Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09LAPAZ303
2009-02-26 22:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

FOREIGN MINISTER ON CIA, ERADICATION, HUMAN RIGHTS

Tags:  PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR ENVR ASEC BL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000303 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR ENVR ASEC BL
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ON CIA, ERADICATION, HUMAN RIGHTS

REF: A. LA PAZ 294

B. LA PAZ 176

Classified By: CDA Krishna Urs for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000303

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR ENVR ASEC BL
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ON CIA, ERADICATION, HUMAN RIGHTS

REF: A. LA PAZ 294

B. LA PAZ 176

Classified By: CDA Krishna Urs for reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: Charge d'Affaires Kris Urs met with Foreign
Minister David Choquehuanca February 26 to refute President
Evo Morales' accusations of CIA presence in state oil company
YPFB, discuss joint counternarcotics eradication efforts, and
review the newly-released human rights report. Choquehuanca
agreed to share Charge's rejection of a CIA presence at YPFB
with Morales and the cabinet, but said he could not
contradict Morales and noted "if it were true, you couldn't
admit it (having spies)." Choquehuanca seemed confused on
details of the updated eradication agreement and emphasized
the government would not wait for USG participation to begin
eradication efforts. Saying the government had decided to
seek improved relations, he broached the idea of wide-ranging
discussions on all aspects of US assistance, but requested
that some aid be funneled through the "Evo Cumple" program.
Choquehuanca pledged that the government would not overreact
to the human rights report, but heavy government criticism
followed immediately. Although pleasant, Choquehuanca seems
unable to affect Morales' behavior where it counts for the
bilateral relationship. End summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CIA Accusations Harming Relations
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (C) Charge opened the meeting by explaining the Department
had requested he meet with the Foreign Minister to discuss
President Morales' accusations of CIA involvement in state
oil company Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos
(YPFB),the status of eradication efforts, and the annual
human rights report. Charge said Assistant Secretary Thomas
Shannon would discuss the same issues in the near future with
Ambassador Pablo Solon.


3. (C) Charge recalled that the Foreign Minister and
President Morales had sent letters to Secretary Clinton and
President Obama, respectively, expressing their government's
desire for better relations. Choquehuanca reported that in a

recent cabinet meeting there had been agreement that Bolivia
would seek better ties. Charge underlined that the USG also
desires better relations but said continued baseless
accusations -- such as Morales' statement that the CIA
infiltrated YPFB to trap former company President Santos
Ramirez and others into a corruption scandal (reftels) --
make such improvements very difficult. Charge emphasized
that a change in tone by the government was a necessary
precondition for improving ties. Noting the oft-mentioned
desire by the government to exchange Ambassadors again, he
said it would be difficult to assign a new Ambassador as long
as there was a likelihood the new Ambassador would be treated
as Ambassador Goldberg had been. (Note: Choquehuanca later
suggested the opposite -- that an exchange of Ambassadors
would be a necessary measure to avoid further harming
bilateral relations. End note.)


4. (C) Choquehuanca noted Charge's statement regarding the
precondition for improved ties, repeated it back, and said he
would pass it on to President Morales and the cabinet. He
responded to Charge's statement regarding the CIA by saying
somewhat inscrutably "Well, even if it were true, you
couldn't admit it." Charge again explained that the charge
was baseless and ridiculous. Choquehuanca signaled he was
not in a position to contradict Morales. He said if he was
asked publicly about the allegations he would simply repeat
that the USG cannot admit it has placed spies (in YPFB or
anywhere else). He did not give any assurances that such
attacks would stop.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Counternarcotics: USG "Unreliable Partner"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

5. (C) Charge reported good news regarding recent
counternarcotics negotiations. He recapitulated that since
the last meeting with the Foreign Minister, there had been
two technical meetings, which had led to an understanding
that the US would continue to pay all costs other than bonus
payments ("bonos"). Charge lauded the advances and raised
the possibility of signing either a new agreement or a face
sheet amendment to the existing letter of agreement.
Choquehuanca seemed confused, as though he had not been
briefed on the latest developments. Charge explained further
that the number of eradicators would rise to 1,600 by the end
of March and that we hoped to continue with our support,
pending Congressional approval. Choquehuanca then recalled
he had been told by Vice Minister Felipe Caceres that the USG
had indeed agreed to "join up," which he welcomed, but added
that the government was not going to wait for the USG's
support. He said the government was going to spend USD 20
million of their own funds because it has realized the USG
was an "unreliable partner," and that if they waited for the
USG they would not reach their goals.


