Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09LAPAZ844
2009-06-08 20:52:00
SECRET
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

HOW GOB COULD BLAME US FOR ALLEGED TERROR CELL

Tags:  ASEC PGOV PREL PTER PINR BL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T LA PAZ 000844 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10 YEARS AFTER CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL PTER PINR BL
SUBJECT: HOW GOB COULD BLAME US FOR ALLEGED TERROR CELL

REF: A. LA PAZ 708

B. LA PAZ 600

C. LA PAZ 593

D. LA PAZ 715

E. LA PAZ 635

F. 08 LAPAZ2374

G. 08 LA PAZ 02543

H. 08 LA PAZ 2483

I. 08 LA PAZ 2374

Classified By: ACTING ECOPOL CHIEF JOE RELK FOR REASONS 1.4
(b) AND (d)

S E C R E T LA PAZ 000844

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10 YEARS AFTER CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL PTER PINR BL
SUBJECT: HOW GOB COULD BLAME US FOR ALLEGED TERROR CELL

REF: A. LA PAZ 708

B. LA PAZ 600

C. LA PAZ 593

D. LA PAZ 715

E. LA PAZ 635

F. 08 LAPAZ2374

G. 08 LA PAZ 02543

H. 08 LA PAZ 2483

I. 08 LA PAZ 2374

Classified By: ACTING ECOPOL CHIEF JOE RELK FOR REASONS 1.4
(b) AND (d)


1. (S) Summary: The USG has not yet been directly accused of
involvement with an alleged terrorist cell in Santa Cruz.
However, there are several factors that could induce the GOB
to connect us to suspected extremist groups in Santa Cruz:
the petition of political asylum from alleged terrorist Hugo
Acha and his wife, allocation of USAID assistance to a
Bolivian organization suspected of funding a terrorist cell
in Santa Cruz, and an implied USG role based on the GOB's
assertion that the Santa Cruz cell leader organized meetings
and had contacts in Washington. End Summary.

Conspiracy Theory 1: Hugo Acha as U.S. Agent
--------------


2. (SBU) Alfredo Rada, Bolivian Minister of the Government
announced April 29 the GOB's plans to ask for the Interpol
arrest of Hugo Acha based on his alleged involvement with a
group in Santa Cruz accused by the GOB of being a terror cell
intent on assassinating President Evo Morales. The alleged
cell was dismantled by the Bolivian Government on April 16,
resulting in two arrests and three deaths (refs B and C).
Prosecutor Marcelo Sosa accused Acha, President of Human
Rights Foundation-Bolivia (HRF-B),and his wife Roxana
Gentile, an alternate congresswoman with the opposition
National Unity (UN) Party, of financing Eduardo Rozsa's
self-proclaimed Santa Cruz defense force in late April. Sosa
also claimed that Acha met with Rozsa on at least three
occasions and that testimony from other terrorist suspects in
custody implicate Acha as a financial supporter of the group.
Sosa announced June 3 the GOB's plan to request extradition
of Acha, who is currently in the United States.


3. (U) Acha and Gentile deny any involvement in the alleged
plot. They publicly admitted knowing Rozsa in his capacity
as a journalist, but contended that they never "saw him

armed." On April 25, Acha and Gentile traveled to the United
States to attend their daughter's graduation. According to
May press reports, Acha is currently seeking political asylum
on behalf of both himself and his wife. Acha purportedly
told reporters the that he feels "defenseless" and will not
return to Bolivia, because there are no judicial
"guarantees." Gentile returned to Bolivia and, to the best
of Post's knowledge, is still in Santa Cruz. Gentile accused
the GOB on May 16 of "violating human and constitutional
rights, using forms of intimidation and persecution" against
her, her family and the people of Santa Cruz.


4. (C) As a alternate member of the Bolivian Congress,
Gentile apparently has immunity from prosecution until the
new Plurinational Congress is elected in December. After the
new Congress is sworn in, likely in January 2010,
congressional immunities will largely end. However, with a
lack of a functioning Constitutional Tribunal (ref D),the
GOB could well choose to ignore existing immunities, as it
has in the case of former Pando Prefect (Governor) Leopoldo
Fernandez, who remains jailed in La Paz since September.

