Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09LAPAZ640
2009-04-30 18:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

CN DEMARCHE: OBAMA OPTIMISM AMIDST CN NEGATIVITY

Tags:  SNAR PGOV PREL PTER EAID KJUS KCRM BL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHLP #0640/01 1201811
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301811Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0650
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8971
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6353
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0327
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7536
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
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RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1772
RUEAIIB/CNC LINEAR WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/NAT DRUG INTEL CTR JOHNSTOWN PA
RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0057
C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000640 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR INL, INL/LP M STEINHELFER
STATE FOR WHA/PPC, WHA/AND
LAC/SA FOR USAID
JUSTICE FOR OIA, AFMLS AND NDDS
CUSTOMS FOR LA OPS, INTELLIGENCE
DEA FOR OEL (PIZARRO)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2019
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PREL PTER EAID KJUS KCRM BL
SUBJECT: CN DEMARCHE: OBAMA OPTIMISM AMIDST CN NEGATIVITY

REF: STATE 36156

Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000640

SIPDIS

STATE FOR INL, INL/LP M STEINHELFER
STATE FOR WHA/PPC, WHA/AND
LAC/SA FOR USAID
JUSTICE FOR OIA, AFMLS AND NDDS
CUSTOMS FOR LA OPS, INTELLIGENCE
DEA FOR OEL (PIZARRO)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2019
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PREL PTER EAID KJUS KCRM BL
SUBJECT: CN DEMARCHE: OBAMA OPTIMISM AMIDST CN NEGATIVITY

REF: STATE 36156

Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Charge delivered the annual certification
counternarcotics (CN) demarche to Vice Minister of Foreign
Affairs Hugo Fernandez on April 28, 2009. Post highlighted
that the legal cultivation of coca needs to be regulated, no
concessions should be made to coca producers in the Chapare
or Yungas areas, groups producing derivatives of cocaine and
precursor chemicals should be intercepted, and work with
international organizations on alternative development should
continue. The GOB responded that these items were the same
as the previous year, noting that the USG's "disappointing"
and "non-transparent" certification process remains the same.
Vice Foreign Minister Hugo Fernandez expressed optimism for
discussing CN and other key bilateral issues at a high-level
meeting tentatively slated for the end of May. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Charge explained he hoped to discuss two items: the CN
demarche and the GOB's expectations for a prospective
high-level meeting discussed by Foreign Minister David
Choquehuanca and Secretary of State Clinton. The Charge
emphasized that the annual counter-narcotics demarche is a
U.S. congressional requirement to evaluate countries on the
Majors List with a high volume of narcotic production and
transit. The Charge added that this notification is to
ensure that certain CN initiatives are progressing.

Identifying Targets to Improve Cooperation
--------------


3. (C) The Charge said that though eradication started at the
end of February this year, the results are showing that 22
hectares are being eradicated a day in the Chapare and about
2 hectares in both the Yungas and Yapacani. To show
significant results, the GOB must eradicate more than 5,000
hectares annually, and preferably exceed their 2007 result of

about 6,300 hectares. Charge underscored that Washington
decision makers would be looking for measurable progress in
CN efforts when making certification decisions. Charge said
the Bolivians could show CN progress by:

--increasing eradication to keep up with increased coca
plantings in both the Chapare and the Yungas;

--rejecting further concessions to coca producers;

--providing options to develop intelligence gathering in the
area of interdiction, to include the possible return of Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) in some form;

--intercepting groups that produce derivatives of cocaine and
precursor chemicals;

--continuing alternative development programs with
international assistance, to include international agencies,
voluntary organizations, and other social associations.

--augmenting its financial investigative unit with more
personnel and resources

--instituting laws against terrorist financing, money
laundering, and corruption.

