Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09LAPAZ175
2009-02-02 20:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy La Paz
Cable title:  

BOLIVIA: PANDO REPORT CONCERNS; OHCHR RESPONSE

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PINR BL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #0175/01 0332038
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 022038Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9906
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8773
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6150
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0113
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7334
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4379
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0357
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4714
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6116
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6998
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1762
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1652
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000175 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IO/RHS AMY OSTERMEIER AND GAYATRI PATEL, DRL/MLGA
CHRIS SIBILLA, IO/PSC DEBORAH ODELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PINR BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: PANDO REPORT CONCERNS; OHCHR RESPONSE
CABLE

REF: A. 08 LAPAZ 2178

B. 08 LAPAZ 2374

C. 08 LAPAZ 2483

D. 08 LAPAZ 2543

E. SECSTATE 02023

F. LAPAZ 38

Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Brian Quigley for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000175

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IO/RHS AMY OSTERMEIER AND GAYATRI PATEL, DRL/MLGA
CHRIS SIBILLA, IO/PSC DEBORAH ODELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PINR BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: PANDO REPORT CONCERNS; OHCHR RESPONSE
CABLE

REF: A. 08 LAPAZ 2178

B. 08 LAPAZ 2374

C. 08 LAPAZ 2483

D. 08 LAPAZ 2543

E. SECSTATE 02023

F. LAPAZ 38

Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Brian Quigley for reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: PolOff met with Denis Racicot,
representative in Bolivia for the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) January 26, to assess OHCHR activities
as per request (Reftel E). Relations between the OHCHR and
both the government and civil society actors appear to be
generally quite good. Post sees potential for collaboration
between the USG and the OHCHR in Bolivia. However, Post is
concerned OHCHR is not sufficiently investigating (Reftel F)
potential violations of human rights that occurred during and
after the September 2008 conflict in Pando department
(state),in which an estimated 13 to 17 people died (Reftels
A - D). Contradicting a January 13 meeting with Charge, in
which UN Chief of Mission Yoriko Yasukawa stressed there was
a need for a "deeper investigation" into the events in Pando,
Mr. Racicot told PolOff the report would not be a "true
investigation" and would rely on government information for
its analysis. We are concerned the local OHCHR office is
too afraid to lose government access to do its job properly.
End summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
OHCHR Background in Bolivia
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (SBU) The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) and the Bolivian government signed a
cooperation agreement to establish OHCHR presence in Bolivia
in early 2007, which was ratified by the Bolivian congress on
July 13, 2007. Initially, the OHCHR was led by an interim
representative, who was only recently replaced by
Representative in Bolivia Denis Racicot on November 20, 2008.
Racicot comes with several years of experience, primarily in
Haiti, where he focused on judicial reform issues. The
office maintains a staff of five people.

- - - - - - - -
OHCHR Activities

- - - - - - - -


3. (SBU) As part of its mandate, the OHCHR monitors the state
of human rights in Bolivia and tracks government adherence to
UN recommendations and decisions. It also assists the
government in developing education programs to promote human
rights. The office works with the government's executive
branch, the National Police, and the country's armed forces
to deliver basic training on respecting human rights. It
also helps educate members of the judicial branch and other
public ministries on legal issues related to human rights.
When necessary, the OHCHR investigates specific cases of
human rights abuses, and it informs relevant authorities
about abuses or violations of human rights with an eye toward
adopting preventive or corrective legislation.


4. (SBU) The OHCHR works in a similar capacity with a range
of civil society groups, including NGOs and human rights
lawyers, offering courses on human rights and advice on how
to utilize national and international mechanisms of
protection. Over the past year, the office worked with human
rights-related groups such as the government's ombudsman's
office, the Catholic church, and several NGOs to plan a major
campaign to promote peace in Bolivia.

- - - - - - - - - -

OHCHR Relationships
- - - - - - - - - -


5. (C) In a January 26, Racicot told PolOff that the
situation with respect to human rights in Bolivia was "quite
tranquil," especially in comparison with his experiences in
other countries. He said that the OHCHR was present at the
invitation of the government and characterized their
relationship as "cordial" and "normal." He noted the
government had not blocked any office activity. In terms of
the office's relationship within the larger UN field
presence, contacts within the OHCHR indicate relations are
good.