Morales Administration Targets Human Rights Foundation
-------------- --------------


5. (U) President Morales accused HRF, which he simply called
"Human Rights," of working to undermine the government.
During his May 1 address, Morales said the group was financed
by "outsiders" and that, if the Bolivian police investigation
showed the group is linked with pro-opposition terrorist
groups, its Bolivian members would be subject to
incarceration and its foreign members operating in Bolivia
would be expelled. Bolivian Vice-Minister for Social
Movements, Sacha Llorenti, a previous target of HRF-B's
criticisms, alleged that the group did not have a license to
operate in Bolivia, an accusation that was reiterated by the
public prosecutor's office and refuted, with documents, by
HRF-B.


6. (U) HRF-B's affiliate organization, Human Rights
Foundation, has defended Acha. Spokesman Sarah Wasserman
accused President Morales of "vilifying the reputation" of
HRF due to HRF-B's reporting on the "destruction of
democratic institutions, the grand human rights violations in
Bolivia" and the "anti-democratic character of the Morales
Administration." HRF-B's Web site (hrfbolivia.blogspot.com)
also makes this case, specifically alleging the Presidency
Minister Juan Ramon Quintana is afraid of HRF-B's
investigation into violence in Pando Department (state)
September 11 and 12. A statement on the site also promises
to take Acha's case to the OAS' Inter-American Human Rights
Court.


7. (C) Opposition strategist Javier Flores told PolOff that
former Bolivian Vice President Victor Hugo Cardenas mentioned
his case during his speech at HRF's Freedom Forum May 18-20
in Oslo, Norway. Flores said no formal statement was issued
regarding Acha, but that Acha's case, related to affiliate
organization HRF-B, was widely discussed and that the
Norwegian government delegation offered to help Acha
financially while he is "stranded" in Washington.


8. (U) A letter of resignation was posted on HRF-Bolivia's
Web site from four of the organizations seven founding
members June 4. It explained that Hugo Acha's failure to
step down as president of the HRF-B has compromised the
organization's ability to operate democratically and with
transparency. The resigning members claim that Acha was
named HRF-B's ad hoc president while the organization was
seeking to achieve legal status (received in March, 2008).
The directors stated that Acha was charged with the
responsibility of naming a new board of directors, but that
he did not meet with the board regularly and they did not
receive updates regarding the organization's activities.
This brought about complaints that HRF-B was not being run
democratically, with transparency or according to Bolivian
statutes. According to the statutes, the directors claimed
that Acha's term as president expired on April 12, 2009,
however Acha maintains that the founding members can
permanently remain in their positions indefinitely."

Acha Targeted for Pando Report ...
--------------


9. (S) Acha told PolOff in January that the government was
trying to squash his investigation into the Pando violence in
September 2008 (reftels E-F) and ensure the HRF-B Pando
report was never released. He continues to contend that
keeping his Pando findings from public view is the GOB's
primary motive for the new charges linking him to "terrorism"
and seeking his detention. His investigation planned to
reveal that the GOB deliberately provoked a confrontation in
Pando and "those who put the campesinos (peasant farmers) in
harms way evaded responsibility." He claimed the Pando
report could include:

--Interviews with families of "four or five" slain
pro-government protesters from Ingave Province in La Paz
Department (state). He contended they would claim Minister
of Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana recruited their family
members, all members of a reserve army unit (Ingave),to
provide muscle for a siege on Pando's capital of Cobija in
order to sack then Prefect (Governor) Leopoldo Fernandez.
Acha said the bodies were expeditiously flown out of Pando
and only given to family members after the GOB tried to
conceal bullet wounds. The GOB told the family of "Mr. Cruz"
that he had died of asphyxia, but did a poor job concealing a
massive bullet wound that "destroyed half of his skull."
Acha claimed the families are afraid to go public and Acha
was not sure he wanted to put them at risk by including them
in the report.

--A rebuke of UNASUR's report. Specifically, he planned to
discredit UNASUR's contention that prefect employee Pedro
Oshiro died next to his truck from stray gunfire, perhaps
from his own people. Acha claimed witnesses who were
kidnapped by the pro-government group the morning of
September 11 told him Oshiro was dragged about five feet from
his vehicle and shot in the head by pro-government activists
(this version of events also supported by the Peruvian
Mission and our own contacts, refs g-i),although he did not
know who fired the fatal shot. He also planned to attack
UNASUR's contention that Oshiro's death was an isolated
incident that should not be considered a catalyst for later
violence, which it characterized as a "massacre."

