U.S./BOLIVIA RELATIONS: HOW WE GOT HERE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000089

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR PTER ECON EFIN EAID BL
SUBJECT: U.S./BOLIVIA RELATIONS: HOW WE GOT HERE

Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Joe Relk for reasons 1.4 b,d


1. (C) Summary: President Evo Morales has repeatedly stated
that he will "never break relations with the United States,"
and he has recently expressed hopes that bilateral relations
will improve under the Obama administration. Privately,
however, high-level officials told us as early as 2007 that
Bolivia seeks to "distance" itself from the United States.
President Morales also regularly uses rhetorical attacks on
the United States as a way to garner support and distract
from domestic problems. This report presents a timeline of
significant bilateral moments since the election of President
Evo Morales (who won the election of December 18, 2005 to
enter into office on January 22, 2006.) End Summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Post-election, Pre-Inauguration
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (U) After the election but before taking office, President
Morales continued the occasional anti-American statements he
had used effectively in his campaign. In his December 18
informal victory declaration, he called for an end of the
"relationship of submission" with the United States and
rallied his audience with his oft-repeated cocalero (coca
grower) slogan of "Death to the Yankees, long live coca!"


3. (C) However, in a January 2, 2006 "breaking the ice"
meeting at the Ambassador's residence, President-elect
Morales claimed he had not publicly maligned the USG (at
least not in the post-election period) and expressed deep
resentment about being allegedly branded a "narco-terrorist"
by some U.S. officials. Throughout the discussion, Morales
repeatedly stated that he wanted to resolve disagreements,
including with the United States, through dialogue.


4. (C) On January 21, 2006, the day before Morales'
inauguration, Morales met with A/S Thomas Shannon in La Paz.
Saying that he was now the head of government and no longer
an opposition leader, Morales underscored the importance of
relations with the United States and his willingness to
continue bilateral dialogue. Morales also said he was
prepared to work constructively on areas of shared concern.
On U.S.-Bolivia relations, Morales explained that after all
the accusations he had turned the page. He fully agreed with
VP-elect Alvaro Garcia Linera on the unique importance of the
meeting with A/S Shannon for which he mentioned he had
canceled other scheduled meetings. It is critical for Bolivia
to have relations with the world's most important power, he
explained, but in the context of mutual respect. "Before I
used to call for 'death to the oligarchy.' But I know I have
lots to learn."


5. (C) In the meeting with A/S Shannon, Vice President Garcia
Linera added that the Morales government was interested in
ensuring the health of its alliances with the U.S. and
European partners, and hoped to continue receiving the aid on
which Bolivia depends greatly for its education, health and
infrastructure needs - "but with the aim of shedding the
dependency and standing on our own two feet."

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Morales' First Two Years in Office: 2006-07
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


6. (C) Morales' first year in office brought two
congressional delegations to Bolivia and renewal of Bolivia's
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Agreement
(ATPDEA) trade benefits. In December 2006, Vice President
Garcia Linera emphasized to Ambassador Goldberg "on behalf of
the president" his government's gratitude to "the Congress
and the U.S. government" for approving a six-month extension
of ATPDEA benefits. Garcia Linera went on to praise Secretary
Rice's key role in sending a letter to the Hill: "This is a
very positive sign in our relationship -- a huge step ahead."



7. (C) Despite this positive development, 2006 and 2007 were
marked by frequent anti-USG statements from high-level
Bolivian government officials, particularly President
Morales. Morales repeatedly accused the USG and specifically
Ambassador Philip Goldberg (who arrived in September 2006) of
leading "conspiracy" against him. For example, at the
November 2007 Ibero-American Summit, Morales displayed a
picture of Ambassador Goldberg taken at a trade show with a
passerby who was later arrested as an alleged criminal but
then released. Morales claimed that the photo with a
"Colombian paramilitary" was evidence of "an open conspiracy."


8. (SBU) Morales summarized many of the conspiracy theories
of his first two years in office in a December 7, 2007
interview with Venezuelan TV network Telesur: "...here the
conspiracy against the government is headed by the Embassy of
the United States and oligarchies...last year, here in La Paz
a U.S. citizen appeared with bombs, killing people...Second,
an American who has ties to the U.S. Embassy in Bolivia in
the past months entered with 500 bullets...she was stopped,
and according to the U.S. Ambassador in Bolivia, (the
bullets) were for hunting in Bolivia...I don't know if it was
to hunt Evo Morales..." (Note: The bomb-placing American was
seemingly mentally-disturbed and not attached to the Mission.
The bullets mentioned had been brought by a friend of the
family for a country team member for target practice, however
Morales publicly described the event as "terrorism." End
note.)