- - - - - - - - - - -
USG Support for OHCHR
- - - - - - - - - - -


6. (SBU) In general, the OHCHR has good relationships with
the Bolivian government and civil society actors. The USG
could leverage these relationships by cooperating on public
diplomacy events, such as appropriately-themed film
festivals, photography exhibitions, discussion fora, and/or
lecture series. USAID could also benefit from coordinating
with the OHCHR more to increase awareness of its projects in
Bolivia.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Major Challenge: Pando Report
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


7. (C) Despite Racicot's relatively rosy characterizations of
the OHCHR's relationship with the Bolivian government, Post
is concerned the OHCHR is backing down from an earlier intent
to fully investigate human rights violations arising from the
September 2008 Pando conflict, in which an estimated 13 to 17
people died (Reftels A - D). While the office is doing a
scaled-back "analysis" of potential human rights violations,
according to Racicot, it has reduced its efforts
significantly and is relying on government-provided
information rather than doing its own formal investigation.


8. (C) Contrary to Racicot's claims, the UN had previously
planned to do a much tougher report. A source within the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) first told PolOff January 7
senior OHCHR officials were taking a more critical look at
the government's role in the violence and their version of
events (Reftel F). The MFA source said senior OHCHR
officials (i.e. outside of Bolivia) were displeased with the
Unasur report on Pando, had grilled the Bolivian UN
Ambassador in September meetings about the conflict, and
subsequently announced they were going to do their own
report.


9. (C) In a January 13 meeting with Charge, and PolOff, UN
Chief of Mission Yoriko Yasukawa confirmed that the UN report
was spurred by a need for a "deeper investigation" in the
Pando events than offered by Unasur report, noting the Unasur
effort "totally disqualified the opposition." Yasukawa said
both sides in the conflict were shamelessly picking and
choosing "parts of the conflict that favored them as the
victims" at the expense of the truth. She added that
although the UN report would differ from the Unasur report,
neither report should be considered "the last word" on the
subject. Yasukawa told us whenever the UN encountered two
conflicting versions of events and could not independently
determine which was correct, it would simply "highlight areas
of contention." Concerning the post-conflict arrests,
Yasukawa said the report would refrain from making
potentially counterproductive legal recommendations, as the
"Bolivian government has jurisdiction" over legal concerns,
but that it might emphasize in vague terms the need to

increase capacity in Bolivia,s judiciary, as the Unasur
report did.


10. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Legal Advisor Paula
Melendres (strictly protect) told PolOff January 24 that the
MFA had convinced the UN to give it an extension for comments
to the report by leveraging its review of UN officials tax
free status in Bolivia, which happened to be up for review.
She claimed Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca had called UN
Mission Chief Yasukawa during the second week of January to
tell her that the MFA would not be able to resolve the
tax-exempt status issue until after the January 25
constitutional referendum and if the review of the UN Pando
report could also wait until after the referendum. Yasukawa
apparently agreed.


11. (C) PolOff's meeting with Racicot January 26 confirmed
the impression that the report had been scaled back
considerably, but he added his own spin. Having recently
arrived, Racicot said the Pando analysis would be the
office's first report, but not a "true investigation." He
noted there were very specific rules to be followed,
especially for investigations, and that his office was still
unfamiliar with them. He noted that Unasur had a staff of 25
to 27 people and claimed they had deep technical experience
in such investigations, while his own office, while broadly
experienced, contained no more than five people and was not
equipped to do such work. Instead, he said his office had
done an analysis using the government prosecutor's
information. He said a first draft of the analysis was
delivered to the MFA during the Christmas season, but that
they had requested more time to review the draft. When
questioned, he confirmed the MFA still had the report a month
later and that he had yet to receive comments. (Note: By not
returning comments on the report, the government delayed its
publication until after the January 25 constitutional
referendum. End note.)


12. (C) Racicot said his office could contribute more by
focusing on the events after the Pando violence, specifically
the legally questionable detentions of then-Prefect Leopoldo
Fernandez and dozens of other Pandinos, many connected with
the opposition regional government or civic groups. He said
he thought their report would come out "in two or three
weeks," but could not be more specific. Racicot also
indicated his team would be more careful than the Unasur
team, especially in discussing the number of deaths that
occurred; he said they would rely on the number of documented
deaths, which was no more than 13, while Unasur reported 22
deaths. (Note: Since the January 26 meeting with Racicot,
local news media have reported at least three of the people
listed as dead in the Unasur report have re-appeared and are
very much alive. End note.)

- - - -
Comment
- - - -


13. (C) Just as in our October meeting with OHCHR staff,
Racicot seemed all too willing to accept government sources
and accounts at the expense of independent investigation in
order to maintain their "cordial" relationship. While our
discussion with Yasukawa gives us some hope the UN report
will provide an improvement to the Unasur report, per Reftel
F there appear to be conflicts regarding the content of the
report not just between the government and the UN, but also
between local OHCHR staff and their New York office. End
Comment.
URS