--A description of the videos, which he hoped to release
simultaneous with his Pando report, showing the person who
likely killed Oshiro (at his side before he was shot; sources
from both campesino and pro-opposition activists),of
Quintana advocating a violent siege of Cobija (source: family
of Jorge Melgar, a Pundit from Beni Department currently
jailed for releasing a similar video),and of the airport
assault September 12 showing excessive and fatal force on the
part of troops (source: an unknown journalist that Acha
claimed as of January was still in hiding in Brazil).

... But Is Also Linked to Alleged Terror Cell
--------------


10. (C) However, Senator Roger Pinto (Podemos, Pando;
strictly protect),told PolOff June 3 that, although the
government has good reason to try to ensure the HRF-B Pando
report is never published, it also has evidence that Acha was
involved with the alleged Santa Cruz cell. He said Acha was
involved in trying to solicit funds for the group from
opposition leaders in the Media Luna, but only in order to
"set up a self-defense force for the Media Luna (if the GOB
tried to violent repress it),not to assassinate the
President" or "any of things the GOB is accusing it of now."
Pinto contended that, among others, Acha approached Trinidad
Mayor Moises Shriqui with group leader Eduardo Rozsa Flores
to enlist his support. Pinto said Shriqui flatly refused to
get involved and discounted the group as "a really bad idea."



11. (C) Podemos Deputies Claudio Banegas (Santa Cruz;
strictly protect) and Bernardo Montenegro (Cochabamba;
strictly protect) told PolOff in May that the congressional
investigation into the Santa Cruz group had revealed that
Acha did in fact have a relation with it. Montenegro said
his involvement was "not at the top of the lighthouse, just
at the bottom." The deputies are in contact with Acha and are
trying to get him to "reveal everything he knows" to them so
they can release it. Banegas explained they hoped to get
Acha's story out via the media so that the GOB cannot
"continue to use uncertainty to its advantage politically."
He argued publicizing Acha's testimony would force a legal
case, redirecting the Acha/HRF-B issue from headline
speculation to the judiciary, "where it belongs." He thought
such a strategy would prevent the GOB from indefinitely
casting a net of suspicion over Acha and HRF-B and using
links to Acha to arrest or intimidate others. After an
initial effort to send leading pundit Carlos Valverde to the
United States to interview Acha fell through, Banegas himself
now plans to go.

Acha and USG Linked by (Counter-) "Terrorism" Course
-------------- --------------


12. (S) Acha participated in a CHDS (Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies) "Terrorism and Counterinsurgency" course in
Washington from October 18 to November 8, 2008. While
attending the course, he received a copy of a Bolivian arrest
warrant in his name for "sedition, conspiracy ... and
terrorism" from his wife Roxana Gentile. She claimed
Bolivian police provided her the warrant during a late night
search conducted on their Santa Cruz home. Suspecting the
Bolivian police would pull him off his flight in La Paz
before continuing on to Santa Cruz, Acha changed his travel
plans to fly directly to Santa Cruz. As of January, Acha
told PolOff he had not heard of any subsequent plans to
arrest him and had continued his work with HRF-B. He said he
was "keeping a low profile, but not hiding either."


13. (S) Comment: Although Acha's arrest warrant could be
aimed at Acha's legitimate right to investigate GOB's
culpability in September Pando violence, it seems a more
likely match with the GOB's current charges against him
associated with the alleged Santa Cruz terror cell. In any
event, we do not yet know the degree of his association with
the group and, as such, should not presume the GOB's case
against Acha is as "political" as he would have us believe.
It is unknown what details the Bolivian authorities have
concerning Acha's trip or the nature of the course. The
current Bolivian Administration is already highly suspicious
about USG training and has banned official participation in
USG courses dealing with military doctrine and intelligence,
and all WHINSEC (Western Hemisphere Institute for Security
and Cooperation) courses. It is reasonable to assume they
would misrepresent the course as "terrorist" training for
someone they consider to be at minimum an active
anti-government extremist, particularly if they see
election-year political gain in entangling the "empire" in
their new campaign against terrorism. End Comment.