Options to Improve CN Intel
--------------


4. (C) The Charge emphasized the need for the GOB to develop
intelligence gathering mechanisms regarding interdiction to
dismantle priority target organizations (PTOs). With the
expulsion of DEA and its intelligence gathering capability,
the Charge explained the ability to combat these PTOs has
been significantly reduced. The Charge suggested the GOB
consider mechanisms to develop narcotics-related intelligence
with international counterparts, possibly including the
return of DEA. Charge urged the GOB to be creative.


5. (C) On the subject of a future DEA role in Bolivian CN
efforts, Fernandez contested that the Bolivians could get
sufficient intelligence information from Brazil, adding "the
DEA does not work alone." He bluntly said it was "not
realistic to think the DEA will return," presumably in any
capacity. Fernandez agreed that a mechanism for consultation
with other countries is necessary and that they will focus on
introducing options.

GOB Tired of "Broken Record" CN Relationship
--------------


6. (C) Vice Minister Hugo Fernandez noted that the demarche
seemed to show no great change from last year, characterizing
our CN strategy in Bolivia as "a broken record." He stated
that the Europeans want to provide CN resources and expressed
a desire to take "fresh look" at CN cooperation, but that
working relations with other countries still needed to be
further evaluated and defined. Fernandez stated that he
hoped our demarche would present a new or revamped
decertification/certification process or other "fresh
approach" to CN cooperation, without elaborating on what
changes he had hoped for. He criticized the certification
process as rigid and non-transparent, in comparison with the
ostensibly more flexible European approach. To illustrate
his point that the bilateral CN relationship is overly
paternalistic with Bolivia in a subordinate role, Fernandez
used the example of use of NAS supported helicopters used for
CN efforts, arguing that it is unreasonable for the Bolivians
to require USG permission to use them. (Note: This comment
likely stems from President Morales' complaint that he was
denied NAS helicopter use in early 2007 to visit flood
ravaged Eastern Bolivia, which was beyond the agreed-upon CN
and humanitarian use of the helicopters. End Note.)
Fernandez tersely suggested the United States do a
"certification on itself," emphasizing the role of U.S.
narcotic use in narcotics trafficking.
Population Driving Leaf Increases; Cocaleros "In Charge"
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Fernandez explained "we understand that the legal
demand for coca is growing because the population is growing,
and (the demand for licit) coca as a result has increased."
He added that the subject of coca leaf production "belongs to
the cocaleros," and that any CN policy needed their approval.
Fernandez suggested we must "accept this country the way it
is." Looking forward to a renegotiation of the Letter of
Agreement for CN assistance, Fernandez suggested CN
assistance not be coupled to coca leaf increases, but instead
other (unidentified) factors and "shared objectives."
Fernandez stated a new agreement must be renegotiated to
continue working together. Charge explained that Washington
is reviewing a draft revised version and we should hear
something within a week.

Obama Optimism and Hope for DC Talks in May
--------------


8. (C) Gustavo Guzman, Special Advisor to Foreign Minister
David Choquehuanca and former Ambassador to the United
States, said the GOB is optimistic about working with
President Obama and eager to discuss CN cooperation at a
high-level meeting agreed upon by FM Choquehuanca and
Secretary Clinton at the Summit of the Americas. Charge
responded that our demarche should be the beginning of a
conversation between the two governments and that we looked
forward to hearing the GOB's concerns and ideas. The Charge
explained in detail the transparency of certification
process, but cautioned that Bolivia and United States would
need to work together for tangible CN results to justify
changing certification or ATPDEA status to Washington
decision makers.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) The responses from the GOB were expected, especially
on certification and the need to renegotiate the letter of
agreement. Fernandez accurately identified the reality of
the CN situation in Bolivia: CN policy in Bolivia is hostage
to the cocalero agenda. Unlike last year's demarche, there
were no clear goals or objectives relayed during this
meeting. We anticipate that the GOB may not provide an
immediate response to the demarche, instead waiting to
address CN issues more substantively at a possible high-level
bilateral meeting. END COMMENT.
URS