6. (C) To illustrate his point on our unreliability,
Choquehuanca said the withholding of Millennium Challenge
funds had shown the government that even supposedly
apolitical programs were, in fact, political and that the
government could not count on USG support. He said these
kinds of actions contributed directly to the low state of
bilateral relations. Charge patiently explained that while
the Millennium Challenge program itself is a relatively
apolitical development program, its funds come from the U.S.
Congress and that it had been impossible to proceed given the
poor state of bilateral relations.


7. (C) Choquehuanca did respond positively to Charge's
suggestion of a new counternarcotics agreement, and built on
this to suggest a larger, overall agreement to regulate
bilateral relations. (Note: Choquehuanca seemed to be
referring to the seven-point agenda proposed by the Bolivian
government in July 2008. End note.) Choquehuanca proposed a
three-day set of meetings to reach a "framework agreement,"
the first day to share ideas, the second to work through
questions, with an agreement constructed by the third day.
He said key representatives with decision-making authority
would have to be present from both sides for each issue. He
offered that the Planning Ministry could lead the effort.


8. (C) Choquehuanca then added his hope that such
negotiations would include discussion of at least some aid
being funneled through the Venezuelan-supported "Evo Cumple"
program, saying the government was in similar negotiations
with the Government of Japan. Charge demurred, instead
referring to earlier efforts with the Planning Ministry to
make our aid more transparent. Choquehuanca agreed
transparency was a key point, and said he would discuss the
negotiations with new Minister of Planning Noel Aguirre.

- - - - - - - - - -
Human Rights Report
- - - - - - - - - -


9. (C) Charge also passed on a copy of the 2008 Human Rights
Report for Bolivia, explaining that the report is
congressionally mandated, that the USG prepares such a report
for over 170 countries, and that it is factual, balanced, and
based on multiple sources. He expressed his hope that the
report and the forthcoming International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (INCSR) would not constitute an additional
friction in our bilateral relationship.


10. (C) Choquehuanca said so long as the reports were
prepared professionally, and were as balanced and fair as
Charge maintained, the government would not react negatively.
He agreed such reports needed to be read in an overall
context, and not mined for prejudicial comments. (Note:
Immediately after the meeting ended, Charge received word
that Vice Ministers Sacha Llorenti and Wilfredo Chavez had
already held a press release to label the report "politically
motivated, poorly informed, immoral, unfair, inaccurate, and
full of lies," among other terms. End Note.)


11. (C) Choquehuanca suggested a better way to avoid negative
comments would be for the USG to submit a draft of the report
to the Foreign Ministry for review and suggestions. He noted
the UN had done this with their report, giving them about a
week to make suggestions. According to Choquehuanca, "They
do not have to take the suggestions, of course, but it makes
discussion possible."

- - - -
Comment
- - - -


12. (C) As usual, the meeting ended cordially, with
Choquehuanca showing off the large number of mosquito bites
he had received in the Yungas valley during his recent trip
for Carnaval. He expressed his hope that he had not
contracted dengue. Choquehuanca seems to dislike delivering
bad news and prefers his role as a friendly go-between.
However, by all appearances neither Choquehuanca nor other
moderate members of the cabinet are able to influence
Morales' decision-making. We have no reason to expect a
diminution in the level of Morales' rhetoric, despite
simultaneous (and confusing) calls for an improved bilateral
relationship. End comment.
URS