9. (C) In a private meeting on October 5, 2007 Deputy Foreign
Minister Hugo Fernandez told visiting DAS McMullen and
WHA/AND Director Chacon "we are tired of a one-sided
relationship" and "we want to create distance from the
United States." Fernandez explained that the 2007 decisions
to require visas for American tourists and to establish ties
with Iran, as well as repeated attacks on USAID, should be
viewed in that context. Fernandez's statement was the first
time a Morales government official acknowledged that the
Bolivian government was purposefully distancing itself from
the United States.


10. (SBU) In two separate public speeches in December 2007,
President Morales told his followers that "the U.S. Embassy
is here to organize a conspiracy" against his government and
announced that Bolivia no longer needed foreign control in
the counternarcotics effort, as this is "an old-fashioned
colonial mechanism...at this point, it is no longer important
that they continue imposing certification or decertification
policies...We no longer want any foreign control; we are
responsible for addressing this issue..."


11. (SBU) Nevertheless, on December 20, 2007, Morales
declared publicly "despite these aggressions and conspiracies
on the part of the Ambassador of the United States, we are
not going to break dialogue, we will maintain diplomatic
relations...How nice it would be if the U.S. government would
recommend to its Ambassador not to come here to conspire, not
to come to Bolivia to make politics but rather to do
diplomacy..."

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2008: Accusations Escalate to Actions
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


12. (U) In a June 6, 2008 press briefing, Presidency Minister
Quintana provided a detailed presentation on the "six
branches" of the Embassy, describing USAID as a political
entity and calling the Peace Corps a "dependent entity of the
United States which permits hundreds of U.S. students to
arrive in Bolivia as intelligence personnel." In a July
meeting with A/S Shannon, Morales repeated his assertion that
Peace Corps volunteers are "intelligence agents."


13. (SBU) On June 9, 2008 after a weekend of anti-U.S.
rhetoric from MAS-aligned El Alto leaders and public
statements from President Morales (accompanied by the Cuban
ambassador) blaming the USG for granting asylum to ex-Defense
Minister Sanchez Berzain, thousands of Morales' supporters
protested at the Embassy. At various times the Embassy was
surrounded, and protesters threw rocks, dynamite, and burning
items over the walls of the compound, resulting in injuries
to a number of police. On June 15, President Evo Morales
praised the June 9 violent demonstration: "(the Embassy)
protects criminals, defends them and hides those who for so
many years caused such damage to the Bolivian
people...Congratulations for this great organization, for
this great mobilization of leaders."


14. (SBU) On June 25, 2008 cocalero leaders in the Chapare
declared their intent to expel USAID from the Chapare, and
the next day Morales endorsed their decision and broadened
the scope to include all U.S. presence in the Chapare,
including NAS and DEA. (Note: Morales continues to this day
to serve as the president of the cocaleros union. End note.)


15. (U) The day before A/S Shannon arrived to meet with him
on July 23, Morales gave a speech, saying, "Tomorrow at five
in the morning I am going to meet with that gringo coming
from the United States. I am going to meet with him and I am
going to show him the evidence that the United States is
propagating a campaign against me, against my government,
and, most of all, against the social movements." Later in
the day, Morales attempted to limit A/S Shannon's movement in
the country, saying, "Bolivia is a sovereign country and any
foreign officials who come to visit need to have permission
from the national government or from the Foreign Minister (in
order to travel throughout the country)."


16. (C) On July 23, A/S Shannon met with Morales, who
expressed his regret for the June 9 march on the Embassy and
its aftermath and acknowledged that Bolivia "needs" the
United States. However, Morales also cited "proofs" of a USG
conspiracy against him and his government. Morales
complained that "since the 90s the Department of State has
described me as a narco-trafficker..." Morales also said
USAID money was used to conspire against him. In response,
Shannon said that the United States was committed to the
success of Bolivian democracy and the Bolivian people and had
no interest in conspiracy against the Morales government.
Shannon mentioned President Bush's congratulatory phone call
after Morales' election and the meeting held with Secretary
Rice. The A/S highlighted how the USG has modified its
anti-narcotics tactics to work with the GOB, re-certified the
GOB, and extended ATPDEA benefits. He also noted that the USG
had worked with multilateral development banks to forgive
USD1 billion in loans owed by Bolivia. Shannon said that
Bolivia and the United States are in a "critical moment in
our relationship" and that he wanted security guarantees for
USAID and the Peace Corps so as "to be able to continue with
these programs." Morales responded that "if the conspiracy
stops then we can begin a new relationship based on our
proposed agenda." In closing, Morales said "We will not
break relations. We will continue to put up with and bear
these things."


