BOLIVIA: WHO CAN CHALLENGE MORALES? (PT 1)

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000436

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PINR ENVR BL ECON
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: WHO CAN CHALLENGE MORALES? (PT 1)

Classified By: CDA Chris Lambert for reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: Although presidential elections will not
occur until December 6, at least ten members of the
opposition are being mentioned as potential candidates. This
is the first in a series of cables that will review the
possibilities for each. Part One will focus on the three
leading candidates: former Vice President Victor Hugo
Cardenas, Potosi Mayor Rene Joaquino, and entrepreneur Samuel
Doria Medina. All of the candidates have significant
electoral drawbacks. End summary.

- - - - - - - - - -
Victor Hugo Cardenas
- - - - - - - - - -


2. (C) Former Vice President Victor Hugo Cardenas is running
as the "unity" candidate, arguing he is the only person who
can bring together the east and the west of the country. In
his appearances, he regularly skewers President Morales and
his ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party, rejecting
the new constitution and criticizing the "MAS revolution" as
divisive and demagogic. Cardenas bases his support on his
high level of name recognition, ostensibly high levels of
support in Santa Cruz, his pledge to unite all Bolivians as
equals, and his ability to speak Aymara and Quechua fluently
and Guarani passably well. Cardenas campaign insiders tell
us they have devised a plan based on focus groups and advice
from polling guru Stanley Greenberg to launch extensive radio
campaigns in all three languages and openly challenge Morales
to debate Cardenas in either Aymara or Quechua. Since
Morales speaks only Spanish, Cardenas' team believes they can
expose Morales as a "fake indigenous," and then pile on with
charges of corruption, economic mismanagement, and divisive
rhetoric. Cardenas and his backers cite private polls
showing Morales' support softening to as low as 35 percent in
the main cities, with Cardenas the leading challenger at up
to twenty percent nationally and 27 percent in the capital
cities (and "surging").


3. (C) Outside of Cardenas' inside circle, the news is quite
different. Cardenas' opponents regularly cite his reputation
as a "Gonista" who betrayed his Lake Titicaca roots and sold
the country's patrimony to the lowest bidder. Although
Cardenas served as vice president only once, in Sanchez de
Lozada's first term, he is often incorrectly associated with
Sanchez de Lozada's role in the Gas Wars and his
poorly-remembered capitalization programs. The recent
takeover of Cardenas' property by his own community, whether
instigated by MAS agitators or others, has only underlined
the message of Cardenas as a "traitor to his people." A
recent Ipsos poll contained a very different message from
Cardenas' numbers, showing any number of other potential
candidates with higher levels of popularity and name
recognition.


4. (C) Comment: While reliable polling numbers are hard to
come by and privately-commissioned polls sometimes suspect,
Cardenas' campaign insiders are privately high on his
prospects. They dismiss Bolivian polls, and stress the
Greenberg-led poll-based strategy they are developing. In a
meeting with Charge, Cardenas unsurprisingly laughed off the
idea that he is in any way a "traitor" to his community, and
his team members have said they are ready to take this charge
head-on in a blitz of public appearances and radio campaigns.
Cardenas told Charge how his father changed his surname from
Choquehuanca (same as Foreign Minister and cousin David
Choquehuanca) when he was a boy in order to avoid racism in
the schooling system. He previewed other messages stressing
his indigenous bona fides as well. Last, Cardenas, like
other candidates, stresses the need to have a "united front"
against Morales, so as not to fracture the opposition vote,
but he believes this process will happen naturally once
polling numbers settle and Santa Cruz leaders commit to one
candidate. In meetings with Santa Cruz business and
political leaders, Embassy officers have heard Cardenas
merits serious consideration. A source from Cardenas' team
tells us this financial commitment could come as early as
April. End comment.

- - - - - - -
Rene Joaquino
- - - - - - -


5. (C) Potosi Mayor Rene Joaquino styles himself as the only
"new" leader in the race, and as a moderate-left indigenous
alternative to Morales. Joaquino is the leader of the Social
Alliance (AS) party that has regional prominence in the
Potosi department. He is advised by Filemon Escobar, one of
the founders of the MAS party, who later split with Morales
over charges the MAS had betrayed its indigenous beginnings
in favor of a Cuban-style classist revolution. Escobar and
Joaquino are now pushing a "softer" version of the original
indigenous-centric MAS agenda, which valorizes indigenous
ideology as the basis of Bolivian identity but is careful to
stress overall unity as well. In a February 19 meeting with
Charge, Joaquino predicted a dramatically worsening economy
and corruption were two issues that would sink the MAS, as
campesinos come to understand that Morales does not really
offer change, only "more of the same." As an example, he
cited Potosi's famous "Cerro Rico" mine, where he said up to
60,000 people used to be employed and now only 10,000 have
work. He also noted that Morales' recent cabinet "shake up"
resulted in little indigenous representation and said
campesinos everywhere were beginning to see Morales was not
"their representative." He placed great stock in the recent
Santos Ramirez corruption scandal, and said awareness of
corruption would make it harder for the MAS to continue its
"control" of the campo through graft and pressure tactics.
Joaquino said he has "done things the right way, unlike
Santos Ramirez," and said he has long been known for his
stand against corruption.