Conspiracy Theory 2 (Already in Progress):
Linking Us to Groups Linked with "Cell"
--------------


14. (C) The GOB suspects several Bolivian organizations,
including the Bolivian Institute for Foreign Trade (IBCE),of
funding the alleged Santa Cruz terror cell. The Morales
Administration has argued since August 2007 that the USG is
"funding the opposition in the name of democracy" through
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
programs (ref A). During a May 21 session of high-level
bilateral talks in La Paz, Bolivian UN Charge Pablo Solon and
Presidency Minister Juan Ramon Quintana charged that the USG
is financing opposition groups in Santa Cruz linked to the
alleged terror cell. Solon specifically mentioned USAID
funding of IBCE. USAID provided 330,000 USD to IBCE via the
Bolivian Trade and Business Competitiveness II program (BTBC
2) and 80,000 USD via the Andean Regional Program, totaling
410,000 USD, over the last four years. The programs' main
objectives were to promote Bolivian trade abroad, attract
foreign investment, and promote economic growth through trade
agreements. USAID funding for these two programs will end by
August 2009.


15. (S) Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera opined May 22,
one day after the delegation departed, that it was "simple
Aristotelian logic" that the USG was "directly or indirectly
the external state structure aiding subversives, separatists,
terrorists that were discovered" in Santa Cruz. He
postulated that even innocuous USG support of ostensibly
opposition-aligned trade and industry groups supported the
terror cell by freeing up funds from these organizations that
the groups could use to finance the cell's nefarious
activities. Other groups targeted by the government include
the Chamber of Industry, Commerce and Tourism (Cainco),
Chamber of Eastern Livestock and Agriculture (CAO),and the
Santa Cruz Federation of Ranchers (Fegasacruz),all of which
include members that are also Post contacts.

Conspiracy Theory 3: Guilt by Geographic Association
-------------- --------------


16. (C) Prosectuor Sosa released portions of 17 e-mails
translated into Spanish allegedly taken from cell ringleader
Eduardo Rozsa's laptop comupter June 5. One of the Rozsa's
alleged e-mail threats (originally in Hungarian) with a
Washington-based contact named "Istvan" discusses a potential
trip to Washington, D.C. Istvan proposed three different
possible meeting locations: "a principal headquarters of the
fraternity," a house near the city, or "one of the hotels."
Rozsa alledegly replies that he "leaves the deinition of the
meeting place to whatever those in the American capital
prefer." The e-mails supposedly date from before November

2008. There is no indication so far whether the meeting
actually took place. Although the GOB has made no direct
assertion that the USG is ipso facto involved with the group
based on plans for its leader to meet a contact in
Washington, it suggests a possible role with headlines from
the government daily Cambio: "Separatism finalized its plans
in Washington" and "Separatism had contacts in Washington."


17. (U) Rozsa also allegedly told "Istvan" that "we have
organized the armed forces" of Santa Cruz and that "the
objective is to have 1,000 trained people and 2,500 civilian
reserves." In the e-mails, Rozsa refers to an "agency" that
could provide assistance for the formation of a Santa
Cruz-based militia. In a separate released e-mail to a
supposed Slovak named Ivan Pistovcak, Rozsa reveals the names
of the Santa Cruz leaders, or "the uncles," he asserts helped
support and lead the group: Ruben Costas (Governor),Branko
Marinkovic (ex-President of the Civic Committee),Eduardo Paz
(President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry),Mauricio
Roca (President of the Chamber of Agriculture and Ranching),
and German Antelo (ex-President of the Civic Committee). All
but Marinkovic publicly denied links to the group after the
e-mails were released. GOB named suspect Alejandro Melgar
(reportedly seeking refuge outside of Bolivia) is alleged to
have bought a November 17 to December 22 plan ticket for
Pistovcak. Media reports also focuses on Rozsa's
identification of pro-government areas in Santa Cruz
Department (state),referring to them as "communist centers."
(Note: The areas identified are all well-known
pro-government strongholds. Some media reported Istvan and
Pistovcak as separate individuals, others reported that
Istvan was a pseudonym for Pistovcak. End Note.)

Comment
--------------


18. (C) These conspiracy theories seem far-fetched and
baseless. But the charges against us and our officers in the
past have been at least as flimsy as the scenarios presented
above. Perhaps the new bilateral talks and President Obama's
reassurance in April at the Summit of the Americas that we
are not trying to undermine Morales' government will keep the
GOB from linking us to the Santa Cruz terrorism. However,
neither development seems to have changed the government's
visceral anti-U.S. tone and, according a ruling MAS party
contact, no GOB request was made to the MAS caucus to do so.
Although admittedly speculative, if past is prologue we
cannot discount these possibilities and, in any event, should
be prepared should they emerge. End Comment.
URS