Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09LAPAZ194
2009-02-06 14:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

LOWER HOUSE PRESIDENT ENLISTS SELF AS BILAT ALLY

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR KDEM SNAR BL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000194 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM SNAR BL
SUBJECT: LOWER HOUSE PRESIDENT ENLISTS SELF AS BILAT ALLY

Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Brian Quigley for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000194

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM SNAR BL
SUBJECT: LOWER HOUSE PRESIDENT ENLISTS SELF AS BILAT ALLY

Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Brian Quigley for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) Summary: Lower House President Edmundo Novillo told
Charge' February 3 that, in order for bilateral relations to
move forward, both sides would need to identify common ground
and establish some "essential points" for engagement. He
added the United States would need to acknowledge the
historical U.S. "trauma" President Evo Morales suffers from
to improve relations, but that this need not include
accepting the "real or imagined" merits of Morales' phobias.
A close confidant of both Morales and Foreign Minister David
Choquehuanca, Novillo volunteered to facilitate a
reengagement. Novillo told us that although the government
strongly prefers to keep national elections scheduled for
December, it would not rule out closing congress, ruling by
decree, and calling for early elections if the "opposition
forces this" by blocking legislation required to convoke the
elections by the April 7 deadline. Novillo said congress
would leave most of the constitutional implementation
legislation to its replacement, the Plurinational Legislative
Assembly. End Summary.


2. (C) Charge' met with Chamber of Deputies (Lower House)
President Edmundo Novillo February 3. Charge' and Novillo
discussed the series of events that have led to the current
precarious state of bilateral affairs. Charge' emphasized
the continued U.S. disposition to improve relations, but
cautioned that this would be hard work for both sides and,
even with good faith and concrete gestures, the relationship
would not turn around abruptly.

Morales Identifies with Obama
--------------


3. (C) Novillo maintained that Morales has a "real affinity"
for President Obama and that his overtures for improving
relations "with Obama" were genuine, despite the fact that
such overtures were typically mixed in with insults and
accusations against the USG. Novillo said Morales considers
Obama's "black government" part of a global trend of newly
enfranchised populations coming into power, including
Morales' own government.

Morales Bilateral Psych 101
--------------



4. (C) Novillo conceded that President Evo Morales was
sending mixed signals about bilateral relations that could
confuse the Washington audience, but that this "double
discourse" was explainable. Novillo explained that most
left-leaning politicians in Latin America were afflicted with
an anti-U.S. "trauma" resulting from USG policies and
associations with Latin American governments during the 70s
and 80s. He said Morales is especially traumatized by his
perceptions of perceived unjust and undue USG involvement
with prior Bolivian administrations, which are compounded by
his personal negative experiences with the DEA as a coca
union leader. Novillo said this "trauma" taints Morales'
"perceptions of the present" and retards his ability to "move
forward."

Dr. Novillo to the Trauma Ward
--------------


5. (C) Novillo told Charge' he supported a strong
U.S.-Bolivian bilateral relationship and offered his services
to facilitate a meeting with Foreign Minister David
Choquehuanca, a "close friend." Novillo said in order to
move forward bilaterally, "we must first deal with the past,
which has left many of our leaders in a trauma." Novillo
stressed that regardless of whether perceived symptoms of USG
transgression in Latin America were real or imagined, the
psychological trauma was "very real." In order to overcome
this, he suggested any USG diplomatic initiative need not
admit to specific wrong doings, but be couched in terms of
"turning the page" and be delivered with a healthy public
dose of recognition of the "large influence" the USG has
played in prior administrations. Novillo implied that such
recognition would gain the United States enough good will to
overcome historical anti-USG "traumas" with Morales and other
leftist Latin American leaders.

Need to Identify Common Ground to Move Forward
-------------- -


6. (C) Novillo urged an expedited effort to improve
relations, arguing that leaving the relationship at a low
point for too long could reset long-term expectations and
stymie initiatives to improve relations. Novillo added that
moving forward bilaterally required "reflecting together on
how we came to this lack of confidence" and "understanding
what we need to do to start over." He suggested coming up
with a "reconciliation paper" that would outline a short list
of "essential points" needed to establish a starting point
for a relationship. He stressed such rules of engagement
might not result in "a great relationship, but at least the
basis of normal relationship," tacitly acknowledging the
current state of affairs is not "normal" or desirable.

DEA/USAID on the Table
--------------


7. (C) Somewhat surprisingly, Novillo opined that "filling
the vacuum" left by DEA could be discussed. He did not
dismiss the possibility of bringing back DEA agents under the
auspices of dual accreditation, TDYs, or as part of a
multi-national counternarcotics structure. Novillo did not
counter Charge' contention that USAID was and is fully
transparent, but discounted the importance of proving USAID's
past transparency. He instead emphasized including GOB
concerns and participation in future USAID decision making.

The MAS as Reasonable, Opposition as Obstreperous
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Novillo claimed he would attempt to work with "all the
powers of the state," including opposition legislators, to
implement the new constitution passed January 25. He
expressed a clear preference to pass constitutional
implementing legislation and modifications of the electoral
code needed to convoke new national elections in December via
regular and legally-established congressional processes.
However, Novillo also reserved the right to resort to other
means should the opposition-controlled senate fail to pass
legislation required to convoke December elections before
April 7, the deadline established by the constitution. "This
will depend greatly on what the opposition does: complement
the process, present obstacles, or block the process. I
understand that it cannot be easy for congressmen who
campaigned for the "no" (on the constitutional referendum) to
now take on the inconsistent role of helping to pass
implementing legislation."


9. (C) Novillo claimed that Morales tried to engage the
opposition leadership in January, particularly on the issue
of autonomies, but that opposition "oligarchs are more
concerned with maintaining power" than compromise. Novillo
contrasted the Bolivian opposition's temperament about
Morales, which "does not even acknowledge that he (Morales)
is the president," with the election of U.S. presidents, who
are generally accepted by members of both parties.

Novillo: Rule by Degree "Unlikely"
--------------


10. (C) Novillo explained that the opposition was not
monolithically radical and hoped that enough "rational"
opposition congressmen would "decide not to be
confrontational." As the "nucleus of democracy," he was
confident that election legislation should and could be
hammered out in congress. Although he doubted Morales would
have to resort to closing congress and ruling by decree to
initiate early elections, he did not rule it out as an option
if the opposition blocks "the necessary (constitutional)
process of re-legitimizing institutions" through new
elections. Novillo added a process of "reestablishing the
state" was "endorsed by the people" with the January 25
referendum vote. "How else will we be able to resolve this
impasse?"

Don't Fear the Constitution; Orderly Process to Ensue
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Novillo said most of constitutional implementing
issues would be worked out by the newly elected
"Plurinational Legislative Assembly," which will replace the
old "Congress." Novillo assured that in the interim,
"existing institutions and practices" would prevail. For
instance, he said ordinary justice would continue to be the
law of the land until implementing legislation defined the
exact jurisdictions and competencies of communitarian
justice, which is given equal standing to the traditional
justice system under the new constitution. Likewise, Novillo
explained old institutions and norms would continue to
function until new institutions could be established or
revamped to provide for new myriad constitutional guarantees
(health, education, employment, etc.).

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Novillo appeared thoughtful, frank, and genuine
throughout. Novillo will likely share our conversation with
Morales, which is probably a positive development. We are
hard pressed to think of another member of Morales' inner
circle who would convey our concerns more accurately or with
less malice. End Comment.
URS