17. (C) Despite A/S Shannon's offer for future bilateral
meetings--and amidst continuing accusations of conspiracy and
espionage--on September 10, 2008 Morales declared the
Ambassador persona non grata. Throughout 2008, members of the
Morales government had made public allegations that
Ambassador Goldberg's "Balkan separatist expertise" from his
tour in Kosovo was evidence of his intent to divide Bolivia.
Morales also publicly criticized the Ambassador's visits with
opposition leaders and even indigenous leaders of groups not
aligned with Morales' MAS party. In light of increasing
threats of violent protests at the Embassy, unclear signals
concerning the Morales Administration's intent to protect the
Mission from attacks, and the expulsion of the Ambassador,
the Embassy went to Authorized Departure in September.


18. (U) During his speech at the United Nations General
Assembly meeting in New York on September 24, 2008, Morales
again spoke against the United States: "Why the expulsion of
the U.S. ambassador? Because Latin America rejects this
attempt at civil coup. In Bolivia groups from the Right burn
gas lines and cut valves...but the U.S. government through
the embassy does not condemn those acts of terrorism and just
stays there. Evo Morales is the Andean Bin Laden and the
campesinos (small farmers) are the Taliban, that is to say
that you are meeting in this moment with an Andean Bin
Laden..."


19. (U) Following Bolivia's counternarcotics decertification
in September, President Bush suspended Bolivia's ATPDEA trade
benefits in late September 2008. Morales responded that "We
cannot kneel for 63 million dollars." Later in December
2008, Foreign Minister Choquehuanca announced that the
Bolivian government would prepare a WTO case to protest the
loss of ATPDEA benefits: "We have reasons, therefore we are
preparing an international suit, because we consider and are
sure that the measure was taken as an unjust and political
measure."


20. (SBU) After refusing DEA overflight permission in
October, on November 1 Morales announced that he was
expelling DEA from the country. Per our bilateral agreement,
DEA then had 90 days to leave the country.


21. (U) At a public event November 12, Morales announced
"Within this call for defense of sovereignty and dignity, of
pride of the Bolivians, now little by little, starting with
the Ambassador, with USAID, DEA, and if anyone is listening
to me, we are also after the CIA. As they follow me, so we
have the authority to go after the CIA." Later that month,
Morales alleged that the CIA supported a supposed coup
against him: "yesterday until 11, 12 at night I was talking
with some officials of the Police, the Armed Forces,
personally investigating. It's impressive how they've
prepared-the racists, the fascists-to get rid of us, with
participation of the CIA."


22. (U) On December 18, 2008, at an act celebrating Cuba,
President Morales announced, "Imagine an Organization of
American States so excluding, so discriminatory, so
marginalizing (as to exclude Cuba)! If that is the OAS,
comrades...better that we organize another organization with
the countries of Latin America and the Caribean, without the
United States."


23. (U) Despite the events and accusations of the past year,
on December 23, 2008 Morales announced that improved
bilateral relations could be possible under the Obama
Administration as long as the United States "respects
Bolivia" and takes responsibility "for the damage they have
done to Bolivia." Morales urged President Obama to make
undefined changes to World Bank policy and compensate BolivQ
for damages and deaths during violent conflicts in 2003,
which he argued were caused by overly-austere U.S. and World
Bank policies imposed on Bolivia.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2009: A Contradictory Start
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -


24. (SBU) On January 17, 2009 Morales announced himself
"willing to recover diplomatic relations" with the United
States and added that despite the decision to suspend ATPDEA
benefits, he would not lodge a complaint at the WTO:
"Trusting on the new American president, we have held back an
international complaint that we had already prepared. We
understand that he (President Obama) has the right to appeal
(the ATPDEA decision) since we are capable of proving that
the rules of international trade have not been respected."


25. (SBU) In a radio interview on January 18, Morales said
that his military had informed him of plots against him:
"Beyond a simple killing of the leader Evo, the plans went
far beyond, and everything was known by DEA and therefore the
U.S. government." Morales implied that plots against him
would continue due to his political stance against the United
States and Israel. Vice President Garcia Linera said
publicly, "It is our hope that a new (U.S.) President, a
President with another mentality, understands that the
relation between big countries and small has to be based on
mutual respect, on non-interference in internal affairs..."

- - - -
Comment
- - - -


26. (C) Although President Evo Morales and his ministers say
that they hope for improved relations with the Obama
administration, other rhetoric and actions suggest that their
view of improved relations will require dramatic changes in
behavior and attitude on the part of the United States, not
Bolivia. It is worth waiting to see if the Morales
government provides any evidence of good faith to support
their stated desire for improved relations, but extreme
optimism is probably not warranted. End comment.
URS