BOLIVIA SCENESETTER FOR FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER

UNCLAS LA PAZ 000631

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

LIMA: FOR D. SHORTS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA SCENESETTER FOR FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER
VISIT


1. Embassy La Paz offers a warm welcome to Former President
Carter and accompanying team to Bolivia April 30-May 3. The
information in this cable on U.S. government engagement in
Bolivia is designed to complement the background paper
provided by the Department of State, which summarized
political and economic developments. Bolivia is an
increasingly polarized country, both geographically and
politically. A new constitution supported by President Evo
Morales and his Movement Towards Socialism party was voted on
and approved by the Bolivian people January 25, 2009. The
opposition continues to oppose parts of Morales, agenda and
push for increased regional autonomy. The disagreements have
caused occasional violent conflicts, leading to deaths on
both sides. President Morales and national representatives
will face re-election December 6, 2009.

THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP


2. President Morales, anti-U.S. rhetoric and actions reflect
a concerted effort to misconstrue U.S. government objectives
and activities in Bolivia. Despite efforts to engage with
Morales on areas of mutual interest, he has gradually
distanced Bolivia from the United States and dismantled
cooperation programs, much to the detriment of our mutual
goals to alleviate poverty, combat illegal narcotics, and
facilitate social/political inclusiveness for Bolivia,s
marginalized populations.


3. The Embassy always aims to engage the Bolivian government
and be responsive to its questions and concerns, particularly
concerning our development programs, counternarcotics
cooperation, and military-to-military relations. Despite this
outreach, the Embassy and the United States government are
constantly targeted for a wide range of baseless public
accusations by the Bolivian government. Relations have been
at a nadir since last summer. Since then the Morales
Administration expelled Ambassador Goldberg in mid-September
2008 and the Drug Enforcement Agency November 1, 2008 and
expelled USAID from a coca-growing region known as &the
Chapare8 in June of 2008.


4. After the election of President Obama, Morales made a
number of public statements expressing his desire to improve
relations with the United States. However, his inflammatory
rhetoric against the United States has continued. President
Morales continues to mischaracterize U.S. government
intentions, making frequent comments about holdover Bush
appointees that continue to &plot8 against Morales,
government. The bilateral relationship remains strained,
although there is a new hope for diplomatic breakthroughs
following brief presidential and Secretary of State exchanges
with the Bolivians at the Summit of the Americas April 17-19.
Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister David
Choquehuanca discussed convening a high-level meeting
sometime in the next several months to move forward on a
bilateral agenda.

USG FINANCIAL SUPPORT


5. Since FY05, the United States Government has provided
nearly $700 million dollars to Bolivia in development and
counter-narcotics assistance, though assistance has been
gradually declining consistent with budget restrictions in
Washington. Total assistance in FY07 was approximately $124
million and in FY08 $103 million.


6. Morales, administration has made several changes to
development and cooperation procedures that have made it
difficult for USG agencies to cooperate while adhering to
their own congressional obligations. Despite our best
efforts, including a month long audit by the GOB of our USAID
program, the Bolivian government continues to suspect and

accuse our assistance programs of bolstering the opposition
and undermining the Morales administration.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS


7. The United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) provided approximately $69 million in FY08 to support
Bolivia,s National Development Plan. Programs cover child
survival and health, alternative development, expansion of
financial services to under-served areas, improved
agricultural technology and market access, support for small
and medium enterprises, sustainable management of tropical
forests, biodiversity, food security, decentralization,
improved civil society participation in democratic processes,
leadership training, and increased justice services for the
poor.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PROGRAMS


8. Our Public Affairs section provided over $1 million in
FY08 programs to support English scholarships, an Embassy
intern program targeting indigenous students, Fulbright and
International Visitors, and an educational program for
Indigenous Youth Leaders to visit the United States.

COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION


9. Bilateral cooperation deteriorated significantly in 2008
with the expulsions of USAID from the Chapare in June, the
U.S. Ambassador in September, and the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) in November. Despite these setbacks,
the U.S. remains committed to working with Government of
Bolivia in the fight against drugs. Our counternarcotics
program seeks to reduce coca cultivation, to provide
logistical support for interdiction activities, fight money
laundering, and increase awareness about the effects of drug
use in Bolivian society.


10. The U.S. government contributed approximately $56 million
toward Bolivia,s counter-narcotics efforts in FY 07,
implemented by the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) and USAID:
eradication $4.2 million; interdiction $13.8 million, demand
reduction $172,000; program support $3.8 million; alternative
development $18.6 million. NAS recently agreed to $26.3
million in CN assistance for FY 2008.


11. The U.S. Military Group also provided $500,000 for
Bolivia,s counter-narcotics efforts in FY09. The MILGP
trained 62 students in FY08 and still have 42 students
programmed for training in FY09.


ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCES AND DRUG ERADICATION ACT (ATPDEA)


12. After several years of being narrowly certified on
counternarcotics cooperation and warned about needed areas to
improve, Bolivia was decertified in 2008. This
decertification led to a suspension of their trade benefits
under the Andean Trade Preferences and Drug Eradication Act
(ATPDEA) by President Bush. The U.S. Congress voted to keep
Bolivia in the program through June 2009, but only if
President Obama re-certifies Bolivia on counter-narcotics
cooperation by that time.

MILITARY-MILITARY COORDINATION & HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE


13. The four pillars of the USMILGP Country Security
Cooperation Plan (CSCP) are Peacekeeping Operations (PKO),
Humanitarian Assistance (HAP),Counter-Narco Terrorism (CNT),
and Transformation & Modernization, in that order of
priority. The primary objective is to reinforce
institutional values and respect for democratic principles

within the Bolivian Military under the four pillars of
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO),Humanitarian Assistance (HAP),
Counter-Narco Terrorism (CNT),and Transformation &
Modernization.


14. Due to new Bolivian government restrictions and attacks
against the U.S. government, SOUTHCOM directed that only
Humanitarian Assistance Projects (HAP) that had been started
would be completed and new projects should not be started.
Originally MILGP planned to complete 13 humanitarian
assistance projects in FY08 valued at a total of $3M, but
instead ultimately only four projects were funded valued at
$1.5M. Humanitarian Assistance has been canceled for FY09
and FY2010. MILGP had historically worked well with the
Bolivian government to provide funding for renovating
schools, providing disaster relief services, medical
assistance, and much more, benefitting the poorest of
Bolivians.


PEACE CORPS


15. The U.S. Peace Corps program in Bolivia was temporarily
suspended in September 2008 after several accusations were
made against it by the Morales administration. Top Morales
advisor, Minister of the Presidency Juan Quintana, publicly
accused the organization of being infiltrated by United
States intelligence agents. Following that accusation, the
USG determined it could not guarantee the safety of its Peace
Corps volunteers and removed all volunteers from the country.
The Bolivian government would need to publicly acknowledge
that the Peace Corps program is not used for intelligence
purposes before volunteers could return to Bolivia.
URS