6. (C) In his meeting with Charge, Joaquino was quick to
address his perceived shortcomings. Joaquino admitted his
party was low on funding and still perceived only as a
regional player, but said it was rapidly gaining national
recognition due to its "moral authority." He said he
surprised everyone in 1993 when he won the Potosi mayor race
with hardly a peso to his name, and said one should not
underestimate the desire for change and new leadership in the
country. Joaquino noted anecdotally that wherever he went,
people "came out to meet" him and "were excited to see" the
AS party flag. Last, he said he did not need to win La Paz
department; he needs only to lower the MAS percentage from 80
percent to 60 or 70 percent and do well in the rest of the
country. "I like to fight," he promised.


7. (C) Comment: Despite his promise to 'shock the world' in
December, Joaquino faces an uphill battle. When his AS party
participated in the 2008 Chuquisaca prefect race, they
garnered only four percent of the vote, which most pundits
viewed as confirmation of his party's limited stature outside
Potosi state. Against the MAS, any candidate will need a
large war chest of funding, and Joaquino does not appear to
have this kind of financial backing. Still, contacts
generally agree with his analysis that the country is looking
for new leadership. Joaquino may be accurate in his judgment
that the only way to win is to field an indigenous-led,
centrist party that can take away some MAS support while
bringing along the rest of the country, but the AS party has
not impressed at a national level. In addition, Joaquino,
while indigenous, has little popularity in El Alto and much
of La Paz because of his support to move the capital to
Sucre. Last, his partnership with Escobar will drive away
eastern voters, especially in Santa Cruz, where Escobar is
widely and distastefully remembered as engineering Morales'
rise to power. End comment.

- - - - - - - - - -
Samuel Doria Medina
- - - - - - - - - -


8. (C) In a March 10 meeting with Charge, Samuel Doria
Medina, head of the moderate UN party and so-called "richest
man in Bolivia," said he was the only candidate with a
national-level operation and that his economic reputation
would be the difference in the race. "Today," he said, "the
economy and national unity are the two issues. Because of
this, we have an interesting advantage." Doria Medina
rattled off several reasons for a coming economic crash and
centered on the importance of "confidence" in both politics
and economics. He discussed a number of ways the Bolivian
economy could falter, ranging from a drop in natural gas
demand to government cash-flow problems that could lead to
difficulty in maintaining popular "bono" or entitlement
payments. Economically, he said, Morales was not taking note
of how the global economic crisis was hurting El Alto.
Saying "Altenos are pragmatic people," he foresaw a potential
political crisis of confidence that could lead to a "chain
reaction" against Morales. Doria Medina noted his prior
presidential run and how his UN party was "five years in the
making." He also cited polling showing sixty percent of the
country to be either disaffected or non-aligned, and argued
these voters were up for the taking.


9. (C) Regarding Cardenas, Doria Medina's staffers said he
did not know to what degree the MAS controlled the community
takeover of his property, but that any benefit that accrued
to Cardenas from this action was fine with the MAS. He said
the MAS was ready to portray Cardenas as "the traitor Indian,
or the permitted Indian" and Morales as "the savior Indian,
or the rebel Indian" (i.e. against the hegemonic U.S.).
Doria Medina said Cardenas would be the MAS' preferred
opponent, and as such would be a grave mistake. He echoed
Cardenas when he said financial commitments would make the
difference in deciding which candidates stayed and which
dropped out of the race. Exuding confidence, Doria Medina
said his Santa Cruz financial contacts were "very
straightforward" and that they would make a commitment
collectively in August. After this, he said, it would be a
much smaller "race to the finish."


10. (C) Comment: While Doria Medina cites his economic
reputation and his party's organizational capabilities,
others discuss his low polling numbers and an apparent lack
of charisma. Cardenas laughingly called Doria Medina "a
leader of cement," referring more to his notorious lack of
charisma than his successful cement business. Virtually all
of our sources agree that Doria Medina would be well-suited
as finance minister, but no one has suggested he could win
the presidency. In addition, the UN party is not united;
party number two Peter Maldonado has had a significant
falling out with the party chief, and he has told us Doria
Medina has "alienated" almost half of the party leadership.
When told Doria Medina said Santa Cruz financial backers
would make a decision in August, Cardenas' campaign advisor
laughed and told Poloff, "Yes, that's what they told him, but
really they'll make their decision in April, and not for
him." Last, Doria Medina is not indigenous and cannot
compete with Cardenas and Joaquino in this regard. End
comment.

- - - - - - - -
The Bottom Line
- - - - - - - -


11. (C) Comment: In meetings with Charge, each of the three
discussed their winning formula and the failures of the other
two. Unfortunately, while some of their claims may be
inflated, their criticisms of their rivals were generally on
the mark. Cardenas is seen as the darling of the eastern
states, but despite his aggressive campaign plans, common
wisdom holds him to be "Goni's servant" or at least part of
the past. Joaquino is widely appreciated as a good mayor,
but lacks national recognition. Many consider him a
potential candidate for 2015. Doria Medina, while respected
for his economic acumen, may be presiding over a crumbling
party and an inflated sense of national support. Of the
three, only Cardenas seems to have at least the makings of a
plan to combat his perceived disadvantages, while Joaquino
and Doria Medina have yet to advance beyond rhetoric. End
comment.
LAMBERT