Toungui,
and aging but influential party barons known as the
"caciques". Increasingly, however, Gabonese politics are
defined by whether one is for or against Ali Bongo. Even
without an obvious alternative to rally around, ordinary
citizens and senior officials object to the creation of what
some now openly call a monarchy. It is possible, though
increasingly unlikely, that a group within the PDG could
mount a successful challenge to Ali Bongo. The current Prime
Minister, Jean Eyeghe Ndong, has little independent political
clout, but could be a compromise figure; Vice President
Didjob Divungui Di Ndingue has only minimal constitutional
authority, little political influence, and in any case is not
a member of the PDG. Another PDG dark horse, whose stature
may grow if President Bongo lingers longer in office, is AU
chairman Jean Ping. Throughout his long career, however,
Ping's domestic political influence has been minimal.


27. (C) Outside the PDG, Ali Bongo would likely face an
electoral challenge from Paul Mba Abessole, the vice-prime
minister and leader of the opposition Rassemblement Pour le
Gabon (RPG),who has not ruled out another contest for the
presidency. Mba Abessole is an ethnic Fang, as are almost
all of his key advisors. Another contender, perhaps more
acceptable to the current elite, is Pierre Mamboundou, leader
of the Union Pour le Gabon (RPG),who placed second in the
last presidential election. Neither figure is believed to
have the popularity or organizational base to thwart a
determined PDG candidate, particularly if that candidate is
Ali Bongo.

--------------
Alternative Scenarios
--------------


28. (C) The death of President Omar Bongo would result in an
immediate and intense period of national mourning, which
would also provide cover for a de facto clampdown on
demonstrations and other dissent by security forces under the
control of Minister of Defense Ali Bongo. Should Bongo's
grip on the security forces slip, or should he stumble the
complex succession process, there would be a genuine and
unpredictable scramble for power among various aspirants.
With Ali Bongo sidelined, it is far from clear whether the
constitutional court, senate president, electoral commission
and other individuals and institutions charged with
overseeing the succession process could withstand external or
extra-constitutional pressures. Here, too, the attitude of
the security forces would be determinant. Those who know him
predict that Ali Bongo would not hesitate to use forces loyal
to him to secure control.

--------------
Gabon After Omar Bongo:
Stability and U.S. Interests
--------------


29. (C) Gabon after Omar Bongo will likely remain open to
closer military and economic ties to both the United States
and China. Although France will remain Gabon's major
external partner, both sides may take the opportunity to
recalibrate at least the public perception of their
relationship--particularly in view of the ongoing campaign in
French courts by anti-corruption organizations against
Bongo's ill-gotten wealth. Gabon will play a diminished, but
potentially still significant, role in regional and
continental politics and security initiatives.


30. (C) Gabon's next leader will need to move quickly to
consolidate power, and Gabon will remain vulnerable to
instability until he or she does so. Establishing and

LIBREVILLE 00000220 006.6 OF 006


reinforcing civilian control over the security forces will be
the key first step. In the end, however, the next
president's leadership will be best secured by providing
better social services, jobs and economic opportunity to a
restive and disenchanted populace.


31. (C) There is no reason why the next leader of Gabon
could not clamp down on corruption; encourage genuine
economic competition and diversification; sustain renewed and
sensible relationships with France, China and the United
States; and remain a positive force for regional stability
through skillful diplomacy, participation in peacekeeping
missions, and support for regional organizations like CEEAC.
We should encourage these policies, along with respect for
the constitution by all players in the current succession
process--and most importantly, by the security forces.


32. (C) In any case, no matter how much longer President
Bongo remains in office, the post-Bongo era has probably
begun.
HOLT